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ABSTRACT 
 
Current understanding of the post-9/11 US civil-military power relationship is clouded by the 
existence of various competing propositions as to whether civilian policymakers, military 
leaders or a combination of both have had the greatest influence in determining military 
strategy in Iraq. Motivated by the empirical and theoretical deficiencies of the post-9/11 US 
civil-military relations literature, this thesis traces the evolution of the shifting power 
relationship between civilian policymakers and military leaders in the formulation and 
implementation of US military strategy during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and explores the 
circumstances within which different balances of civil-military power occur. Using the 
policymaking process as an analytical framework, OIF is deconstructed into a series of decision 
points from 2001 to 2008 and the relative balance of civil-military power is identified at each 
according to one of five variations: Civilian Dominance; Shared Dominance Civilian; Shared 
Dominance; Shared Dominance Military; or Military Dominance. Using both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, the thesis tests and explores the importance of six 
independent variables in explaining variations in the relative balance of civil-military power: 
civil-military preference divergence; civilian assertiveness; military assertiveness; civilian unity; 
military unity; and information advantage. In presenting a comprehensive analysis of civil-
military power relations throughout OIF, the thesis offers a more nuanced response to the 
question of who controls US military strategy and demonstrates which independent variables 
hold the greatest potential for explaining variations in the relative balance of civil-military 
power. Analysis of the relationships between the dependent and independent variables 
reveals associations of varying strengths, thereby both confirming and challenging a number of 
the assumptions contained within the existing literature. By rooting contemporary research in 
the broader study of US civil-military relations, the thesis provides empirical clarity to the post-
9/11 period as well as offering theoretical insight into the civil-military relationship beyond the 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The rift between U.S. military and civilian leaders did not start with George W. Bush, but his 
administration’s meddling and disregard for military expertise have made it worse. The new 
defense secretary must restore a division of labor that gives soldiers authority over tactics and 
civilians authority over strategy - or risk discrediting civilian control of the military even 
further.’  
Michael C. Desch (2007), Bush and The Generals, Foreign Affairs, 86 (3), p97. 
 
‘After the invasion, the pattern that seems more apparent to me . . . is not that Rumsfeld is 
running roughshod over his generals; it’s that the secretary is actually relatively passive. . . The 
dominating role is held by the generals. . . And so the basic dynamic between Baghdad and 
Washington, in scores and scores of meetings, is Baghdad briefs; Washington listens.’ 
Philip Zelikow (2007), Interview by Frontline, PBS. 
 
Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the US-led coalition military operation in 
Iraq, US military strategy underwent significant change. From 2003 to 2008, US military 
strategy transformed from a highly offensive, enemy-centric approach emphasising speed and 
precision to a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy aimed at achieving a 
much more complex set of political and security related objectives. The decisions which 
determined this evolution were inevitably shaped by both the civilian policymakers and 
military leaders of the George W. Bush administration as the power to shape military strategy 
is shared between the civilian and military spheres; the constitutional principle of civilian 
control empowers civilian policymakers with the de jure authority to determine all military 
decision-making, while military leaders possess expertise regarding the exercise of military 
power as well as the ultimate responsibility for its implementation. However, despite renewed 
academic and political interest in civil-military relations in the post-9/11 period, the relative 
balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders in determining US military 
strategy in OIF remains unclear. As indicated by the two quotations above, current 
assessments are clouded by contrasting propositions as to whether civilian policymakers or 
military leaders have had the greatest influence in determining US military strategy. It is the 
aim of this thesis to add clarity and synthesis to our understanding of the civil-military power 
relationship during OIF through comprehensive empirical analysis and theoretical exploration.   
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THREE CONTRASTING PROPOSITIONS OF THE POST-9/11 CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER 
 
The contemporary literature on post-9/11 US civil-military relations contains varying 
propositions as to whether civilian policymakers or military leaders have had greater influence 
in shaping US military strategy as it evolved in OIF. Several commentators have argued that the 
balance of civil-military power lay too far in favour of the civilian policymakers of the George 
W. Bush administration. According to this interpretation, civilian policymakers intrusively 
involved themselves in areas of traditionally military prerogative (Herspring, 2005; Desch, 
2007; Korb, 2007) whilst frequently ignoring, side-lining or outright over-ruling professional 
military advice (Korb, 2007; Camancho and Hauser, 2007; Desch, 2007). Speaking out against 
the administration in 2006, Marine Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, Director of Operations 
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 2000 to 2002, described an ‘arrogant micromanagement 
that at times crippled the military’s effectiveness’ (2006, p31). As well as a result of 
overbearing civilian policymakers, this perceived civilian dominance over military strategy is 
also seen to have been facilitated by an overly acquiescent and compliant military leadership 
who failed to fully articulate their views or to appropriately contest civilian decisions which 
they opposed (Newbold, 2006; Ignatius, 2005; Margolick, 2007; Cook, 2008). Autonomous 
professional military advice and influence were, according to some, so degraded under the 
George W. Bush administration that calls were made for the next generation of military 
leaders to be willing and able to ‘push back’ (Ignatius, 2005) against the civilian leadership in 
order to restore a more equitable balance of civil-military power.  
 
Contrary to this civilian dominance argument, other sources within the post-9/11 literature 
describe a very different civil-military balance of power which affords military leaders far 
greater influence in shaping US military strategy. Philip Zelikow, a State Department appointee 
from 2005 to 2007, observed that, following the initial invasion, civilians policymakers 
‘delegated almost completely to the field . . . to write the strategy and to form the policy and 
then to tell Washington what the strategy is and what its requirements are’ (2007). Colonel 
Douglas MacGregor (Ret.), who acted in an advisory capacity to the Bush administration, 
similarly concluded that ‘the truth is I think Rumsfeld thought he was in charge, but I’m not 
sure that he ever was . . . what was happening on the ground was always very different to 
what he thought in the Pentagon’ (2007). Rather than demonstrating an intimate involvement 
in US military strategy, several commentators note a disengagement by civilian policymakers 
from the strategic and operational conduct of the war (MacGregor, 2007; Kaplan, 2008, Ricks, 
2006) and an associated failure to successfully exert control over both the military itself and 
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the course of US military strategy in Iraq (Kaplan, 2008; Kagan, 2007). According to this 
perspective, the problem was not one of civilian micromanagement, but rather that ‘the 
uniformed military . . . was given too much leeway to develop and execute the strategy in Iraq 
as it chose’ (Kagan, 2007).   
 
A third proposition regarding the relative balance of civil-military power in determining US 
military strategy in Iraq also emerges from the existing literature, asserting that military 
strategy was shaped, both in its entirety and at individual decision points, jointly by both 
civilian policymakers and military leaders. In their rebuttal of some of the criticisms of civil-
military relations under George W. Bush, Richard H. Kohn and former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Richard B. Myers (2007) highlighted key points of consensus 
between civilian policymakers and military leaders both in terms of the initial invasion plan 
and the occupation itself, further asserting that military advice was both provided and heard. 
Similarly, General Jack Keane (2007), who played an important advisory role in the 
management of the occupation of Iraq and the adoption of the surge strategy in 2007, 
suggests that the strategy pursued by the US in Iraq between 2004 and 2006 was very much a 
shared strategy between General John Abizaid, Commander of US Central Command 
(CENTCOM), the ground commander General George Casey, and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld. William Luti, a former Navy captain and Special Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy in the George W. Bush administration, also 
emphasised civil-military concurrence as a key shaping influence on US military strategy stating 
that ‘Critics claim Rumsfeld bullied the generals to think his way. That’s not what happened. 
Abizaid, Casey and Rumsfeld agreed with one another!’ (cited in West, 2009, p201).  
 
THE EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL EXIGENCIES OF POST-9/11 US CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
The relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders in 
determining US military strategy in OIF is at present unclear and the existing literature 
provides no means of reconciling the multiple, competing propositions contained therein. 
While such divergent views are inevitably the result of some normative disagreement between 
commentators regarding where the balance of power between civilian policymakers and 





Despite a significant amount of literature produced on the George W. Bush administration and 
the war in Iraq, there is currently no comprehensive study of civil-military decision-making 
within OIF. While numerous accounts of the US military intervention in Iraq (Ricks, 2006; West, 
2006, 2009; Mansoor, 2008; Gordon and Trainor, 2007) and of decision-making within the 
George W. Bush administration (Woodward, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008) have been published, the 
civil-military relationship is only irregularly addressed as part of these broader narratives. This 
is similarly the case with those sources whose specific focus is US military strategy (Metz, 
2008, 2010; Wright and Reese, 2008). While the emerging challenges of the twenty-first 
century have prompted a resurgence of interest in civil-military relations, books such as 
American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Nielson and Snider, 
2009) and The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century (Sarkesian and Connor, 
2006) consider a wide spectrum of issues facing contemporary civil-military relations, with only 
minimal empirical or theoretical contribution. The issue of who controls US military strategy 
has not therefore been a primary area of interest in the post-9/11 literature to date. Those 
interested in civil-military relations have not sought to identify whether civilian policymakers 
or military leaders have been most responsible for instigating and implementing the changes 
which US military strategy has undergone in the past decade, while those interested in military 
strategy have not considered how the distribution of civil-military power has shaped the 
creation and adoption of new warfighting concepts.  
 
For those sources which do directly consider the balance of power at the heart of post-9/11 
civil-military relations, as outlined in the opening paragraphs to the thesis, only a fragmented 
view of the civil-military relationship is provided as attention tends to be focused on a small 
number of particularly controversial and consequential decision points including the decisions 
to invade Iraq and the creation of the initial invasion plan, the failure to establish control in the 
immediate post-war period, and the 2007 decision to implement the surge. While these are all 
indeed crucial points in the evolution of US military strategy in OIF, such points of interest 
cannot automatically serve as being representative of the civil-military relationship over the 
course of the conflict as a whole. Current observations and arguments offered regarding the 
post-9/11 power relationship between civilian policymakers and military leaders are therefore 
at best only partially correct, and at worst, potentially misleading in their assertions.  
 
The discussion hereto has illustrated the need for a systematic empirical study of civil-military 
decision-making in OIF in order to determine how US military strategy in Iraq was shaped by 
the relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders. However, 
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beyond the demand for empirical clarity lies the broader issue of explanation; the need not 
only to identify how and when military strategy in Iraq was shaped by the civil-military power 
relationship, but also to explain why civilian policymakers or military leaders, or a fusion of 
both, are able to shape decision-making at any given point and why the relative balance of 
power between the two spheres may vary. The majority of post-9/11 literature has made little 
contribution to this important area of study, primarily being descriptive rather than theoretical 
in nature. As Joseph Collins (2010) has remarked, ‘Much of the recent analysis reads like a 
political version of People magazine with larger than life admirals and generals . . . jousting 
with cabinet officers and making “power plays”’ (p177).  
 
This deficit is reflective of a general under-development of civil-military relations theory, which 
for more than thirty years has been dominated by Samuel Huntington’s seminal work, The 
Soldier and The State, first published in 1957. As Peter Feaver (1999) has noted, Huntington’s 
paradigm remained dominant, critiqued but not surpassed, until the post-cold war period 
which saw a resurgence of interest in civil-military relations theory (Avant, 1993; Kohn, 1994; 
Dauber, 1998; Desch, 2001; Feaver, 2003; Schiff, 2004). These new avenues of explanation 
including structural theories, institutionalism and principal-agent models, discussed in further 
detail in Chapter Two, were largely advanced through the application of concepts, frameworks 
and ideas drawn from other, diverse areas of political science (Feaver, 1999). However, as 
explanation via a clearly articulated theoretical framework has not been a primary driving 
force of the study of civil-military relations, US civil-military relations theory is, as a result, a 
somewhat fragmented body of work with little in the way of collective theory building or 
focused theory testing. The development and progression of the theory of civil-military 
relations yet again appears to have waned somewhat in the twenty-first century with limited 
theoretical development and even fewer applications to post-9/11 civil-military relations. 
Given the importance of the civil-military relationship for both effective policymaking and as a 
key concern of democratic governance, the paucity of civil-military relations theory is 
lamentable. 
 
FUNCTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC IMPERATIVES OF US CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
 
The US civil-military relationship has two key imperatives, a functional imperative aimed at 
effectively safeguarding the nation’s security (Huntington, 1985) and a democratic imperative 
(Feaver, 2003) which requires ultimate civilian authority over the armed forces. The 
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importance of both of these concerns ensures that civil-military relations remain an issue of 
perennial significance.  
 
Civil-military relations are at the nexus of decision-making in a variety of highly consequential 
areas of US policy, but its function is perhaps most overtly crucial during times of war when 
‘decisions about whether and how to use military power . . . may be the most fateful a state 
makes’ (Art, 1999, p4). In producing military strategy, civilian policymakers and military leaders 
bear the responsibility for synchronising political and military resources in the effective pursuit 
of political objectives. The roots of strategic failure, both at the national and theatre levels, are 
often the direct result of deficiencies within the civil-military relationship and such linkages 
have already been made regarding OIF by authors such as Hew Strachan (2006), Colin Gray 
(2009) and Mackubin Thomas Owens (2011). A central concern of the functional imperative of 
civil-military relations is the relative balance of power between the two spheres. Whether 
civilian policymakers or military leaders have greater influence in decision-making can have 
profound ramifications on policy outcomes; consider General Douglas MacArthur’s potential 
impact on the course of the war in Korea had he not been removed from office by President 
Harry Truman in 1951 or the conduct of the ground war in Vietnam if the US military had not 
resisted President John F. Kennedy’s earlier efforts to establish greater COIN capabilities in the 
US Army in the early 1960s. The significance of the civil-military relationship in determining the 
outcomes of decision-making makes it an issue of paramount importance in US policymaking. 
As Christopher Gibson (2009) notes, ‘Functional civil-military relations do not guarantee 
successful policy outcomes, but dysfunction in this critical area is sure to produce incomplete 
options and ineffective outcomes’ (p239). 
 
Despite its importance, the functional imperative of civil-military relations is often over-
shadowed by the relevance of the relationship to the democratic enterprise (Feaver, 2003) 
which proportionately receives far more public and scholarly attention. Securing the 
subordination of military forces to political control is one of the oldest problems of governance 
(Kohn, 1999). The principle of civilian control articulated in the US Constitution places the 
armed forces under civilian authority to safeguard against the potential threat of excessive 
military influence and to retain decision-making power in the hands of those accountable to 
the electorate. While historically the primary threat was considered to be that posed by the 
coercive power of the military, in the contemporary context the concern is rather ‘the 
influence, both formal and informal, of the military relative to other groups within society, 
particularly those civilian groups responsible for control of the military’ (Huntington, 1985, 
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p82). While there is little threat of a direct seizure of political power by military leaders in the 
US, as legitimate participants in the policymaking process military representatives nonetheless 
have the potential to shape and influence the processes and outcomes of decision-making, 
thereby potentially corroding, if not directly usurping, civilian authority. The extent to which 
military leaders determine decision-making vis-a-vis civilian policymakers is therefore of 
persistent concern in determining the strength, efficacy and boundaries of the essential 
democratic principle of civilian control.  
 
A NEW ERA OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS? 
 
While the central issues addressed in this thesis are of perennial interest, the particular 
contemporary relevance of this study is highlighted by the challenges and changes in the 
domestic and international environments brought about by 9/11. Though there are some who 
see a greater degree of continuity between the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras in terms of 
civil-military relations (Hooker, 2003), there is a growing debate as to whether the emerging 
challenges of the post-9/11 period are bringing to bear substantive changes to the ways in 
which civilian policymakers and the military interact in the contemporary environment, 
potentially portending ‘a future greatly unlike the past’ (Foster, 2005, p91).  
 
One of the most anticipated sources of change for civil-military relations is the altered source 
of threat in the international system and the corresponding changes in warfare. The 
‘profoundly political, intensely local and protracted’ (Cronin, 2008, p1) nature of irregular wars 
such as those waged in Afghanistan and Iraq raise new questions over how military and civilian 
leaders should each contribute to military strategy, further blurring the already indistinct 
boundaries between the civilian and military spheres. Thomas Hammes has noted that ‘the 
primary characteristic of fourth generation warfare is that it is a political and not military 
struggle’ (2012, p273), meaning that US military leaders must increasingly integrate economic, 
social, religious and political factors into their advisory and decision-making roles to a greater 
degree than ever before. Changes in US Army doctrine already reflect such a shift as a result of 
the combat operations faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. A 2005 Department of Defense (DOD) 
directive stated that ‘Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department 
of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable 
to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities 
including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, facilities, and planning’ (FM3-07 US Army, 2008, pvi). It is not unreasonable to 
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assume that such changes may have a significant impact on both the scope of military 
influence and the behaviour of military leaders within the context of civil-military relations, 
particularly if civilian agencies and departments do not equally seek to advance their own 
capacity and expertise in such areas (Foster, 2005). As Gregory Foster (2005) suggests, ‘there is 
every reason to believe that a military whose purpose is something other than warfighting 
would be a qualitatively different military’ (p97). 
 
While issues of control and influence are relevant regardless of time and thus ensure a certain 
degree of continuity in the civil-military relationship, the new challenges that have arisen as a 
result of the domestic and international changes following 9/11 suggest that US civil-military 
relations in the twenty-first century may well be subject to important changes. A recent 
conference held by the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the US Army War College 
(Moselle, 2008) concluded that contemporary civil-military relations face a complex 
combination of traditional and novel problems. Just as the end of the Cold War precipitated 
significant changes in how civilians and the military interacted, so it can be anticipated that the 
period following the defining security event for the US of this century to date may have similar 
import in changing the parameters and patterns of how civilians and the military work 
together. However, without clear empirical evidence, a systematic methodological approach 
and insightful theory, identifying or predicting shifts within the civil-military power relationship 




In light of the preceding discussion, the research aim of this thesis is two-fold. The first aim is 
to redress the empirical deficiency regarding the civil-military power relationship in OIF. In 
order to be able to identify the pattern of civil-military control of military strategy this thesis 
identifies eighty-nine decision points within the formulation and implementation OIF, from the 
initial decision to include Iraq on the post-9/11 national security agenda in late 2001 through 
to the drawdown of US troops in mid-2008, with a particular focus on the evolution of land-
based military strategy. The relative balance of power between civilian policymakers within 
the executive branch and senior military leaders is determined at each decision point and 
coded as one of five different possible civil-military power dynamics: Civilian Dominance, 
Shared Dominance Civilian, Shared Dominance, Shared Dominance Military, and Military 
Dominance. Coding each of the eighty-nine decision points according to one of these five 
variations allows the thesis to present the varying pattern of civil-military power relations 
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throughout the conflict in Iraq and enables systematic conclusions to be drawn as to whether 
civilian policymakers or military leaders had the greatest impact on determining US military 
strategy in OIF. 
 
The second aim of this thesis is to theoretically explore the circumstances under which each of 
the five variations of the civil-military balance of power occur. Six independent variables which 
have potential import in explaining the relative balance of civil-military power are identified 
and tested: the degree of preference divergence between civilian policymakers and military 
leaders, the respective levels of civilian and military assertiveness, civilian unity, military unity, 
and the relative balance of information and expertise between the two spheres. These 
variables are drawn from existing studies of civil-military relations, both empirical and 
theoretical, and are consistently identified as being important in determining control. The 
independent variables are coded for each of the eighty-nine decision points identified for OIF 
and the resultant data set is used to test the importance of each of the six independent 
variables in explaining the relative balance of power between senior civilian policymakers and 
military leaders, using both qualitative and quantitative methods.  
 
POST-9/11 CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: THE NEED FOR SYNTHESIS 
 
While each of the three propositions identified within the existing literature, outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter, are proven to be valid to a certain extent, this thesis will ultimately 
demonstrate the need for a more balanced and nuanced conclusion to the question of who 
controls US military strategy. The analysis of the relative balance of civil-military power during 
OIF will show that while military leaders determined the outcomes of the greatest number of 
decision points, civilian policymakers nonetheless had a crucial impact at key points in the 
evolution of US military strategy which must be acknowledged. This dual civil-military 
influence is not, however, indicative of a synchronous exercise of power as US military strategy 
in OIF was predominantly shaped by either civilian policymakers or military leaders. Rather, 
analysis reveals a fluctuating power relationship and a significant degree of civil-military 
separation in the formulation and implementation of US military strategy.  
 
The theoretical element of the thesis will demonstrate that four out of the six independent 
variables tested display explanatory promise in determining the relative balance of civil-
military power. Civil-military preference divergence, civilian assertiveness, civilian unity and 
information advantage all show moderate to strong correlations with the dependent variable, 
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therefore demonstrating potential in a more formal, multivariate theoretical model. Analysis 
will also reveal that the two military-specific variables, military assertiveness and military 
unity, demonstrate no consistent correlational relationship with the dependent variable. The 
results of analysis therefore confirm some theoretical assumptions contained within the 
broader civil-military relations literature regarding the expected performance of the 
independent variables, but challenge others. The thesis concludes that the relative balance of 
civil-military power within OIF was determined to a far greater extent by the civilian and 
mutual variables rather than those variables which explicitly reflect military attributes and 
behaviours.   
  
In responding to the primary research aims outlined above, this thesis makes a number of 
contributions to our understanding of the civil-military relationship during OIF and to the 
broader study of civil-military relations. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive and systematic 
study of US civil-military relations in OIF which enables the thesis to draw representative 
conclusions regarding the relative balance of civil-military power during this period. The 
analysis redresses many empirical imbalances and inaccuracies of the existing literature, 
providing a more robust foundation for appropriate recommendations relevant for both the 
study and practice of civil-military relations. Although the conclusions of the research are 
inevitably only directly reflective of OIF, the thesis nonetheless demonstrates its relevance to 
the wider study of civil-military relations by challenging many of the theoretical assumptions 
contained within the existing literature and by revealing new insights into the import and 
impact of key aspects of the civil-military relationship. While the thesis itself is limited to 
bivariate testing between the dependent and independent variables, such a study lays a 
foundation for the future development of civil-military relations theory and the potential for a 
new multivariate theoretical model for explaining the relative balance of civil-military power.  
 
OUTLINE OF THESIS 
 
Chapter Two sets the post-9/11 civil-military relationship within its historical and 
contemporary contexts and discusses the key issues of concern within the study of civil-
military relations, including a discussion and critique of the existing civil-military relations 
literature and a critical assessment of the current state of civil-military relations theory. 
Chapter Three acts as a bridging chapter between Chapters Two and Four, continuing the 
discussion of the existing literature, but with specific reference to the dependent and 
independent variables employed within this study. Chapter Four articulates the research 
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design and methodology for the thesis, justifying the multi-strategy research design 
incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods, describing how OIF is broken down 
into its individual decision points, and outlining the processes for collecting and managing data 
during the research process. Chapter Four also explains how the dependent variable and the 
six independent variables are operationalised and the measurement and coding processes for 
each. Chapters Five and Six provide the results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses, 
examining the performances of the dependent variable and the independent variables 
respectively. The final chapter, Chapter Seven, synthesises the findings of the thesis and draws 
out the implications of the conclusions for the study and practice of civil-military relations, as 
well as providing some reflective commentary on the contributions and limitations of the 























In seeking to identify and explain the relative balance of power between civilian policymakers 
and military leaders in formulating and implementing US military strategy during OIF, this 
thesis builds on an existing body of literature exploring the various empirical, conceptual and 
theoretical aspects of US civil-military relations. Chapter Two sets the study of the thesis 
within this broader context, divided into three sections. The first section provides historical 
context by examining the locus of the relative balance of power of civil-military power during 
the Cold War and post-Cold War periods and exposes the need for further empirical research 
into the post-9/11 period. The second section of the chapter examines the dominant 
approaches to the study of civil-military relations and challenges the preoccupation with 
civilian control as the central issue of US civil-military power relations. The third section of the 
chapter provides a critical evaluation of the major contemporary theories of US civil-military 
relations.   
 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL-MILITARY POWER RELATIONS  
 
While relations between civilians and the military have been of primary concern since the 
genesis of the American nation, the contemporary form of the relationship has arguably only 
emerged since the end of World War II which not only saw the elevation of the US into 
superpower status, but also ‘changed the role of the military and brought it into a more 
complex and closer relationship to policy decisions and strategy formulation affecting the 
military institution’ (Sarkesian and Connor, 2006, pp57-58). Prior to 1945, the influence of the 
military on policymaking was limited. No proper standing army existed and US forces 
predominantly consisted of citizen, rather than professional, soldiers. As the military expanded 
both in size and significance in response to the changing international security environment of 
the mid to late twentieth century, so its role in policymaking also grew. With the successive 
creation of agencies and institutions as a result of the National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949, 
the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, the military’s participation in the political process was formalised 
into its modern role.  
 
The prevailing consensus of the Cold War period is that, despite some notable occasions of 
military dominance, civilian policymakers reigned on issues regarding the use of force (Betts, 
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1991; Feaver, 2003; Hooker, 2003; Desch, 2001). In a study of major civil-military conflicts of 
the Cold War, Michael Desch (2001) determined that between 1945 and 1986, civilian 
preferences prevailed over military preferences in thirty out of thirty-five cases of civil-military 
decision-making (pp136-138). While Desch’s study to some extent inevitably sacrifices depth 
for breadth (the ten year conflict in Vietnam for example is reduced to two decisions), his 
study demonstrates that, on a variety of issues throughout various applications of US power 
over the duration of the Cold War period, civilian policymakers of successive administrations 
were largely able to determine the key questions of whether and how military force should be 
used. Richard Betts (1991) also concludes from his study of Cold War crises that ‘military 
professionals rarely have dominated decisions on the use of force’ (p5). Despite a prevalence 
of civilian dominance, civilian policymakers nonetheless struggled at times to ensure that their 
preferences were realised, as evidenced in the two major conflicts of the period, the Korean 
(1950-1953) and Vietnam (1965-1975) wars. 
  
In the Korean War, fundamental civil-military differences over the objectives of the conflict 
and the strategy of waging a limited war tested the bounds of civilian authority. The 
commanding general, General Douglas MacArthur, engaged in persistent efforts to escape 
restrictions on military action beyond the 38th parallel and to expand the objectives of the war 
to the reunification of Korea regardless of the broader political consequences within the Cold 
War security environment. Resisting what he saw as ‘unwarranted political interference in his 
command’ (Herspring, 2005, p77), MacArthur took unauthorised actions regarding the conduct 
of the war and violated instructions from President Harry Truman. Faced with a recalcitrant 
general and the threat of an expanding war, civilian control over military strategy in Korea was 
only re-established through MacArthur’s removal from command in April 1951.   
 
Policymaking for the war in Vietnam was rife with civil-military problems and is commonly 
seen as the nadir of contemporary US civil-military relations. Deep mutual suspicions and 
enmity between civilian policymakers and military leaders caused civilian policymakers to 
disparage military advice (McMaster, 1997), while endemic communication failures prevented 
military leaders and civilian policymakers from reconciling a fundamental divergence over war 
strategy. For civilians the gradualist approach was a sophisticated strategy of measured 
response aimed to communicate American resolve to the North Vietnamese. For military 
leaders, however, this approach created a war of half-measures which lay waste to American 
lives and resources. As General William Westmoreland argued, ‘bomb a little bit, stop it a 
while to give the enemy a chance to cry uncle, then bomb a bit more but never enough to 
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hurt. That’s no way to win a war’ (cited in Buley, 2008, p69). While excessive civilian control 
would become an enduring theme in explanations as to why the US lost the war in Vietnam, 
control of US military strategy was more complicated than this simple explanation suggests. 
Although civilian policymakers were intimately involved in the conduct of the air war, with 
President Lyndon Johnson famously selecting targets, ‘When it became clear to the Chiefs that 
they were to have little influence on the policy-making process . . . they attempted to work 
within that strategy in order to remove over time the limitations to further action’ (McMaster, 
1997, p328) and restrictions on the air war were gradually reduced. Military leaders also faced 
far fewer civilian constraints in determining and implementing the initial ‘search and destroy’ 
strategy on the ground or the subsequent counterinsurgency pacification strategy. The Army’s 
pursuit of a ground war of attrition against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and the failure 
to develop an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy led some to conclude that, despite 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s broader efforts to establish greater civilian control 
over the uniformed military, military leaders were ultimately given ‘too much leeway rather 
than too little’ (Kinnard, 1980, p110) in the formulation of US military strategy in Vietnam.  
  
The end of the Cold War saw a shift in the civil-military distribution of power which several 
scholars have argued resulted in an unprecedented level of military influence in policymaking 
and an erosion of civilian control (Weigley, 1993; Kohn, 1994; Gibson and Snider, 1999; Feaver, 
2003). In contrast to the civilian supremacy of the Cold War period, Desch’s (2001) study of 
major civil-military conflicts found that out of twelve cases of decision-making examined from 
1990 to 1997, civilians prevailed in only four (p138). The post-Cold War period witnessed a 
number of US interventions, many of which reflected a notable military influence. During the 
1991 Gulf War, CJCS Colin Powell ‘played a crucial role in both defining the response to the 
Iraqi aggression and the criteria for ending the war’ (Johnson, 1997, p49). Military leaders 
subsequently resisted military involvement in Bosnia (1994-1995) (Halberstram, 2003) and 
Haiti (1994-1995) (Desch, 2001) and only agreed to send troops to Somalia (1991-1993) as a 
means of ‘not sending troops to Bosnia, a place that, as far as [Powell] was concerned, was far 
more dangerous’ (Halberstram, 2003, p251). According to Desch (2001) ‘military foot-dragging 
on direct intervention in Bosnia forced civilians in the Clinton administration to delay plans for 
a larger U.S. military role . . . until conditions met the military’s terms for going in’ (p32).  
 
For both personal and political reasons, President Bill Clinton faced an almost unceasing series 
of challenges in his relationship with the military throughout the 1990s. As described by 
Richard Kohn (2002), ‘no president was ever as reviled by the professional military . . . as Bill 
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Clinton. Conversely, no administration ever treated the military with more fear and deference 
on the one hand, and indifference and neglect on the other, as the Clinton administration’ 
(p10). However, beyond the idiosyncrasies of the Clinton administration’s management of the 
armed forces, three broader factors help explain this apparent shift towards greater military 
influence in the post-Cold War period: the legacy of Vietnam, the formulation and adoption of 
the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.  
 
The ‘traumatic experience’ (Feaver, 2003, p171) of Vietnam cast a long shadow over both US 
foreign policy and civil-military relations, spurring a more assertive military influence on US 
policymaking regarding the use of force. Motivated by their ‘obsession with lost autonomy’ 
(Betts, 1977, p11) military leaders became more protective of their institutions and more 
conservative in their views regarding the use of US military power (Petraeus, 1989), while 
civilian leaders became somewhat more sensitised to intrusive methods of civilian control. 
Brent Scrowcroft captures this effect in his description of President George H.W. Bush during 
the Persian Gulf War, stating how ‘The President was torn. He did not want to appear to be 
second-guessing the military experts. Sill vivid in his mind was the image of Lyndon Johnson 
during Vietnam, hunched over aerial charts selecting individual targets for air strikes’ (Bush 
and Scrowcroft, 1999, p466).  
 
The Weinberger-Powell doctrine was also, in part, a response to the war in Vietnam. First 
outlined by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984 and further elaborated by Colin 
Powell in the early 1990s, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine embodied a set of principles which 
sought to prescribe specific criteria governing the use of US military power as a foreign policy 
tool.1 Although by no means ubiquitously accepted, the principles of the Weinberger-Powell 
doctrine became highly influential in shaping the US military interventions of the late 1980s 
and 1990s, including those in Panama (1989), the Gulf War (1991), and Bosnia (1994-1995). 
The creation and adoption of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine facilitated an increase in military 
influence as it essentially held the political use of military power subject to the fulfillment of 
certain military conditions. According to Edward Luttwak, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine 
enabled the military an ‘effective veto power . . . over intervention decisions’ (cited in Johnson, 
1993, p63), thereby restricting the freedom of civilian policymakers to use military force as and 
when they chose.   
                                                 
1 The Weinberger-Powell doctrine asserted that US military interventions should be vital to the national 
interest and that once deployed, troops should be fully supported. Military engagements also required 
clearly defined political objectives with military action having the support of the American public and 
Congress (Rosati, 2004).   
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The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act had a significant impact on the military and its role in US 
foreign policy (Rosati, 2004). Prior to the changes brought about by the 1986 Goldwater-
Nichols Act, the effectiveness of the JCS as a decision-making body was impaired by intra-
service rivalry and a ‘cumbersome committee process’ (Jones, cited in Reardon, 2012, p450). 
Goldwater-Nichols enabled the development of a more efficient Joint Staff, but also a more 
influential one, by elevating the CJCS to principle military advisor to the president, the National 
Security Council (NSC) and the secretary of defense, and centralising operational authority for 
command through the CJCS, as opposed to the individual service chiefs. According to Reardon 
(2012), the upshot of changes made to the organisation and activities of the JCS as a result of 
Goldwater-Nichols created a ‘more visible, active, and aggressive Joint Staff with 
institutionalized influence placing it on a par with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], the 
State Department, the CIA, and other established agencies in the policy process’ (p482).  
 
With an enhanced institutional role in policymaking and greater military assertiveness, civil-
military relations during the post-Cold War period were considered by some to be in crisis. In 
an article entitled ‘Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations’, Richard Kohn (1994) 
lamented that ‘the US military is now more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any 
time in American history, and more vocal about it’ (p3). Kohn (2002) subsequently argued that 
the US military had grown ‘in influence to the point of being able to impose its own 
perspectives on many policies and decisions’ (p9). While Kohn’s charge of a ‘crisis’ in civil-
military relations was considered by some to be overplayed (Hooker, 2003), there remains an 
evident consensus within the literature regarding a qualitative shift in the relative balance of 
civil-military power between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods towards greater military 
influence.  
 
Existing studies which have sought to identify the civil-military power dynamic and trace its 
evolution over time reveal a fluid balance of power, one which not only varies in broad 
pendulum swings, but also at a much more immediate level; the relative balance of power 
shifted from the military to civilians during the war in Korea, from civilians to the military 
during the Vietnam War and oscillated between civilian policymakers and the military during 
the 1990s. Unfortunately, deficiencies in the scope and depth of research as yet carried out 
into post-9/11 US civil-military decision-making currently prevent us from being able to 
determine the continuation of the trajectory of the civil-military power relationship into the 




CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
 
The post-9/11 period to date has presented a highly challenging environment for civil-military 
relations. Although George W. Bush entered the presidency in 2000 with limited foreign policy 
goals, pledging to restore a clear military mission based on traditional US national security 
interests, within a matter of months the US had launched a controversial ‘War on Terror’ 
involving two unconventional, asymmetric wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Simultaneously to 
this, the Bush administration was engaged in an ambitious defense transformation agenda 
with a view to transforming the US military into a lighter, more agile and technologically 
advanced force to reflect the changing demands of the international security environment of 
the twenty-first century.2 The US military therefore essentially underwent two transformations 
during the George W. Bush administration, one prompted by an official defense 
transformation agenda and the other demanded by the exigencies of the insurgent wars which 
evolved in both Afghanistan and Iraq for which US forces were neither doctrinally nor 
strategically prepared for (Wright and Reese, 2008). 
 
In the pursuit of both defense transformation and the exercise of US military power, Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld adopted a highly assertive approach to managing a military 
establishment he viewed as having become too independent and autonomous under President 
Clinton (Rumsfeld, 2011). Given the ambitiousness of the transformation agenda and the 
inevitable bureaucratic resistance to change, Rumsfeld saw firm civilian control as an essential 
means of galvanising the Pentagon, ‘an institution that moved with all the speed and dexterity 
of a half-million-ton oil tanker’ (Rumsfeld, 2011, p294), into transformative action. Rumsfeld 
therefore immediately set about recalibrating the balance of civil-military power in the 
Pentagon, directly intervening on issues of military personnel, force structure, weapons and 
budgets (Herspring, 2005). Rumsfeld achieved some initial successes in exerting civilian 
dominance on issues of transformation, cancelling the Army’s Crusader project and cutting the 
Comanche helicopter programme in half (Herspring, 2005), but faced such intense resistance 
from the military on some fronts, that there were early speculations in the press that the 
                                                 
2
 For further details on the defense transformation agenda within the George W. Bush administration 
see: the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), available from 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf; Donald Rumsfeld’s (2002) article ‘Transforming the 
Military’, Foreign Affairs, 81 (3), pp20-32; Paul C. Light’s (2005) Policy Brief #142 for The Brookings 
Institution, ‘Rumsfeld’s Revolution at Defense’, available from: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2005/07/governance-light; and Max Boot’s (2005) article 




Secretary of Defense would be the first civilian policymaker within the Bush administration to 
leave office (Stevenson, 2006).  
 
The deleterious impact of these collective challenges is evident within the contemporary 
literature which has primarily depicted a dysfunctional civil-military relationship, described as 
corrosive (Moselle, 2008), on the verge of crisis (Kohn, 2008) and in need of repair (Sewall and 
White, 2009). Scholarly attention has also generally concluded that the poor state of post-9/11 
civil-military relations has had a detrimental effect on one of the relationship’s primary 
functional purposes, the formulation and implementation of military strategy (Ricks, 2008; 
Hoffman, 2008; Desch, 2007). In the search for accountability, explanations for the problems 
of US civil-military relations and the failures of military strategy in Iraq have been diversely 
attributed to overly assertive civilians (Desch, 2007), weak (Newbold, 2006) or incompetent 
(Yingling, 2007) military leaders, or ineffective presidential management styles (Kagan, 2007). 
Despite the differences, all are inevitably rooted in a discourse of power and a civil-military 
relationship which is in some way out-of-balance. However, without a comprehensive and 
focused study of the period in question, we are unable to determine the appropriate 
restoratives to improve the civil-military performance in policymaking.  
 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MILITARY 
STRATEGY 
 
Traditional understandings of how the civil-military relationship functions in relation to the 
formulation and implementation of military strategy centre on divisions of labour and clear 
distinctions between civilian and military spheres. The notion that politics and administration 
are separable activities determines specific areas of responsibility and establishes clear 
domains of civilian and military dominance; civilians formulate policy, the military implements 
it. The epitome of this ‘normal theory’ (Cohen, 2001) of civil-military relations is Samuel 
Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1985), which has framed much of the subsequent 
discourse on civil-military relations in the US. Huntington (1985) prescribed a distribution of 
power based on a division of labour according to the relative areas of expertise of civilians and 
the military, which he termed as ‘Objective Civilian Control’. Huntington’s paradigm asserted 
that while civilian ascendancy over the political aspects of war necessitated that the military 
remained apolitical, ‘the integrity of the [military] profession and its subject matter’ (1985, 
p72) meant that the military had a legitimate area of authority in operational and tactical 
matters. As Eliot Cohen (2001) notes, ‘a theory of civil-military relations contains within it a 
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theory of strategy’ (p432) and, accordingly, control has traditionally been seen to vary across 
the composite dimensions of military strategy, with civilians dominating the setting of 
objectives and the allocation of resources and the military dominating in terms of the 
operational paradigm. As stated by Huntington (1985), ‘this is indeed the meaning of military 
strategy in relation to policy’ (p72). While notions of a strict division of labour continue to hold 
sway both within the military and the scholarly communities even into the twenty-first 
century, the reality of how civilian policymakers and military leaders interact within the 
policymaking process is much more complicated than this simple separation suggests.  
 
There is no established formula for devising military strategy (Murray and Grimsley, 1994) and 
decisions are made by and between civilian policymakers and military leaders in an on-going 
policymaking process as in any other realm of public policymaking (Gelb and Halperin, 1972; 
Kozak, 1998; Szayna et al., 2007). The principle of civilian control, as outlined in the US 
Constitution, gives civilian the de jure right to intervene in any area of military activity. Civilian 
policymakers, across administrations, have utilised this right, determining various aspects of 
US military strategy. From applying a strategy of graduated pressure in Vietnam to operations 
with a light footprint in Afghanistan, civilian policymakers have involved themselves in the 
details of formulating and implementing US military strategy and have successfully imposed 
their preferences on how military force is applied. For their part, military leaders are rarely 
able to extricate themselves from the political considerations of war and, much like other 
institutional entities within a pluralistic policymaking process, have their own motivating 
interests. Despite the dominance of traditional understandings of the apolitical soldier, as 
Richard Hooker (2003) states, ‘the absence of the US military from the politics of policy is, and 
always has been, largely a myth’ (p11). The blurring of civilian and military roles and 
boundaries within the policymaking process renders the relative balance of power much more 
complex as their respective spheres of influence often converge.  
 
The sharing of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders and unclear divisions 
of labour have given rise to different approaches to studying the civil-military relationship. The 
majority of studies involve an axiomatic separation between civilian policymakers and military 
leaders, conceptualising the two as disparate groups; indeed, differentiation is inherent within 
the very term ‘civil-military relations’, suggesting interaction between two separate and 
distinct spheres (Feaver, 2003). This dichotomous approach stems from the recognition that 
there are fundamental, ‘irreducible’ (Feaver 2003, p58) differences between civilian 
policymakers and military leaders in terms of values, interests, cultures, roles and 
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responsibilities. Such differences are seen to imbue the two spheres with such ‘different 
perspectives and different requirements’ (Kohn, 2008, p71) so as to demand clear conceptual 
distinctions between uniformed members of the armed forces and civilians in government.   
 
There are those, however, who contest the utility of interpreting the civil-military relationship 
in this way, preferring a fusionist approach which acknowledges and embraces the shared 
characteristics and activities of civilian policymakers and military leaders often evidenced in 
the policymaking process. In their study of the role of senior military leaders in the formulation 
of national security policy, Peter Roman and David Tarr (2001) argue that ‘traditional civil-
military distinctions fail to capture the range of expertise and leadership that are brought 
together in national security deliberations’ (p405). They suggest instead that the blurring of 
the military’s role as advisor with that of policymaker, intra-military and intra-civilian 
differences, as well as the unifying effect of the national security policymaking institutions and 
processes, renders the civil-military dichotomy less useful in understanding the complexities of 
decision-making (Roman and Tarr, 2001). Despite the appeal more fusionist approaches have 
demonstrated to some scholars of civil-military relations, this thesis maintains the traditional 
approach of a conceptual and analytical separation between civilian policymakers and military 
leaders, concurring with Peter Feaver’s (1999) assertion that fusionism ‘overreaches by 
confusing overlap between the functions of the civilian and military spheres with a merging of 
the spheres themselves’ (p250). While civilian policymakers and military leaders share many of 
the demands of policymaking and may even share views, expertise or interests, two 
fundamental differences remain to justify analytic distinction. Firstly, civilian policymakers and 
military leaders are not equals within the policymaking process and the clear hierarchy 
governing the relationship ultimately demands military subordination to civilian authority. 
Secondly, the blurring of roles and responsibilities is not absolute and will always cease at the 
actual implementation of policy as it remains the sole purpose of the military to fight and and 
win the nation’s wars (Sarkesian and Connor, 2006).  
 
THE PRIMACY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL 
 
Reflecting both the tendency towards bipartite analysis of civil-military relations and the 
significance of the hierarchical nature of the relationship is the existing literature’s 
preoccupation with civilian control as the primary means of studying civil-military power 
relations. Given its importance to fundamental principles of democratic governance, 
evaluating the state and strength of civilian control has been the primary focus of numerous 
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scholars in order to determine whether or not this essential principle of civil-military relations 
is robust or under threat (Desch, 2007; Feaver, 2003; Kohn, 1994, 2002, 2008). However, the 
definitional, operational and normative problems associated with the concept of civilian 
control do not make it the best dependent variable to study when seeking to determine how 
power is shared and distributed between the civilian and military spheres. 
 
What civilian control means in terms of defining and explaining how an interdependent but 
hierarchical relationship actually operates in a pluralist political process has been a matter of 
much academic debate. This is in no small part due to the fact that the Constitution is of very 
little use in terms of managing the contemporary civil-military relationship (Huntington, 1956). 
Contemporary civil-military relations are the product of evolution rather than specific 
prescription as the mechanisms, norms and regulations of civil-military interaction have 
unfolded over time, changing as the context has altered from the eighteenth to the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries. The US Constitution therefore provides only minimal structure and 
guidance in terms of how civilians and the military are to interact in the policymaking process. 
Different scholars use different definitions of civilian control which suggest different 
interpretations of the civil-military relationship. Compare, for example, James Burk’s (2002) 
description of civilian control, ‘whether (or to what degree) uniformed military elites follow 
the commands of civilian political elites’ (p7), with Richard Hooker’s (2003) assertion that 
civilian control equates to ‘the degree to which the military’s civilian masters can enforce their 
authority on the military services’ (p4). While both definitions clearly reflect the hierarchy of 
the civil-military relationship, each reflects different underlying assumptions about the sources 
of civilian control; one seems to place the emphasis on the military’s obedience to civilian 
instruction, while the other seems to focus on the importance of civilian assertiveness in 
ensuring control.  
 
Similar differences in opinion also emerge over the parameters of civilian control. Richard 
Kohn (1997) states that ‘in principle, civilian control is absolute and all-encompassing: no 
decision or responsibility falls to the military unless expressly or implicitly delegated to it by 
civilian leaders’ (p142). This remains the case no matter what the context or the decisions at 
hand. Peter Feaver (2003) shares a similarly expansive view of civilian control stating that 
‘regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. 
Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what they really want. In other words, 
civilians have a right to be wrong’ (p6). In this particular conception, the democratic imperative 
of ensuring that civilian preferences dominate in military decision-making is supreme, 
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regardless of the possible consequences for the functional imperative of the relationship. As 
Charles Stevenson (2006) notes, ‘the dirty secret about democracy is that its test is fairness 
and faithful observance of the rules, not the wisdom or justice of the outcomes’ (p1). 
However, given the interdependent nature of civil-military relations, particularly when it 
comes to formulating and implementing military strategy, the strict normative conception of 
civilian control becomes complicated and gives rise to concerns about the practicalities 
involved in conducting warfare where civilians have absolute civilian control. As with any 
delegation of responsibility based on expertise, military leaders require a certain amount of 
freedom of operation in order to be able to execute their duties effectively.  
 
Variations in the definitions and parameters of civilian control mean that subjective normative 
influences often play a significant role in analyses of the civil-military relationship. As Richard 
Betts (1991) observes, ‘whether professional soldiers have too much influence or too little . . . 
depends on one’s political preferences’ (pxv). The potentially distorting impact of normative 
influences on assessments of civil-military power relations is evident within the debate over 
the ‘crisis’ in civil-military relations which emerged during the post-Cold War period. Given 
Kohn’s (1994) strict normative understanding, he is inevitably far more susceptible to 
identifying corrosions in civilian control than others with a more flexible understanding of the 
term. For example, in contrast to Kohn, Richard Hooker (2003) concludes from his assessment 
that, contrary to being the cause of a crisis, the US military has instead participated 
‘appropriately in defense and national security policymaking with due deference to the 
principle of civilian control’ (p4). Assessments of the relative balance of civil-military power can 
therefore be dramatically affected by the normative positions of the observer regarding the 
boundaries of the role of the military in policymaking. While normative debates certainly play 
a valid role in the study and practice of civil-military relations, the basic foundation for 
analyses of civil-military power relations, and the recommendations which may stem from 
them, must derive first from objective empirical analysis rather than from the basis of 
personal, political preferences.  
  
Several scholars have questioned the prioritisation of civilian control in the study of civil-
military relations. Douglas Bland (2001) suggests that the study and understanding of civil-
military relations have been hindered by ‘narrow definitions of the “problem”’ (p527) and by 
‘dogmatic demands for unconditional civilian control’ (p527). Bland (1999) prefers instead the 
normative implications of the term ‘civilian direction’ (p19), which emphasises the notion of 
shared responsibility, rather than civilian control which tends to categorise the relationship as 
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one ‘defined by dominance over and the restraint of a potentially dangerous opponent’ (p18). 
Other scholars such as Russell Weigley (1999) note that ‘the most desirable civil-military 
relations in a democracy are not simply those in which the civilian leadership almost always 
prevails’ (p810). While there are those who recognise the relative importance of the functional 
imperative of the relationship, studies of civil-military relations continue to predominantly 
focus on civilian control, neglecting the relationship between civil-military interaction and the 
outcomes of policymaking or US military strategy (Owens, 2010). Perhaps the greatest 
inadequacy of civilian control as the primary focus when studying civil-military power relations 
is that it may not necessarily even reflect where the balance of power actually lies in 
determining outcomes. Civilian control does not necessarily equate with civilian dominance in 
the policymaking process in terms of determining outcomes, nor is there any inherent 
incompatibility between civilian control and military dominance. If civilian policymakers defer 
to military preferences or delegate decisions of military strategy, civilian control could still be 
considered robust, as there are no challenges to civilian authority, yet it is the military who are 
substantively determining the choices of policy or strategy. In seeking to identify the relative 
balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders in OIF this thesis uses an 
objective assessment of preferences and outcomes (discussed further in Chapter Four), an 
approach which not only overcomes many of the definitional, operational and normative 
issues of civilian control, but also determines where the locus of power actually lies. 
Distinctions between civilian control of the armed forces and control of the outcomes of 
policymaking, and how this distinction affects the study of power, are further discussed in 




An alternative focus to civilian control in the study of the civil-military power relationship has 
been to analyse the role and mechanisms of military influence and to assess its impact on the 
outcomes of policy. As part of the military’s primary mission, to ‘win the nation’s wars’ 
(Sarkesian and Connor, 2006, p143), military leaders are afforded a role in the policymaking 
process by way of their professional expertise in ‘the threat or use of force to achieve the 
political purposes of the state’ (Nielson and Snider, 2009, p291). Within the policymaking 
process the military has two vital roles: to provide advice and recommendations and to 
implement the decisions made. As already indicated, however, the military’s participation in 
the policymaking process may not necessarily be politically neutral. The military is not a 
passive agent of the state (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) and against a background of shared 
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power and the potential for differing civil-military preferences rises the possibility that military 
leaders will seek to shape policy in accordance with their own interests, thereby transmuting 
advice or recommendations concerning prudent action into influence over the shaping of 
policy itself. The extent of the military’s participation in policymaking, appropriate norms of 
behaviour and the proper level of military influence are all subject to debate.  
Depictions of military leaders in their policymaking role vary from military professionals 
reluctantly drawn into political activity to assertive bureaucrats vying with civilian 
policymakers for control over policy. Matthew Moten (2009), for example, highlights the 
complexity of demands placed on senior military officers and the need for political acumen in 
order to properly perform their roles. He argues that ‘Civil-military relations at the politico-
military nexus are never as simple as a dialogue between a general and his civilian superior in 
the Pentagon. They are always complicated by the various allegiances, interests, and 
constituencies of competing politicians from both parties, both houses of Congress and the 
White House - in other words, by democracy. Absent the development of political-cultural 
expertise, no officer can hope to navigate the storm’ (Moten, 2009, pp69-70). At the other 
extreme, Andrew Bacevich has asserted that ‘the dirty little secret of American civil-military 
relations . . . is that the commander-in-chief does not command the military; he cajoles it, 
negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it’ (cited in Hooker, 2003, p10), suggesting that 
military activity in the domestic political process is a hindrance to effective decision-making. 
The military has, at one time or another, played both roles, maintaining ‘professional 
neutrality’ (Petraeus, 1989, p491) at some points of policy while clearly representing a more 
politically motivated position at others.  
One of the prime concerns regarding military influence in the policymaking process is the 
militarisation of foreign policy. In his ‘Garrison State’ article, Harold Lasswell (1941) lamented 
‘a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society’ (p455). 
Later studies have also attributed greater militarism to increased military influence (Van Evera, 
1984). Michael Desch (2006), however, argues that ‘the new American militarism is largely, if 
not exclusively, a civilian phenomenon’ (p575). Existing studies on the nature and impact of 
military advice lend greater support to Desch’s conclusion as these have found that military 
leaders are generally more cautious than civilians on whether to use force (Betts, 1991; 
Petraeus, 1989), although they do tend to be more aggressive than their civilian counterparts 
on issues regarding how force should be used (Betts, 1991; Petraeus, 1989).  
Richard Betts (1991) concludes from his assessment of Cold War crises that the central issue 
concerning the military’s participation in the policymaking process stems from the indirect 
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influence of military leaders over policy, rather than the direct influence afforded to them 
through formal military advice (p210). Despite instances of significant civilian involvement in 
the operational and tactical elements of war, the US military’s historical tradition of autonomy, 
as well as its primary responsibility for implementation, has ensured that military leaders have 
played a major role in determining military strategy with the greatest influence in determining 
how force is used rather than whether (Petraeus, 1989). Several authors note an exception to 
the generally low impact of military influence on decisions of whether or not to intervene 
when the advice is direct and negative, at which times the military is considered to possess a 
veto over such decisions (Betts, 1991; Petraeus, 1989; Stevenson, 2006). Overall, the 
conclusions regarding the impact of military advice and influence reflect the shift between the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War periods identified earlier. Commenting on the Cold War, Betts 
(1991) concludes that ‘the diversity of military recommendations and the extent of 
consonance with civilian opinion indicate that military professionals rarely have dominated 
decisions on the use of force’ (p5), while Johnson (1996) later argued that ‘professional 
military officers are largely in control of defense policy in the United States in the Post-Cold 
War Era and that civilians defer to their bureaucratic expertise to an inordinate degree’ (p1).  
Whether or not political activity by military leaders harms or helps US national security is open 
to debate. Risa Brooks (2009) argues that ‘especially on issues related to military strategy and 
policy, political activity is not intrinsically harmful’ (p214), while others advocate a much 
stricter conception of appropriate military behaviour (Kohn, 1994; Feaver, 2003). It appears, 
however, that for some, focus is shifting towards finding a new means of managing the 
inevitability of the military’s participation in the politics of policy, rather than trying to negate 
or discourage it. In their book, The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century, 
Sarkesian and Connor (2006) advocate a process of ‘constructive political engagement’ 
reflecting the need they see for military leaders to be able to offer an ‘intellectually and 
philosophically sound view of the capability of the military and those policies and strategies 
that offer the best path for achieving success’ (p181).  
THEORIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
As indicated in Chapter One, the theoretical aspect of contemporary civil-military relations 
literature is its weakest component. Until the end of the Cold War, theoretical studies of US 
civil-military relations were largely dominated by the framework articulated by Samuel 
Huntington in his seminal work, The Soldier and The State (1985). Responding to the new 
international security environment of the Cold War, Huntington (1985) described the rise of 
tensions between the demands of military security in combatting a long-term threat to 
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national security, such as that posed by the Soviet Union, and a traditionally anti-military US 
liberal ideology.  
Huntington (1985) identified three main variables which explained civil-military relations: the 
level of external threat, the constitutional structure of the state, and ideology (Feaver, 2003). 
Given the durability of the Soviet threat and the improbability of constitutional change, 
Huntington thought that the only way to meet the continuing security demands of the Cold 
War period was a shift in ideology. According to Huntington (1985), ‘So long as the Cold War 
continued . . . security would depend upon the ability of the United States to evolve an 
intellectual climate more favourable to the existence of military professionalism’ (p457). 
Huntington therefore prescribed a normative distribution of power which he saw to be the 
most conducive to achieving equilibrium between the competing demands of the civilian and 
military spheres; one which ensured civilian ascendancy over the political aspects of war, but 
also safeguarded a distinct sphere of military dominance. ‘Objective Civilian Control’ would 
allow the military sufficient freedom to best deliver national defense, while the 
professionalism of the military would prevent it from impinging on the political prerogatives of 
civilian policymakers. While Huntington’s theoretical arguments regarding shifts in ideology 
during the Cold War have since been challenged (Feaver, 2003), his theoretical and normative 
contributions remain highly influential, frequently providing the bedrock for the theories of 
civil-military relations which have followed.  
In his book Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Michael Desch 
(2001) uses a structural theory to explain the state of civilian control, asking the question ‘can 
civilian leaders reliably get the military to do what they want it to do?’ (p4). Desch (2001) 
argues that ‘the causes of patterns of civilian control are not completely reducible to the 
internal attributes of a particular state; rather, that patterns of civilian control are shaped by 
the interaction of these internal attributes with the external environment’ (p11). As such, his 
major explanatory variable is the internal or external threat level. Desch (2001) posits that 
when external threats are high and internal threats are low states should have ‘the most stable 
civil-military relations’ (p13), by which he means strong civilian control; conversely, when 
external threats are low and internal threats high, a state faces weakest civilian control of the 
military. Desch (2001) draws on evidence from the Cold War and post-Cold War periods to 
support his thesis, outlining how civilian control was stronger during the Cold War when there 
was a clear external threat and weaker during the post-Cold War period when external threats 




While Desch’s (2001) theory is interesting in its effort to incorporate international variables 
into its explanations of civil-military relations, there are some issues with its specific 
application to US civil-military relations (the theory is open to all states and the book discusses 
a variety of different countries within). As the US does not arguably face internal threats to the 
same degree as other states, particularly developing states (David, 1991), potential 
explanations of US civil-military relations are reduced to variations only on the level of external 
threat which immediately limits the utility of his typology in understanding US civil-military 
relations. If internal threats are removed, only the level of external threat remains to 
determine civilian control, which according to Desch (2001) produces ‘good’ civilian control in 
scenarios of low internal and high external threat and ‘mixed’ civilian control in scenarios of 
low internal and low external threats (p14). Although Desch (2001) acknowledges that civilian 
control may fluctuate during periods of high external threat due to variations in the 
‘perception of the threat’ (p68), it is not clear how one is to determine how and when the 
threat perception rises and falls. Further to this, for ‘indeterminate threat environments’ 
(Desch, 2001, p16) of low external and low internal threats, Desch relies on a variety of 
intervening domestic variables in support of his thesis rendering his primary explanatory 
variables of less importance.  
 
Further issues arise from the definition of an external threat, which Desch (2001) argues ‘have 
obvious effects: they threaten the entire state, including the military; they usually produce 
increased unity with the state; and they focus everyone’s attention outwards’ (p12). According 
to this definition, the Cold War period is classified as one of high external threat due to the 
precariousness and persistency of the perception of the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union, while the post-Cold War period is classified as a low external threat environment, 
despite featuring a high number of individual interventions. It is, however, uncertain how the 
post-9/11 period would be classified. Terrorism has arguably been the major threat of the 
post-9/11 period, yet whether this directly threatens the entire state, including the military, is 
debatable. In this respect, the essential definition used by Desch seems a little outdated for 
the twenty-first century, when nebulous sources of threat often present greater danger than 
traditional state-based threats. Overall, Desch’s structural theory, with its emphasis on 
international factors, is not sensitive enough to capture the nuanced power variations often 
present in the US civil-military relationship. 
 
Focusing on middle range levels of analysis, institutional theories have provided an alternative 
theoretical framework for understanding and explaining US civil-military relations. These 
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theories seek to explain how the behaviours of political actors are shaped and conditioned by 
the institutional contexts in which they operate, how individuals wield power and utilise 
institutional resources within the policymaking process, and how behaviour is shaped and 
defined by institutions. Deborah Avant (1993) employs institutional theory to explain how the 
structure of civilian institutions impacts on the development of military organisations, 
examining how some militaries are able to formulate appropriate military doctrine while 
others are not. Avant (1993) argues that the British Army was more able to develop 
appropriate military doctrine during the Boer War (1899-1902) than the US Army was in 
Vietnam (1965-1975) due to ‘the way civilian institutions affected civilian choices and the way 
civilian choices affected the development of the two armies‘ (p427). Christopher Gibson and 
Don Snider (1997) use a new institutionalist approach to explain an increase in military 
influence during the 1990s. They argue that an increase in military expertise and experience in 
political-military affairs, coupled with the institutional changes brought about as a result of the 
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, have allowed military leaders greater opportunity to assert 
influence in policymaking.  
 
It is evident from both the work of Avant (1993) and Gibson and Snider (1997) that institutions 
can and do play an important role in determining civil-military relations. Just as Desch (2001) 
argued that international variables provide the broader structure within which domestic 
politics operates, so institutions provide the broader structure in which policymaking takes 
place. Changes in the structure and scope of civilian and military institutions have historically 
affected the distribution of power between the two spheres. The Department of Defense 
Reorganisation Act of 1958 enabled the civilian policymakers of the Vietnam era to assert a 
greater degree of control over the military (Kinnard, 1980), while the post-Vietnam Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganisation Act of 1986 facilitated greater military 
influence (Gibson and Snider, 1997). However, theoretical approaches that focus on 
institutional factors are too distanced from the immediate context of civil-military interaction 
to be able to explain the variations in the relative balance of power that occur within the 
course of the policymaking process itself.  
 
Approaches which focus on the underlying power structure provided by institutions tend to 
dismiss the political relationships that emerge within the policymaking process as ‘transitory 
and conditional’ (Freedman, 1976, p445). However, this does not make the variation any less 
significant as even transitory dominance over policy can have important consequences. It is 
precisely because the relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and military 
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leaders is so fluid and situational that institutional approaches are of limited value as 
institutions do not change easily (Steinmo, 2001). While institutional theory has been applied 
to explain the failure of the US Army to adapt its doctrine to the circumstances of the Vietnam 
war and the military’s successful resistance of presidential efforts to engender a shift towards 
counterinsurgency (Avant, 1993), the key explanatory variable (the structure of civilian 
institutions in the US) becomes more of antecedent condition in contemplating the more 
subtle fluctuations of power evident within the policymaking processes for devising theatre 
specific military strategies, which are much more fluid and undergo a quicker rate of change. 
Similarly, while Goldwater-Nichols may have altered the dynamics of civil-military relations by 
imbuing military leaders with greater institutional power, this does not necessarily determine 
military dominance over the outcomes of policymaking. In seeking to explain the relative 
balance of civil-military power, a closer examination of the interaction between civilian 
policymakers and military leaders is necessary.   
 
Principal-agent theory has increasingly been used to explore a variety of problems 
encountered by hierarchical relationships in politics, including those of civil-military relations. 
The essential problem investigated by principal-agent theories is how to get the agent to act in 
the best interests of the principal when the agent possesses an informational advantage over 
the principal and has different motivating interests. Originally a tool of economic analysis, 
principal-agent theory been reformulated in some quite fundamental ways in order to explain 
political relationships (Miller, 2005). The most comprehensive application of principal-agent 
theory to the civil-military relationship comes in the form of Peter Feaver’s (2003) Armed 
Servants, which seeks to explain how the control relationship between civilians and the 
military plays out on a day-to-day basis.  
 
According to Feaver (2003), civilians create the military institution and ‘contract’ (p57) it to use 
military force on society’s behalf. Despite this delegation to the military, civilians still need to 
ensure that this delegation is not ‘abused’ (Feaver, 2003, p57), particularly given that the 
military may have different preferences to civilians and may hold private information. Civilians 
must therefore choose which ‘ancillary mechanisms’ (Feaver, 2003, p57) to use, namely by 
way of monitoring the military’s behaviour and punishing the military when it does not behave 
appropriately. As the military ‘has the ability and sometimes also the incentive to respond 
strategically to civilian delegation and control decisions’ (Feaver, 2003, p57), the military must 
then choose whether to ‘work or shirk’. According to Feaver (2003), ‘working is doing things 
the way civilians want, and shirking is doing things the way those in the military want’ (p60). 
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While principal-agent approaches provide important insights into the civil-military relationship, 
key aspects limit is usefulness. One of the primary limitations is the assumption that civilian 
and military actors are unitary, with one principle and one agent (Stevenson, 2006; Waterman 
and Meier, 1998). Neither civilian policymakers nor military leaders are monolithic blocks and 
the variety of civilian principals and military agents involved in policymaking might include 
actors as diverse as the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the secretaries of the 
individual armed forces, relevant ambassadors, the JCS (representing four different military 
services), as well as the regional and specific theatre commanders, all of whom might hold 
different preferences in terms of the means, methods and goals of strategy. A theory unable to 
capture the various dynamics between multiple principals and agents is unable to account for 
the coalitions that can arise across civil-military lines, often a crucial mechanism in the pluralist 
US policymaking process. Failure to acknowledge the potential splits which arise within civilian 
and military groups also misses a key facilitator for bureaucratic negotiation and bargaining. 
Waterman and Meier (1998) argue that principal-agent theory demonstrates a weakness in its 
inability to account for bureaucratic behavior which ‘may appear to be random (or even as 
shirking) yet . . . can easily be explained by the political goals and resources of the various 
principals and goals of the bureaucrats’ (p180). While the principal-agent’s dyadic model aids 
its theoretical simplicity, it fails to ‘cover the complexities of the policy process, whereby ideas 
are advocated, debated, sometimes compromised, decided and then re-decided perhaps 
numerous times during implementation’ (Stevenson, 2006, p206).  
 
Although Feaver (2003) acknowledges that there may be a ‘gradation of working and shirking’ 
(p62), the outcomes of civil-military interaction according to his agency theory are essentially 
dichotomous. Feaver’s strict interpretation of civilian control causes any behaviour by the 
military other than providing advice (extending to persuasion in some circumstances) and 
faithfully implementing civilian choices to be constituted as ‘shirking’ on behalf of the military. 
No distinction is made between different levels of military influence or behaviour; whether 
military leaders are advocating a particular course of action within the policymaking process or 
deliberately disobeying civilian instruction, the military is still considered to be shirking. 
Conversely, Feaver’s construction doesn’t seem to allow for the prospect of civilian shirking. 
The possibility is mentioned briefly (Feaver, 2003, p287, p302), but not explored in any depth. 
In order to determine the occurrence of military shirking one of the questions Feaver (2003) 
asks is ‘whether the civilian is the one who is making key policy decisions . . . and whether 
those decisions are substantive rather than nominal’ (p61). According to Feaver (2003), when 
the answer to this question is positive then the military is working, when the answer is 
31 
 
negative, the military is shirking. However, it seems highly questionable to label the military as 
shirking if civilians are substantively deferring or delegating to the military, particularly if 
civilians are ‘shirking’ in their responsibilities to provide clear policy goals and guidance. This 
seems to presuppose that clear civilian preferences are being articulated to the military, when 
this is not always the case, removing the possibility that the military may be ‘working’ whilst 
also making (legitimate) substantive decisions. Further to this, it is less clear how shirking 
would be determined in cases where the military are caught directly between the competing 
preferences of multiple principles; would military leaders be considered shirking in providing 
military advice to Congress which may directly contradict or undermine an executive branch 
policy? Although Feaver (2003) asserts that his principal-agent approach reconceptualises the 
civil-military relationship beyond the coup/no coup dichotomy (p285), which he argues ‘misses 
much of the interesting give and take in civil-military relations’ (Feaver, 1999, p218), the 
working/shirking dynamic that forms the basis of his agency theory essentially replaces one 
dichotomy with another (Stevenson, 2006).  
 
Feaver’s (2003) description of the civil-military relationship as ‘a strategic interaction’ is based 
on the premise that ‘the choices civilians make are contingent on their expectations of what 
the military is likely to do, and vice versa’ (p55). The civil-military relationship is therefore 
confined to operating within one model of interaction where decisions on how to act or how 
to respond are carefully calculated based on rational considerations of probability. While this 
may occur, either explicitly or implicitly, to varying extents, the assumption of rational 
interaction excludes other models of decision-making which may bear relevance to 
understanding the civil-military relationship. 
 
While the bureaucratic politics approach is a decision-making model, rather than a theory of 
civil-military relations, many of the fundamental propositions of bureaucratic politics seem to 
resonate within empirical analyses of the civil-military relationship. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the military’s status as ‘the largest bureaucratic institution in the United 
States’ (Rosati, 2004, p159) and the analogous concerns of political control over the 
bureaucracy and civilian control over the military. While different illustrations of the model 
vary, the central assumptions underlying the bureaucratic politics approach focus on the 
process by which decisions are made, viewing policy as flowing from ‘an amalgam of 
organisations and political actors who differ substantially on any particular issue and who 
compete to advance their own personal and organisational interests as they try to influence 
decisions’ (Clifford, 2004, p93). The bureaucratic politics approach focuses on the intricacies of 
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the policymaking process to explain outcome, its explanatory power coming from ‘displaying 
the game – the action-channel, the positions, the players, their preferences, and the pulling 
and hauling – that yielded, as a resultant, the action in question’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 
pp304–305). 
 
Numerous sources from both the civil-military relations literature and the bureaucratic politics 
literature support the contention that there is potential utility for the bureaucratic politics 
approach to be used as the basis for explaining the civil-military relationship in the US. Chris 
Jefferies (1988) sees bureaucratic politics as the dominant process within defense decision-
making, while studies of individual instances of decision-making such as the survival of the 
V22-Osprey programme (Jones, 2004), the decision to launch Operation Desert Storm 
(Holland, 1999), and decision-making within the Persian Gulf War (Yetiv, 2001) all illuminate 
bureaucratic aspects of civil-military relations. In his book Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-
Military Relations Under Stress, Charles Stevenson (2006) concludes that ‘instead of the 
incomplete model offered by the principal-agent theory . . . we need a revised model closer to 
the bureaucratic politics tradition’ (p207).  
 
While the bureaucratic politics approach does indeed seem to capture certain elements of 
civil-military relations, reflecting the different bureaucratic and organisational interests of 
civilian and military groups, as well many of the different behaviours and tactics employed by 
both civilian policymakers and military leaders within the policymaking process, as a coherent 
paradigm, bureaucratic politics does not appear a propitious means of specifically explaining 
civil-military relations at the elite level. The descriptive emphasis and theoretical vagueness of 
the approach has been the subject of much disparagement (Welch, 1992; Bernstein, 2000) and 
empirical tests have at best produced mixed results as a means of explaining decision-making 
behaviour (Rhodes, 1994; Holland, 1999).  
 
THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY 
 
Despite greater attention being focused on the theoretical aspects of civil-military relations in 
recent years, the subject remains under-developed. Existing theoretical approaches are limited 
by a tendency towards a bipartite analysis focusing on explaining either civilian control or 
military influence. One of the most significant shortcomings of existing theoretical approaches 
is the neglect of a third dynamic of control, that of shared power. Theoretical studies which 
recognise the existence of a shared power model offer either an unsatisfactory description or a 
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weak explanation. Risa Brooks’ (2008) institutional theory acknowledges a shared power 
configuration, but its description, a situation in which ‘both political and military leaders have 
their own resources on which they draw in relation to one another’ (p34), is too general to be 
useful in the US context where shared power is endemic. Michael Desch (2001) also recognises 
that the civil-military power dynamic might reflect a ‘mixed control’ (pp15-17), although as his 
structural theory is less able to account for instances where the distribution of power does not 
clearly favour either the military or civilians, ‘mixed control’ appears to be a catch-all category 
for situations in which the distribution of power is unclear.  
 
A lack of confidence in existing theoretical frameworks and an absence of theoretical efforts to 
specifically explain civil-military relations in the post-9/11 period have necessitated this thesis 
to engage primarily in theoretical exploration, rather than the testing of existing theories. 
While there are insights to be gained from each of the theoretical approaches discussed within 
this chapter, none offers a satisfactory means of explaining the relative balance of civil-military 
power within the course of a particular conflict. The greatest potential for explanation lies 
within those theories which directly focus on civil-military interaction within the policymaking 
process rather those which emphasise larger, structural factors. While neither Feaver’s (2003) 
agency theory nor the bureaucratic politics approach provide suitable theoretical models for 
the task at hand within this thesis, they both capture relevant and important aspects of the 
civil-military relationship and provide useful insights in exploring the potential impact of the six 
independent variables tested within. It is therefore primarily with reference to these two 
approaches, principal-agent theory and bureaucratic politics, that the next chapter proceeds 
with its discussion of the dependent and independent variables used within the thesis. As 
Chapter Three will illustrate, the uncertainty surrounding many of the core assumptions of 
civil-military relations prompts a return to the fundamental elements of the relationship in 
order to identify independent variables which may be of use in forming a new theoretical 
framework for explaining the relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and 










CHAPTER THREE  
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
In order to determine who controls US military strategy, this thesis identifies the relative 
balance of power across a series of decision points within OIF and explores the explanatory 
potential of six independent variables in accounting for why civilian policymakers, military 
leaders or a combination of both have the greatest influence over the outcomes of decision-
making. This chapter continues to draw on the existing civil-military relations literature to 
present a discussion of the variables employed within this study and articulates the 
hypotheses for each. The discussion identifies some questionable assumptions embedded in 
the contemporary literature regarding the relative importance and anticipated performance of 
the independent variables, highlighting areas of on-going debate. The chapter also lays the 
methodological foundations for the thesis, providing context and background to explanations 
regarding the measurement and coding of these variables, presented in Chapter Four.  
 
THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 
The dependent variable for this study is the relative balance of civil-military power. As outlined 
in Chapter One, civilian policymakers and military leaders share power in the joint domain of 
military strategy. As the relative balance of power between the two spheres is fluid rather than 
fixed, outcomes of decision-making can reflect different variations in the civil-military 
relationship. In order to reflect the full spectrum of possible variance in the civil-military power 
relationship five variations of the dependent variable are identified: Civilian Dominance, 
Shared Dominance Civilian, Shared Dominance, Shared Dominance Military, and Military 
Dominance. Such classifications are not unique to this thesis and recognition of a dominant 
group within a pluralist decision-making setting has been used both within broader political 
science studies and civil-military relations in particular. Literature on the control of the 
bureaucracy has distinguished between presidential dominance and congressional dominance 
(Hammond and Knott, 1996; Wood and Waterman, 1991) and the majority of civil-military 
relations studies recognise the relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and 
military leaders, though the terminology is often centred on civilian control and military 
influence rather than dominance. Risa Brooks’ (2008) study of strategic assessment specifically 
identifies three configurations of the political-military balance of power (one of her 
independent variables); political dominance, shared power and military dominance. This study 
uses similar categorisations, although it further recognises that in instances where civilian 
35 
 
policymakers and military leaders both shape the outcome of policymaking that shared 
dominance may not always reflect a parity of influence. Two additional possible variations of 
the relative balance of civil-military power are also therefore included, Shared Dominance 
Civilian and Shared Dominance Military.  
 
In order to explore the circumstances under which each variation of the relative balance of 
civil-military power occurs, the thesis identifies and tests six independent variables which are 
empirically and theoretically rooted in the civil-military relations literature, yet which also 
demonstrate continuing relevance into the post-9/11 period.  
 
CIVIL-MILITARY PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE   
 
The first independent variable under consideration is the degree of divergence that exists 
between the preferred policy outcomes of civilian policymakers and military leaders. Conflict 
between the civilian and military spheres is often presented as an inherent feature of civil-
military relations and considered to be particularly acute over issues involving the use of force 
(Pearlman, 1999). As Peter Feaver (2003) notes, ‘despite the relatively harmonious experience 
America enjoys compared with that of the rest of the world, by far the dominant theme [in the 
study of US civil-military relations] is conflict’ (pp10-11). 
Divergent civil-military preferences are to a large part assumed within the existing literature. 
Tensions between the two spheres, seen as ‘typical and functional’ (Kohn, 2008, p71), are the 
result of the potentially conflicting demands of the civilians’ need for political control and the 
military’s need for operational autonomy (Kohn, 2002; Feaver, 1999). Fundamental differences 
between the interests, cultures, roles and responsibilities of civilian policymakers and military 
leaders are also seen to produce divergent views on questions regarding the use of military 
power (Huntington, 1985; Betts, 1991; Kohn, 2002; Feaver, 2003). Using a combination of 
original survey data and analysis of US foreign policy decision-making since 1816, Peter Feaver 
and Christopher Gelpi (2004) conclude from their study of US civil-military relations and the 
use of force that ‘civilians and the military do differ in systematic ways in their attitudes 
considering whether and how to use force’ (p5). 
 
Civil-military preference divergence provides the foundation for many studies of civil-military 
relations, both empirical and theoretical. Given the literature’s preoccupation with civilian 
control, studies often focus on examples of civil-military preference divergence as a 
methodological means of determining whether civilian control is robust or weak. For example, 
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in his assessment of civilian control during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, Michael 
Desch (2001) only considers cases involving civil-military conflict. Divergent preferences also 
provide important theoretical mechanisms. In Peter Feaver’s (2003) agency theory, it is the 
potential for differing preferences between civilian policymakers and military leaders which 
provides the incentive for the military agent to move beyond the mere presentation of advice 
into efforts to influence the outcomes of decision-making and to therefore potentially pursue 
alternative policies to those set forth by the principal. According to Feaver (2003), the military 
‘may not share identical preferences with the civilians on all policy questions and so may seek 
to manipulate the relationship so as to prevail in policy disputes’ (p57). Conflict between the 
multiple participants in the political process is also a central feature of the bureaucratic politics 
model which understands outcomes of policymaking as the result of the ‘interaction of 
competing preferences’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p255). 
 
While even a cursory assessment of the historical US civil-military relationship provides a mass 
of evidence demonstrating occasions of contrary civilian and military views on whether and 
how to employ force, to accept preference divergence as a constant is both misleading and 
reductive. Firstly, civilian policymakers and military leaders do not always disagree. As part of 
their fusionist approach, Roman and Tarr (2001) argue that at the elite level of government 
‘national security policymaking, institutions and processes draw people together in ways that 
engender mutual respect, enhance cohesion and establish trust’ (p424), thereby establishing 
greater potential for consensus between civilian and military participants. Further to this, 
Roman and Tarr (2001) also highlight that while there may be a plethora of preferences 
present in the policymaking process these do not necessarily reflect a strict civil-military 
separation. In direct contrast to Feaver and Gelpi (2004), Roman and Tarr (2001) conclude 
from their study of the ‘civil-military gap’ that ‘the cleavages that arise in the struggle over 
policy issues do not very often define themselves along civil-military lines’ (p424). Secondly, 
studies of civil-military relations which do not fully allow for the absence of preference 
divergence fail to consider important dynamics of civil-military interaction relevant to 
questions of power. Civil-military conflict may characterise a significant proportion of civil-
military decision-making, but civilian delegation or deference to military leaders or military 
deference to the preferences of civilian policymakers are both equally important in informing 
the relative balance of power, without being premised on divergent preferences. The potential 
for different preferences is important as a potential impetus for civil-military struggle over 




The majority of empirical studies of civil-military relations within the George W. Bush 
administration reflect the tendency to focus on conflict within the civil-military relationship, 
depicting high levels of civil-military tension. Indeed, civilian policymakers and military leaders 
disagreed on a number of core issues over the course of OIF including whether Iraq should be 
a primary target in America’s initial response to 9/11, whether the US military or the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) should be in charge of training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and 
whether or not to implement the 2007 surge. However, OIF equally demonstrates evidence of 
civil-military consensus on multiple issues of US military strategy. CENTCOM commander 
General Tommy Franks and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shared views on key 
aspects of the initial invasion plan and all senior civilian and military policymakers concurred 
regarding the ‘train to transition’ strategy, pursued from 2004 to 2006, which focused on 
training ISF as a means of transferring responsibility for fighting the insurgency and allowing 
US extrication. The assumption of civil-military preference divergence is therefore by no 
means an accurate reflection of civil-military relations during OIF. 
  
The tendency to assume divergent preferences, or at least the tendency to focus on civil-
military interaction where divergent preferences are present, has meant that the civil-military 
relations literature has not focused much attention on exploring the possible causal or 
correlational links between preference divergence and the relative balance of civil-military 
power. Other theories within political science, however, present competing propositions 
regarding the effect of divergent preferences on the issue of control. Meier, O’Toole and 
Hawes (2007) conclude from their study of the theoretical determinants of political control 
over the bureaucracy that ‘we can be confident that bureaucratic support for political goals 
enhances the ability of politicians to achieve the results they desire’ (p17). In a civil-military 
context, this suggests that low preference divergence facilitates greater civilian influence over 
the outcomes of policy. The ‘ally principle’ within principal-agent theories, however, suggests a 
different impact; that, ‘all else equal, as the policy preferences of politicians and bureaucrats 
converge, politicians will delegate more discretion to bureaucrats’ (Huber and Shipan, 2008, 
p260). This proposition is echoed within the work of Feaver and Gelpi (2004) who anticipate 
that ‘military preferences will have a greater influence on civilian policy choices when civilian 
leaders share preferences that are similar to those in the military’ (p68). The bureaucratic 
politics literature and its emphasis on government behaviour as the result of ‘bargaining 
games’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p255) suggests that divergent preferences lead to 
compromises within the policymaking process, the outcomes of which inevitably reflect the 
preferences of both civilian policymakers and military leaders to varying degrees. There is then 
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some debate within the existing theoretical literature regarding the impact of preference 
divergence on the outcomes of policymaking and the civil-military power dynamic.  
 
The preceding discussion leads to a number of possible hypotheses (H) to test regarding the 
performance of the preference divergence variable relative to the civil-military balance of 
power in determining US military strategy: 
 
H1:  Low preference divergence facilitates Civilian Dominance; 
H2:  Low preference divergence facilitates Military Dominance; 
H3:  Low preference divergence facilitates Shared Dominance; 
H4:  High preference divergence facilitates Shared Dominance. 
 
The first three hypotheses reflect the different possible effects of low preference divergence 
on the relative balance of civil-military power. Hypothesis one asserts that low preference 
divergence will facilitate Civilian Dominance as the more civilian policymakers and military 
leaders share ideas, the more civilian policymakers are able to get military leaders to comply. 
The second hypothesis contrarily asserts that low preference divergence facilitates Military 
Dominance based on the premise that as the policy preferences of civilian policymakers and 
military leaders converge, civilian policymakers will delegate more discretion to military 
leaders enabling greater military influence. The third hypothesis suggests that low preference 
divergence will result in Shared Dominance as agreement between civilian policymakers and 
military leaders allows the preferences of both to be realised in the outcomes of policymaking. 
The fourth hypothesis follows the assumption of the bureaucratic politics approach, indicating 
that high levels of preference divergence will result in Shared Dominance as civilian 
policymakers and military leaders will be prone towards compromise building as a means of 
reconciling different preferences.  
 
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS  
 
The next two independent variables under consideration are civilian assertiveness and military 
assertiveness. These variables consider the extent to which civilian policymakers and military 
leaders actively seek to advance their respective preferences in the policymaking process. 
Closely associated with the assumption that civilian and military preferences will diverge is the 
expectation that each will take affirmative action to endeavor to get their respective 
preferences realised in the outcomes of decision-making. If, as Richard Kohn (1997) argues, 
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civilian control is ‘a process not a fact’ (p143), civilian policymakers cannot always simply 
command the military; rather, they must engage with it in order to advance their preferences. 
Similarly, military leaders are often characterised as powerful bureaucratic competitors, 
operating to advance their own interests or outcomes. Andrew Bacevich’s assertion, quoted 
earlier, that the commander-in-chief must cajole, negotiate with, and appease the military 
(cited in Hooker, 2003) captures this sense of mutual assertiveness between civilian 
policymakers and military leaders within the policymaking process and reflects the 
assumptions of military ‘shirking’ or mutual bureaucratic pulling and hauling often embedded 
within the existing literature.   
 
The means by which civilians exert control over the armed forces and how military leaders 
exert influence have been of primary importance to the study of civil-military relations and the 
existing literature has catalogued various mechanisms of both. Different methods of civilian 
control have been identified (Huntington, 1985; Desch, 2001) and various control mechanisms 
classified, distinguishing between those which affect the ability of the military to subvert 
control and those which affect the military’s disposition to influence (Feaver, 1999). These 
elements have subsequently been incorporated into theoretical frameworks of civil-military 
relations. Samuel Huntington (1985) and Michael Desch (2001) distinguish between different 
types of civilian control within their theories, while Peter Feaver (2003) incorporates civilian 
capabilities for oversight and punitive action into his agency theory. Scholars such as Samuel 
Finer (1962) and Richard Betts (1991) have sought to identify varying levels of military 
intervention and influence within the policymaking process, illustrating the primary means by 
which military leaders shape decision-making. Betts (1991) identifies two types of military 
influence, ‘direct influence’ which ‘flows from formal and explicit recommendations, or control 
of operations’ (p5), capturing the military’s formal advisory role, and ‘indirect influence’ which 
‘flows from ways in which the soldiers may control the premises of civilian decision through 
monopoly of information or control of options’ (p5).  
 
Both the willingness of civilian policymakers to assert control and the tendency of the military 
to exert influence have been identified within the existing literature as being important in 
determining the overall relative balance of power between the two spheres. The ‘crisis’ of civil-
military relations in the 1990s was not only attributed to the military’s increasing will to 
impose its own preferences, but also to an ‘unwillingness’ (Kohn, 2002, p15) on the part of 
civilians to exert control. H.R. McMaster’s thesis in his book Dereliction of Duty (1997) centred 
on the ‘five silent men’ of the JCS who failed to fully articulate their views during the 
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policymaking process for the war in Vietnam. There is, however, some uncertainty as to 
whether civilian assertiveness or military assertiveness is of greater importance in determining 
the relative balance of civil-military power.  
 
Both Samuel Huntington (1985) and Richard Kohn (1997) focus on the military’s proclivity to 
assert itself in the policymaking process as a primary mechanism by which civilian control is 
either maintained or eroded. A central feature of Samuel Huntington’s thesis in The Soldier 
and the State (1985) is military professionalism. Huntington argued that civilian recognition of 
an autonomous military sphere would maintain military professionalism, thereby ensuring 
military leaders’ abstinence from political activity and obedience to civilian direction. Though 
the behaviour of civilian policymakers is important in maintaining the sanctity of an 
autonomous military sphere, Huntington’s emphasis is the importance of military 
professionalism; as Peter Feaver (2003) notes ‘the heart of [Huntington’s] concept is the 
putative link between professionalism and voluntary subordination’ (p18). Richard Kohn (1997) 
also seems to place the burden of responsibility for civilian control on military behavior as, 
while he recognises the importance of a countervailing civilian power, he argues that 
‘ultimately, it is the military’s own professionalism and restraint that on a daily basis maintains 
civilian control’ (p146).  
 
Other scholars, however, emphasise the importance of civilian behaviour in ensuring civilian 
control. The central argument of Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command (2002) is that civilian 
intervention into military matters is both essential for civilian policymakers and positive for 
war-time strategy-making. However, by implication, Cohen also suggests that civilian control of 
the military and control over military strategy is possible providing that civilian policymakers 
are assertiveness enough to achieve it. Henry Eccles’ assertion that ‘the only occasion when 
civilian control is in doubt is when civilian officials themselves fail to exercise it, or reflect to 
use the power legally vested in them’ (cited in Bland, 1999, p8) echoes similar conclusions 
drawn in the broader literature on political control of the bureaucracy. Stephen Krasner (2004) 
argues that bureaucratic politics occurs ‘not because of the independent power of government 
organisations, but because of failures by decision makers to assert control’ (p452), while 
Thomas Hammond and Jack Knott (1996) highlight presidential and congressional indifference 
as a major reason for bureaucratic autonomy. 
 
While the civil-military relations literature recognises that the propensity to assert preferences 
within the policymaking process may vary, none of the aforementioned studies capture the full 
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range of civilian and military behaviour. Desch (2001) and Feaver (2003) essentially employ 
dichotomous variables (for Desch this is either objective or subjective civilian control, and for 
Feaver, either working or shirking) and Betts’ (1991) does not establish gradations of military 
behaviour within his typology of military influence. Steve Yetiv (2001) defines gradations of 
governmental behaviour within his study of US decision-making in the Persian Gulf War, 
ranging from explanation, through to bargaining, advocacy and rivalry, although his focus is 
not specifically civil-military relations. Distinguishing between different levels of assertiveness, 
however, is essential to understanding the spectrum of civil-military interactions which 
inevitably involve a range of behaviours. Civilian policymakers and military leaders may seek to 
actively advance their preferences in the policymaking process to varying degrees, but civilian 
policymakers may also delegate or defer to the military and military leaders may accept civilian 
instruction without significant opposition or resistance.  
 
Within the post-9/11 literature civilian assertiveness has been a prime explanatory factor in 
arguments of both civilian dominance and military dominance within OIF. Propositions of 
civilian dominance are accompanied by descriptions of a highly assertive civilian leadership 
(Desch, 2007; Korb, 2007; Herspring, 2005), while propositions of military dominance are 
explained by civilian disengagement and a failure to exert control over military strategy 
(MacGregor, 2007; Kaplan, 2008; Kagan, 2007). In general, the existing literature tends to 
present low levels of military assertiveness with military leaders identified as being overly 
acquiescent in their interactions with civilian policymakers (Newbold, 2006; Ignatius, 2005; 
Margolick, 2007; Cook, 2008). The analysis of OIF presented in latter chapters, however, will 
illustrate a range of both civilian and military assertiveness behaviors during the course of 
decision-making for OIF.  
 
The purpose of the civilian assertiveness and military assertiveness variables is to determine 
the respective levels of civilian and military assertiveness throughout the process of 
formulating and implementing OIF and to ascertain whether different levels of assertiveness 
have a substantive impact on the relative balance of civil-military power. The inclusion of these 
variables enables the thesis not only to provide a more accurate assessment of how 
assertiveness civilian policymakers and military leaders were during OIF, but to also determine 
the relative importance between the two variables. As such the following hypotheses are 





H5:  Civilian Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian assertiveness is high;  
H6:  Military Dominance is more likely to occur when military assertiveness is high; 
H7:  High levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Shared Dominance; 
H8:  Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Civilian Dominance;  
H9: Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Military Dominance; 
H10:  Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Shared Dominance. 
 
The essential assumption behind hypotheses five and six is that greater assertiveness increases 
the likelihood of either civilian policymakers or military leaders getting their preferences 
recognised in the outcomes of policymaking; high levels of civilian assertiveness will facilitate 
Civilian Dominance, while high levels of military will facilitate Military Dominance. Hypothesis 
seven is premised on the logic that high levels of both civilian and military assertiveness will 
engender compromise between the two spheres, enabling both to realise some element of 
their respective preferences in the outcome of policymaking. The final three hypotheses refer 
to situations when both civilian and military assertiveness are low. Low civilian and low 
military assertiveness is the least determinative of scenarios as it may facilitate Civilian 
Dominance through military acceptance of civilian preferences, Military Dominance through 
civilian deference to military preferences, or Shared Dominance through consensus and 
agreement, hence all three possible outcomes are reflected. 
 
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY UNITY 
 
Independent variables four and five are civilian unity and military unity respectively. Unity is 
the relative internal cohesiveness of either civilian policymakers or military leaders and the 
extent to which they share preferred outcomes within their respective groups. As suggested in 
Chapter Two, despite a tendency to refer to civilian policymakers and military leaders as 
monolithic groups, there is the potential for great diversity in views and preferences within 
each sphere. Each civilian policymaker may represent a different department or agency of 
government, while inter-service, as well as intra-service, rivalry has a long history within the 
US military as the different services often compete over resources, roles and missions 
(Reardon, 2012). Studies of military advice have long recognised the variance in preferences 
and recommendations between the different services (Betts, 1991). It is therefore by no 
means guaranteed that civilian policymakers and military leaders will respectively present 
unified fronts in the course of their mutual interaction.  
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Within the existing civil-military relations literature unity is consistently identified as an 
important variable. Huntington (1985), for example, states that ‘a group which is structurally 
united possesses great advantages in dealing with a group which is structurally disunited’ 
(p87). Richard Betts (1991) also notes that ‘unanimous [military] recommendations make . . . it 
more difficult for civilians to overrule their judgment’ (p8), while Deborah Avant (1993) 
observes that military leaders are more likely to obey when civilians are unified. A lack of 
unity, on the other hand, is seen to weaken the relative position of either group. H.R. 
McMaster’s (1997) analysis of Vietnam War decision-making identified how service 
parochialism and an inability to present unified views enabled civilian policymakers to 
undermine the military’s input into policymaking. Divisions between civilians may also enable 
military leaders to play one civilian off against the other to their own advantage (Avant, 1993), 
or vice versa, to civilian advantage (Huntington, 1985).  
 
The interdependence of civilian policymakers and military leaders, however, complicates the 
unity variables as some degree of mutual support is often necessary for both spheres to be 
able to achieve their goals. Studies have found that, even for a strong military leadership, 
civilian support of military views is essential to their success. Richard Hooker (2003), for 
example, argues that despite possessing some institutional advantages, ‘on the big issues of 
budget and force structure, social policy, and war and peace, the influence of senior military 
elites - absent powerful congressional and media support - is more limited than is often 
recognized’ (p15). This dependence works both ways, however, as Hooker (2003) goes on to 
highlight how military support of civilian-led policies in military matters is also essential as 
civilians can run a high political risk in acting in contravention of the advice and 
recommendations of its military leaders.  
 
Despite the clear emphasis on the importance of unity within the civil-military relations 
literature, it is not clear how the variable functions within the context of multiple civilian and 
military participants, all of whom may have different interests and motivations, and where 
some degree of mutual support is often necessary for decision-making and implementation to 
occur. The assumptions regarding unity appear to be widely held, but rarely tested. Critiques 
of post-9/11 civil-military relations have tended to generalise both civilian and military groups 
without having fully explored the degree of unity within each sphere. Divisions have been 
noted at salient policy points, such as the divisions between the Department of Defense and 
the Department of State, and between the ground commander and the JCS, regarding the 
implementation of the surge, but it is not clear what impact, if any, such dynamics may have 
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had on the relative balance of civil-military power for such decision points. In recognising the 
potential for divisions within civilian and military groups the unity variables address a 
fundamental weakness of Feaver’s (2003) agency theory, and of principal-agency theories in 
general, which feature only one principal and one agent. While useful as a mechanism for 
theoretical parsimony, the dyadic model is unable to capture the variety of civilian and military 
participants involved in the policymaking process. In this respect, the potential multiplicity of 
views present within the policymaking process is more naturally captured by the bureaucratic 
politics framework.  
 
The hypotheses for the civilian unity and military unity variables are as follows: 
 
H11:  Civilian Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian policymakers are unified; 
H12:  Military Dominance is more likely to occur when military leaders are unified; 
H13:  Shared Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian policymakers and military 
leaders are both internally divided; 
H14:  Shared Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian policymakers and military 
leaders are both internally unified. 
 
Hypotheses eleven and twelve reflect the general assumption within the civil-military relations 
literature that unity is a source of strength in terms of getting preferences realised in the 
outcomes of policymaking. Hypothesis thirteen surmises that low levels of unity within both 
civilian and military groups will increase the opportunity for cross-cutting alliances thereby 
making competition and compromise more likely. Hypothesis fourteen suggests that high 
levels of unity between both civilian policymakers and military leaders will either lead to 
Shared Dominance as a result of consensus or, in the case of divergent preferences, will 
decrease the potential for cross-cutting alliances thereby making it more difficult for one side 




The final variable under consideration within this thesis is the relative information advantage 
which may exist between civilian policymakers and military leaders. Essential to decision-
making, the possession and utilisation of information is a significant source of power and 
influence within the policymaking process as participants can use their respective sources of 
information to frame options, to support recommendations, to establish arguments for or 
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against a particular decision and to maintain control over a policy once implementation has 
begun. In general, it is discerned that information asymmetries tend to favour the military 
(Betts, 1991; Feaver, 2003; Petraeus, 1989) as military leaders usually possess greater 
technical expertise and have access to superior situational information. The existence and 
impact of information asymmetries are widely recognised within studies of the bureaucracy 
and political control. Principal-agent theory is premised on the claim that agents possess more 
relevant information than do the principals (Waterman and Meier, 1998), thereby providing 
the means and opportunity for the agent to act in ways contrary to the wishes of the principal. 
Studies of the bureaucracy have also identified information and expertise as the essential 
power basis of modern bureaucracies as ‘expertise and control over information . . . enables 
one to define the problem, identify options and estimate feasibilities . . . and to determine 
whether and in what form decisions are being implemented’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p300). 
Despite the importance of information to decision-making, neither the direction of the 
asymmetry nor its impact on the overall relative balance of power are predetermined.  
 
Traditional conceptions of civil-military relations tend to view information asymmetries as one-
directional. Samuel Huntington (1985) describes the essence of the civil-military relationship as 
that of ‘the relation of the expert to the politician’ (p20), while Richard Betts (1991) highlights 
the ‘tradeoff between control and expertise’ (p41) at the heart of civil-military relations. Both 
of these depictions reflect a focus on technical expertise and the associated suggestion that 
technical expertise is located on only one side of the civil-military relationship. Roman and Tarr 
(2001) challenge this bounded sense of expertise by arguing that ‘the assumption of special 
expertise of the military profession represents an important social myth: it is not that there is 
no truth to the idea, but the idea goes beyond truth’ (p405). Roman and Tarr (2001) do not 
dismiss in total the concept of a distinctive area of military competence, but rather argue that 
senior military leaders ‘rarely engage in the central activity that defines their profession: “real 
war” . . . Mostly they just “practice”’ (p405). In advocating greater civilian involvement in 
military matters, Eliot Cohen (2001) establishes a similar critique, arguing that ‘the catalogue 
of mistakes that emerge from military considerations untrammeled not only by political 
considerations, but by the sober scrutiny of mere common sense, is a large one’ (p437). While 
Roman, Tarr and Cohen all underestimate the value of the inherent specialised knowledge 
within the senior military leadership, they do raise questions regarding its limits and suggest 
alternative sources of expertise that may lie within the civilian political leadership. Civilian 
policymakers not only possess their own sources of political expertise, but may also develop 
technical expertise during their professional experiences within the defense and national 
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security arenas allowing them to a certain extent to counteract a total reliance on military 
advice.  
 
The impact of military expertise on the outcomes of the policymaking process may also vary. 
While Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow claim that ‘no military action is chosen without 
extensive consultation with the military players’ (1999, p312), the military have in fact, at 
times, been prevented from contributing to the policymaking process thereby negating any 
potential effect their expertise or information advantages may have. As Jeffrey Record (1993) 
notes, civilians are under no obligation to consult the military for advice, although, as indicated 
earlier, they may incur political costs for failing to do so (Hooker, 2003). Civilian policymakers 
themselves have also placed varying value on military expertise, some even holding a deep 
suspicion of it. President Lyndon Johnson was notably cautious about accepting military advice 
too readily. According to Doris Kearns Goodwin (1976), Johnson said ‘It’s hard to be a military 
hero without a war. . . That’s why I’m suspicious of the military. They’re always narrow in their 
appraisal of everything. They see everything in military terms’ (p252). Finally, even if 
information asymmetries do exist in favour of the military, civilian policymakers still have 
means of managing informational deficits through oversight and access to multiple sources of 
information and expertise, both within and outside of the military. As indicated above, civilian 
policymakers can also impact the control of information channels, either excluding the military 
from participation or regulating lines of communication. For example, during the Vietnam War, 
Secretary of Defense McNamara established a tight chain of command and control of 
information which enabled him to marginalise military advice (McMaster, 1997). Lines of 
authority can therefore play an important role in preventing or denying military access, as well 
as in rejecting recommendations.  
 
In OIF, the prevalent criticisms of both civilian policymakers and military leaders were directly 
related to the issue of expertise, rendering the role of expertise in the formulation and 
implementation of military strategy in Iraq unclear. Civilian policymakers were frequently 
accused of disparaging or ignoring military recommendations (Korb, 2007; Desch, 2007; Loeb 
and Ricks, 2002; Herspring, 2005), while military leaders were accused of not offering their 
best professional advice (Newbold, 2006; Yingling, 2007). Indeed, civilian policymakers did not 
always heed military advice, over-ruling military recommendations on a number of occasions 
and dismissing military advice on others. Two notable examples of this include the rejection of 
General Eric Shinseki’s 2003 testimony that post-war Iraq would require ‘Something on the 
order of several hundred thousand soldiers’ (cited in Herspring, 2005, p395) and the pursuit of 
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the surge option in 2007 over the objections of the ground commander and the JCS. Military 
expertise and informational advantages were off-set at other points by the Secretary of 
Defense’s assertive management style and the use of alternative sources of advice drawn from 
outside the armed forces. However, the recommendations of military experts were also 
accepted on many occasions. There was a notable level of deference to military expertise 
during the initial invasion of Iraq, the ‘train to transition’ strategy pursued from 2004 to 2006, 
and the implementation of the surge. The locus of information advantages as well as their 
impact therefore varied over the course of the conflict. The information advantage variable 
seeks to identify whether and at which points the information advantage favoured the military 
and whether such advantages, or lack thereof, consequently affected the relative balance of 
civil-military power. In doing so, the following hypotheses are tested:  
 
H15:  Information advantages favour the military; 
H16:  Information advantages which favour the military facilitate Military Dominance; 
H17:  No military information advantage facilitates Civilian Dominance.  
 
The first hypothesis articulated above tests the fundamental assumption that information 
advantages tend to lay with the military, while hypotheses sixteen and seventeen test the 
impact of information advantages on the relative balance of civil-military power. Hypothesis 
sixteen proposes that military information advantages over civilian policymakers facilitate 
Military Dominance by reducing the level of political control over policymaking. Hypothesis 
seventeen suggests that the absence of an information advantage in favour of the military will 
facilitate Civilian Dominance by neutralising a significant source of military influence.  
 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
 
The discussion of the dependent and independent variables presented within this chapter has 
generated seventeen hypotheses for testing, summarised in Table 1. Examining the 
performance of each of the six independent variables in relation to the relative balance of civil-
military power will achieve three related aims: 1) to determine the empirical performance of 
these variables during OIF; 2) to test the assumptions existent within the broader civil-military 
relations regarding the expected performance and importance of the independent variables; 
and 3) to determine the relative importance of each independent variable in explaining the 
relative balance of civil-military power. The testing of the hypotheses summarised in Table 1 
(page 49) is therefore not only instructive in determining the relevance of the variables for 
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explaining the shifting balance of power evident within OIF, but also provides broader insights 
into the utility of these variables for non-case-study specific civil-military relations theories. 
How the dependent and independent variables are operationalised, measured and tested is 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter which presents the research design and 








































H1: Low preference divergence facilitates Civilian Dominance. 
H2: Low preference divergence facilitates Military Dominance. 
H3: Low preference divergence facilitates Shared Dominance.  





H5: Civilian Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian 
assertiveness is high.  
H6: Military Dominance is more likely to occur when military 
assertiveness is high.  
H7: High levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate 
Shared Dominance. 
H8: Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate 
Civilian Dominance. 
H9: Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate 
Military Dominance. 
H10: Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate 
Shared Dominance. 
IV4: Civilian Unity & 
IV5: Military Unity 
H11: Civilian Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian 
policymakers are unified. 
H12: Military Dominance is more likely to occur when military leaders 
are unified. 
H13: Shared Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian 
policymakers and military leaders are both internally divided. 
H14: Shared Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian 
policymakers and military leaders are both internally unified. 
IV6: Information  
Advantage 
H15: Information advantages favour the military. 
H16: Information advantages which favour the military facilitate 
Military Dominance. 








CHAPTER FOUR  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, this thesis has two core research aims: 1) to determine the relative 
balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders in determining US military 
strategy in OIF; and 2) to explore the circumstances under which different balances of power 
occur by testing the importance of six independent variables. This chapter presents the 
research design and methodologies used within the thesis in pursuit of these two research 
aims, discussing the thesis’ multi-strategy research design, the deconstruction of OIF, the 
processes of data collection and data management, coding and analysis, as well as issues of 




This thesis uses a multi-strategy research design (Robson, 2011; Bryman and Teevan, 2005), 
employing the dual use of qualitative and quantitative methods, in order to best address the 
central research aims of this study. Qualitative research methods are used to reconstruct the 
chronological narrative of civil-military interaction throughout the course of OIF and to 
generate detailed data for each of the dependent and independent variables, while 
quantitative research methods are used to add greater precision and objectivity in analysing 
relationships between the variables. 
 
The original research design of the thesis focused on examining the civil-military relationship in 
the formulation and implementation of US military strategy in both the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, using a purely qualitative approach. While US forces have been deployed for various 
reasons in a number of different countries since September 2001, Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and OIF are the most notable US military interventions of the post-9/11 period 










of the thesis.3 Due to limitations of time, however, and a significant disparity in the volume 
and variety of available sources for the two conflicts, the thesis was later restricted to a single 
case-study of OIF. It should be briefly noted here that the term case-study is used to reflect 
only the thesis’ ‘detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events’ (George and Bennett, 2005, 
p5), rather than to reflect the use of traditional methodologies associated with the case-study 
approach, such as on-site fieldwork, participant observation and interview-driven data 
collection (King et al., 1994).   
 
The absence of comprehensive studies focused explicitly on civil-military interaction in the 
making of US military strategy in OIF inevitably made empirical research a core necessity. As 
discussed in Chapter One, current accounts of the post-9/11 civil-military relationship tend to 
be fragmented and contradictory, while the broader literature concentrates primarily on the 
wider policymaking processes and issues of the George W. Bush administration, thematic 
issues of post-9/11 US civil-military relations, or the evolution of US military strategy. In order 
to construct the narrative of the formulation and implementation of US military strategy in OIF 
and to capture as much of the complex behaviour associated with political decision-making 
and civil-military relations as possible, substantial empirical research was undertaken using a 
combination of existing and emerging literature, primary documentation and published 
interviews. The rich detail and contextual awareness provided by such qualitative research 
methods were necessary in order to be able to accurately determine the relative balance of 
power between civilian policymakers and military leaders and to provide specific details 
relevant to the six independent variables. Despite the importance of narrative construction 
and detail, it was equally imperative that the research remain structured and focused. 
Qualitative research methods have suffered from criticism for being ‘’soft’ and ‘unscientific’’ 
(Snape and Spencer, 2003, p8) and for being of limited use for theoretical testing and 
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 In addition to peacekeeping and stabilisation operations in Yugoslavia, Kosovo, East Timor and Bosnia, 
US forces have been deployed throughout the world as part of the ongoing ‘War on Terror’, conducting 
individual or collaborative anti-terror operations (Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Somalia), assisting, training 
and advising foreign militaries in counter-terrorism (Philippines, Georgia, Horn of Africa) as well as 
conducting various maritime interception operations. US armed forces have also been used at various 
times as a response to rebellion or disorder (Liberia, Haiti, Colombia), the deliverance of humanitarian 
assistance (Liberia), or the protection of US embassies and citizens (Haiti, Lebanon). (Based on 
information provided in: Grimmet, R.F., (2008) ‘Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 
1798-2007’, Congressional Research Report. [online]. Available from: 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32170.pdf [Accessed 24 January 2014] and supplemented by: 
Grossman, Z., (n.d.), ‘From Wounded Knee to Libya: A Century of U.S. Military Operations’. [online] 





development (Yin, 1984). Although such criticisms may legitimately be levied against specific, 
individual examples of qualitative research, they are not universally appropriate and it is 
generally recognised that qualitative research is increasingly moving towards greater 
methodological rigour and precision.   
 
Following extensive research on the evolution of US military strategy and the policymaking 
processes involved, OIF was structurally decomposed into six phases, demarcating the key 
shifts in the evolution of US military strategy. These six phases were further refined into 
eighty-nine individual decision points using the framework of the policymaking process as an 
analytical tool. This process of deconstructing Iraq into individual units for analysis allowed for 
both precision and breadth in identifying the relative balance of civil-military power 
throughout the course of OIF and enabled specific and relevant information for each of the 
independent variables to be collated for each decision point. Quantitative methods were 
subsequently incorporated into the thesis’ research design as the growing scale of OIF as a 
case-study introduced the potential for statistical tests to be employed as an effective tool for 
analysing the volume of decision points generated. While not large in comparison to large-n 
studies, the number of decision points identified for analysis was sizeable enough to 
potentially hinder effective qualitative analysis, whilst also being of sufficient size for 
quantitative analysis. It therefore seemed both appropriate and beneficial to utilise 
quantitative research methods within the thesis’ research design. The initial intent was to use 
multivariate statistical analysis to explore the relationships between all of the variables under 
consideration as one potential theoretical model. However, for reasons explained later in the 
chapter, the eventual use of statistical testing was limited to bivariate correlation tests only. 
The use of such quantitative analysis techniques nonetheless acted as a complement to the 
research aims, allowing for more objective conclusions to be drawn regarding the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables and the relative importance of the 
independent variables in terms of their explanatory potential.  
 
Multi-strategy research designs and the dual use of both quantitative and qualitative methods 
within a single research project have received a mixed reception. Bryman and Teevan (2005) 
suggest that arguments against multi-strategy research primarily stem from epistemological 
issues, whereas arguments from a technical perspective tend to view the two research 
strategies as much more compatible. For this thesis, the mixed methods approach was 
adopted as the best means of fulfilling the research aims as it allowed the objective analysis of 
quantitative methods to complement the contextual complexity of the qualitative research. A 
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single methodology research design, using only qualitative or quantitative methods, could not 
have created the same depth of analysis. Notwithstanding the fact that deficiencies within the 
existing literature on OIF necessitated significant qualitative investigation, even had a full data 
set been readily available, a purely quantitative study would not provide sufficient insight into 
‘the causal process that comprises the hypothesis’ explanation’ (Van Evera, 1997, p55). While 
it would have been possible to conduct a purely qualitative analysis, the quantitative element 
adds great value to the study, not only by strengthening analysis in terms of identifying 
relationships between variables, but also by indicating the strength of those relationships, 




Before addressing the specifics of the research design as employed within this thesis, it is 
necessary to comment on the parameters of the research. Firstly, even though the war in Iraq 
did not officially end until December 15th 2011, during the Barack Obama administration, the 
thesis focuses only on the formulation and implementation of US military strategy under 
George W. Bush. This decision was made in order to maintain as much consistency as possible 
in terms of the civilian and military participants involved and to minimise the impact of 
changes to advisory systems and decision-making processes which are inevitable when 
transitioning to a new administration. As such, the end of George W. Bush’s second term in 
office is used as an end point with which to define the scope of focus. OIF is therefore 
examined over a period of seven years, from the point of the initial inception of military action 
in Iraq in September 2001 until the final major review of US military strategy under George W. 
Bush in April 2008.  
 
In studying US military strategy, the thesis also limits itself to consideration of the formulation 
and implementation of land-based strategy. While there is sometimes a tendency to consider 
the US military as a monolithic entity, different services utilise different doctrines and 
strategies to conduct combat operations with land, sea and air warfare all operating according 
to different principles. The focus on land strategy was chosen as the recent changes in US 
military strategy, both in terms of the defense transformation agenda and the subsequent shift 
towards counterinsurgency, have mostly focused on land-based strategies, primarily impacting 




The final parameter of the thesis worthy of note is the exclusive focus on the interactions 
between senior military leaders and civilian policymakers within the executive branch of 
government. The broader study of civil-military relations inevitably incorporates relations 
between military personnel and a wide range of different civilian groups, from the broader 
civilian society through to the highest levels of government, including Congress. This thesis, 
however, limits itself to considerations of the relationship between senior military leaders and 
the executive branch for three reasons. Firstly, it is the executive branch that generally has the 
most interaction with military leaders in the process of policymaking. Secondly, Congress 
played only a sporadic role in the policymaking processes for OIF. Finally, thirdly, such 




In order to be able to systematically study the relative balance of civil-military power within 
OIF, US military strategy was broken down into six critical phases (Table 2) tracing the 
evolution of military strategy from the initial highly offensive, enemy-centric approach, 
emphasising speed, precision and a lighter footprint, to a manpower-intensive 
counterinsurgency strategy. Each phase represents a change in one of the three core elements 
of strategy, either the political-military objectives of strategy, the resources provided to 
conduct the strategy, or the operational concepts which shape the way in which strategy is 
implemented (Lykke Jr., 2001). Each phase also reflects a critical juncture at which the relative 
balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders was important in 
determining change and the future evolution of US military strategy. Full descriptions of the six 
phases identified within the evolution of OIF are provided in Appendix A.  
 
Table 2. The Six Phases of US Military Strategy in Operation Iraqi Freedom  
Phase One The Invasion of Iraq (November 2001 - May 2003) 
Phase Two Post-invasion Iraq (May 2003 - June 2004) 
Phase Three Train to Transition (June 2004 - November 2005) 
Phase Four Clear, Hold, Build (November 2005 - December 2006) 
Phase Five Surge and Secure (January 2007 - September 2007) 
Phase Six Strategic Patience (September 2007 - April 2008) 
 
The six phases of US military strategy were further broken down into a total of eighty-nine 
decision points using the framework of the policymaking process. In order to ascertain 
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whether the substance of military strategy is influenced to a greater degree by civilian or 
military actors, it is necessary to study the exercise of power in the processes by which 
strategy is shaped and decisions are made. While each phase represents points of change in 
US military strategy, the analysis of policy cannot be limited to a focus solely on ‘decisions' as 
there are several key points throughout the process of policymaking, both before and after a 
decision is made, at which participants can shape policy. In order to be able to systematically 
assess the exercise of power at these different points within the policymaking process, it was 
therefore necessary to impose some conceptual order on the process itself. To this end, this 
thesis employed the dominant paradigm of the policy process (Sabatier, 1991), the 
policymaking cycle, as a means of conceptualising and differentiating between the different 
activities of policymaking and determining the individual decision points under study within 
this thesis.  
 
Since Harold Laswell advanced the first model of the policy process in 1956, a variety of 
typologies have been developed (Jones, 1970; Anderson, 1975; Jenkins, 1978; May and 
Wildavsky, 1978; Brewer and Deleon, 1983; Peters, 1986), progressing from linear and 
sequential models to those which emphasise the cyclical nature of policymaking (Jann and 
Wegrich, 2007). The policymaking model used within this thesis desegregates the policymaking 
process into five different sets of activities corresponding to a different stage of the 
policymaking process: problem identification and agenda-setting, formulation, legitimation, 
implementation, and evaluation. This model is broadly based on that proposed by Charles 
Jones (1970). Jones’ model was chosen from a number of possible typologies as it identifies 
the various stages of opportunity to shape policy throughout the policymaking process, but yet 
remains simple enough to minimise methodological problems associated with applying the 
framework to substantive policy issues. Many of the later models offer further differentiation 
between sub-stages (Jann and Wegrich, 2007), complicating their practical application to 
empirical evidence. Jones’ (1970) model is essentially replicated here, with two adaptations. 
Firstly, the first stage of the model has been expanded to more explicitly reflect agenda-setting 
activities as well as problem identification activities and the fourth stage is termed as 
implementation, rather than application, simply because the terminology is more familiar to 
military strategy. A description of each stage of the policymaking process, as used within this 
thesis, is provided in Appendix B. 
 
Despite their continued use, models of the policymaking process have been subject to 
significant criticisms regarding their descriptive accuracy and conceptual value. Though the 
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policymaking cycle advances upon the stages model, it still suggests that policymaking 
progresses through a series of chronological and distinct sets of activities, when in reality they 
may be blurred together, may not occur chronologically or may not occur at all (Jann and 
Wegrich, 2007). Further to this, policymaking models contain within their structure an 
assumption that policymaking proceeds through a coherent and rational process (Lindblom 
and Woodhouse, 1993) when this is often not the case. Indeed, the gap between the simplicity 
of the model and the complexity of practice becomes evident when attempting to apply the 
framework to empirical evidence. Difficulties can arise in distinguishing between the different 
stages and separating out the evidence accordingly or even in finding evidence specific to each 
stage.  
 
While such criticisms regarding descriptive accuracy and the associated methodological 
problems serve as warnings, they do not render the policymaking model useless. Simplification 
is inevitable in constructing a model of this kind; indeed, it is one of the central purposes. 
Although it may not always be an accurate reflection of all instances of policymaking, the 
conceptual distinctions made between the different activities taking place at different points 
of the policy process are nonetheless rooted in reality. As Peter Deleon (2007) argues, 
‘although they certainly can merge with one another, each does have a distinctive 
characteristic and mannerism and process that gives the individual stage a life and presence of 
its own’ (p21). As such it can provide a useful framework, not only for capturing the evolution 
of policy, but also for assessing ‘the cumulative effects of the various actors, forces and 
institutions that interact in the policy process and therefore shape its outcome(s)’ (Jann and 
Wegrich, 2007, p44). Despite a number of criticisms regarding the utility of the policymaking 
framework in terms of theory (Sabatier, 1991), the application of the model is not directly 
intended to be predictive, either in general or in its use within this thesis. While the 
breakdown of the policymaking process into ‘stages’ may essentially be artificial, it is a useful 
analytic tool which helps impose a degree of order on a complicated process and, in this 
respect, the utility of the model outweigh its weaknesses.  
 
Using the five stages of the policymaking process each of the six phases of US military strategy 
was further refined into its composite decision points, providing the individual unit of analysis 
for this thesis. An illustration of this refining process, as applied to the first phase of US military 





Table 3. A Breakdown of Decision Points for Phase One of US Military Strategy in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom   
 















DP 1.1: Raising and accepting potential military action in 
Iraq as an issue on the immediate post-9/11 National 
Security agenda  
DP 1.2: Deciding to pursue an ‘Afghanistan first’ approach 
in the ‘War on Terror’, effectively postponing military 
action in Iraq.  
DP 1.3: Initiating military planning processes within the 
Department of Defense for a possible invasion of Iraq. 
Formulation 
DP 2.1: Determining the objectives of military strategy for 
the initial invasion plan. 
DP 2.2: Determining the necessary US force levels for the 
initial invasion plan. 
DP 2.3: Determining the operational concepts of military 
strategy for the initial invasion plan. 
Legitimation 
DP 3: Accepting a final iteration of the invasion plan, 
approved for action.   
Implementation  
DP 4.1: Changing the timing of the start of the ground war 
for OIF and advancing the main land attack by one day, 
commencing ground action prior to air strikes.  
DP 4.2: Deciding whether to act on intelligence regarding 
the potential location of Saddam Hussein and strike at 
Dora Farms. 
DP 4.3: Deciding whether to include the 4th Infantry 
Division as part of the push to Baghdad.  
DP 4.4: Initiating a pause in military operations before 
entering Baghdad in order to clear resistance and secure 
supply lines.  
DP 4.5: Deciding whether additional forces were needed 
for the final advancement into Baghdad. 
DP 4.6: Implementing an improvised ‘Thunder Run’ into 
Baghdad. 




DP 5.1: Calling an end to major combat operations and 
transitioning to postwar stability, support and 
reconstruction operations. 
DP 5.2: Issuing the order to commence the withdrawal of 
US war-fighting units from Iraq. 
DP 5.3: Off-ramping US forces, already inbound for Iraq, 
deemed unnecessary for the transition to postwar 
operations.   
 
As illustrated by Table 3, some stages of the policymaking process generate more than one 
decision point for reasons of empirical and methodological precision. Formulation and 
implementation stages generate multiple decision points as these are broader in scope and 
usually of longer duration. The formulation stage for each phase of US military strategy 
generates three decision points, relating to each one of the three main components of 
strategy; the setting of objectives, the determining of resources, and the selection of operating 
concepts (Lykke Jr., 2001). This not only allows greater analytical precision but solves 
methodological difficulties involved in determining one coding for each variable within a 
complex policymaking process. Implementation stages, which can be of considerable duration, 
are also broken down into a number of key decisions or events. Without such measures, it 
would be too difficult to produce a single coding for each variable which accurately reflects 
and captures the many decisions and events which may occur during the implementation 
phase.  
 
Other decision points which are particularly complex are also broken down into separate 
decision points. As set out in Table 3, Phase One of US military strategy, ‘The invasion of Iraq 
(November 2001 - May 2003)’, generates a total of seventeen decision points (DPs). DP 1 is 
characterised by three main points: the acceptance of Iraq onto the immediate post-9/11 
national security agenda (DP 1.1); the subsequent decision to pursue an Afghanistan first 
approach (DP 1.2); and the ultimate decision to action the issue of Iraq reflected in the 
President’s order to the Department of Defense to commence planning for an invasion (DP 
1.3). DP 2, the formulation of the military plan for the initial invasion of Iraq, is also split into 
three, as outlined above: the setting of objectives (DP 2.1); the allocation of resources (DP 2.2); 
and the determination of operational concepts (DP 2.3). The decision to legitimate the 
invasion plan is DP 3, while the implementation phase, DP 4, is split into seven key events or 
decisions made within the course of the invasion plan itself (DPs 4.1–4.7). Following the 
invasion, there were then three separate events which represented different forms of 
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evaluation of the war to date: DP 5.1 marks the decision to call an end to major combat 
operations, thereby signifying the ‘end’ of the war; DP 5.2 reflects the decision to begin 
planning for the drawdown of US forces; and DP 5.3 captures the decision to off-ramp US units 
already in-bound to Iraq.   
 
By applying the stages of the policymaking process to the six phases of US military strategy, a 
total of eighty-nine decision points were produced for analysis, a full list of which is presented 
in Appendix C. Although the selection of the eighty-nine decision points was primarily 
determined by the evolution of US military strategy and the application of the policymaking 
model, personal judgment inevitably played some part in the selection process; including or 
omitting decision points based on their relative significance to the main research questions 
under study and the availability of source information. On no occasion were decision points 
chosen on the basis of the actual or suspected performance of any of the variables under 
examination. Overall, the sampling design used within this thesis, as described above, fulfills 
the demands of the research in two related ways. Firstly, the number of selected decision 
points covers the breadth of the period in question and ensures that the sample population is 
as representative of the period under study as possible. Secondly, the use of the policymaking 
model as a means of deconstructing the policymaking process ensures that the hypotheses are 
tested across a diverse range of decision points.  
 
DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Once the chronology of decision points was in place, source material was compiled for each 
with a view to reconstructing the policymaking process at that particular point. As this thesis 
has had to generate its own complete data set, specific to the research aims pursued herein, it 
has inevitably drawn upon the existing literature and available evidence in order to do so. This 
section of the chapter addresses the processes, as well as some of the problems, involved in 
data collection.  
 
Three aspects of the thesis’ research area are problematic for the collection of evidence: 1) the 
focus on the policymaking process; 2) the contemporaneity of the case-study; and 3) the 
policymaking area under study. Reconstructing the processes that explain and account for why 
particular outcomes emerged is always difficult given the often highly complex nature of the 
policymaking process and the imperfect evidence available. The evolution of the policy process 
can be difficult to trace and is often composed of activities, actions and motivations that are 
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not recorded in any formal means. As described by Sarkesian et al. (2008), examining the 
policy process within the US political system is ‘like trying to find the beginning of a spiderweb’ 
(p167). The very recent occurrence of OIF adds a further dimension of difficulty to this initial 
problem as, compared with historical case-studies of decision-making, the primary evidence 
available for use in this study is minimal with official government documentation regarding the 
decision-making of the George W. Bush administration for the conflict in Iraq likely to remain 
unavailable to the public domain for many years to come. The third problem arises from the 
fact that secrecy is often paramount in matters relating to foreign affairs, national security or 
defense, again reducing the potential pool of evidence.  
 
Despite these challenges, the controversies of the George W. Bush administration and the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated significant interest, which in turn has increased 
the availability of relevant primary sources as well as producing a large volume of secondary 
source literature, written from a variety of perspectives with various points of focus. Media 
and journalistic interest has produced some particularly useful sources such as a series of 
interviews conducted by Frontline (PBS), the transcripts of which are freely available on their 
website, providing access to the thoughts, perspectives and opinions informed people, many 
of whom had direct involvement in the policymaking process. The highly contentious nature of 
politics and foreign affairs over the past eight years has also produced a number of first-hand 
accounts from participants including those by Douglas Feith (2008), Paul Bremer (2006), 
Colonel Pete Mansoor (2008), General Tommy Franks (2005), General Richard Myers (2009), 
General Ricardo Sanchez (2009), Ali Allawi (2007), George W. Bush (2010) and Donald 
Rumsfeld (2011). Donald Rumsfeld’s memoir, Known and Unknown (2011), was even 
accompanied by an archival website of resources from his period in office 
(http://papers.rumsfeld.com/). A number of journalists have also used their access, resources 
and research to compile histories of recent events, including those by Bob Woodward (2003, 
2004, 2006, 2008), Tom Ricks (2006, 2009) and Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor (2007). 
The research and endeavours of other academics and scholars have also been widely used to 
help try and reconstruct the policymaking processes for OIF. All sources are duly referenced 
throughout and listed in the bibliography. As any and all evidence may be subject to bias in its 
assertions or distortions in its facts and descriptions, I have sought to corroborate key pieces 
of evidence between a number of sources wherever possible. 
 
Throughout the course of the research data collection was managed by systematically 
compiling a written record of evidence and sources for each decision point. Each file contained 
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a narrative overview and recorded relevant information for the dependent variable and each 
of the six independent variables. The structured nature of the research inquiry helped to focus 
the data collection so that only the relevant information was recorded. The method of 
recording data, by variable, also helped to manage the large volume of data and to 




Once the raw data had been collected and collated, each variable was then coded according to 
the available information. Great importance was laid on operationalising the variables in a 
meaningful, accurate and measurable way with a clearly articulated system of coding to 
facilitate analysis. The process of determining how a variable was to be measured and coded 
was an iterative process which developed as the research progressed. The challenges of the 
coding process mainly stemmed from transforming concepts into measurable variables. In the 
early research stage, initial coding systems were devised for each variable based on related 
theoretical understanding and existing examples of operationalised variables. The final 
versions, however, were mostly the result of inductive analysis (Patton, 1990) and a process by 
which ‘the salient categories emerge from the data’ (Marshall and Rossman, 1995, p114). A 
code book was thus iteratively developed to determine how each variable was to be measured 
and how corresponding numerical values, appropriate for quantitative analysis, were to be 
allocated. The iterative nature of the development of the coding systems enabled several tests 
in order for refinement with regard to the accuracy and relevance of measurement. The next 
section of the chapter presents the fundamentals of the code book utilised in the research, 
providing a description of the coding systems for the dependent variable and each of the six 
independent variables.  
 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DV): THE RELATIVE BALANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY POWER  
 
The dependent variable of this study is the civil-military balance of power in determining US 
military strategy. It seeks to identify the locus of power at each of the eighty-nine decision 
points within OIF in order to ascertain to what extent civilian policymakers or military leaders 
had the greatest impact on determining the outcomes of policymaking. Although the study of 
power in political science remains a contested concept, it nonetheless requires definition as it 




In this study, the term civil-military balance of power refers to the relative ability of civilian 
policymakers or military leaders to realise their preferences in the outcomes of decision 
points. If ‘the central idea in the concept of power . . . is connected with getting what one 
wants’ (Goldman, 1986, p157), in a pluralist policymaking process where both the 
responsibility to determine US military strategy and the power to shape it are shared between 
civilian policymakers and military leaders, the relative balance of power can be identified 
through a study of the relationship between wants and outcomes (Lukes, 1986). Whether the 
outcomes of decision points more strongly reflect civilian preferences, military preferences or 
some combination of both, therefore serves as an indicator of the relative balance of power at 
that point; as Steven Lukes (1986) has noted, ‘power lies where a certain proposed difference 
to significant outcomes can be made, or resisted’ (p15).  
 
Using outcomes as an indicator of the locus of power is an established methodology for 
analysing pluralist power structures used by such scholars as Robert Dahl (2005), Michael 
Desch (2001) and Peter Feaver (2003). As the focus of this study is control of US military 
strategy, it is important to recognise that the conception of power employed within this thesis 
is not predicated on the ability to control behaviour. Unlike other definitions and 
measurements of power, codings of the dependent variable do not necessarily recognise 
whether ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957, p202-203). While in many cases the power to determine the 
outcome of policymaking inevitably involves exercising power over other actors, this is not 
always the case. Military leaders may be able to determine the outcome of a decision point in 
accordance with their preferences without necessarily exerting power over civilian 
policymakers in the process (for example, if civilian policymakers express no preference and 
defer automatically to the military on a particular decision point).  
 
If civilian policymakers and military leaders share power and if the principle of civilian control 
does not necessarily ensure that civilian preferences are reflected in the outcomes of 
policymaking then the relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and military 
leaders may vary. Table 4 presents the five variations of the relative balance of civil-military 












Variation of DV Coding Description 
0 Civilian 
Dominance 
A coding of Civilian Dominance is given when the outcome of 





A coding of Shared Dominance Civilian is given when the 
outcome of the decision point reflects the preferences of 
both civilian policymakers and military leaders, but reflects 




A coding of Shared Dominance is given when the preferences 
of both civilian policymakers and military leaders are equally 




A coding of Shared Military Dominance is given when the 
outcome of the decision point reflects the preferences of 
both civilian policymakers and military leaders, but reflects 




A coding of Military Dominance is given when the outcome of 
the decision point most closely reflects the preferences of 
military leaders.  
8 Indeterminable Insufficient information to code.  
 
 
In order to determine how each decision point is coded for the dependent variable, it is first 
necessary to identify the preferences of the civilian policymakers and military leaders involved 
and the outcome of the decision point. Codings are made on the basis of two points: 1) the 
extent to which the outcome of the decision point reflects either the preferences of civilian 
policymakers, the preferences of military leaders or an amalgam of both; and 2) the presence 
of evidence to confirm that specific preferences shaped the outcome in a significant manner 
(Lukes, 1986).  
 
An assessment of preferences and outcomes provides an indicator of the relative balance of 
power based on whether civilian or military preferences are most reflected in the outcome of 
the decision point. For example, in DP 1.1 civilian policymakers were far more open to the idea 
of considering military action in Iraq than military leaders, who opposed it (Woodward, 2002; 
Clarke, 2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). As Iraq 
was indeed initially accepted onto the national security agenda, evidenced by its recurrent 
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discussion in meetings between 12th and 17th September (Woodward, 2002; Clarke, 2004), it 
was the preferences of civilian policymakers which prevailed over military preferences to 
determine the outcome of this decision point. A coding of Civilian Dominance is therefore 
allocated when the preferences of civilian policymakers are most reflected in the outcome of a 
decision point and a coding of Military Dominance is allocated when the outcome most 
reflects military preferences. A decision point is coded as Shared Dominance when both the 
preferences of civilian policymakers and military leaders are reflected in the outcome, either 
as a result of consensus or as a result of a compromise indicative of parity. Decision points are 
coded as Shared Dominance Civilian and Shared Dominance Military when the outcomes 
reflect the preferences of both civilian policymakers and military leaders, but when one 
preference is more dominant within the outcome than the other. For example, DP 7.1, the 
formulation of the objectives of US military strategy for the immediate post-invasion phase, is 
coded as Shared Military Dominance as although civilian guidance and preferences were 
broadly reflected in the outcomes, it was the preferences of military leaders that had the 
greatest determinative impact on the how civilian guidance was interpreted and how 
objectives were subsequently articulated.  
 
Imperative in any coding for the dependent variable is evidence of impact. Coding cannot 
wholly rely on the observation of a preference being reflected in the outcome of a decision 
point; evidence is required to demonstrate that preferences substantively shaped the 
outcome, indicative of a causal effect, rather than just a correlation. For example, in late 2003 
a debate arose over whether to delay the planned transfer of authority to an interim Iraqi 
government (DP 9.4). Both the President and senior military leaders were of the view that the 
transfer should not be delayed and the transfer went ahead as planned. Although the outcome 
of this decision point ostensibly reflected the preferences of both civilian policymakers and 
military leaders, the impact of their preferences were not equal as the empirical evidence 
suggests that the views of military leaders did not play a significant role in shaping the 
outcome of this highly political decision (Rumsfeld, 2011). The coding of this particular decision 
point is therefore one of Civilian Dominance as it was the preferences of civilian policymakers 
that had the greatest casual impact on the outcome. Evidence of impact can usually be 
identified contextually through a variety of means: in the authority of a position (i.e. a 
presidential decision); integral involvement in decision-making processes; or through evidence 
of compromise and negotiation. Likewise, the absence of impact can be determined through: 
non-involvement; a deference of civilian policymakers to military leaders or vice versa; or 
evidence suggesting that particular views or preferences were not taken into direct account.  
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ONE (IV1): CIVIL-MILITARY PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE  
 
This variable measures the degree of divergence between the preferred outcomes of civilian 
policymakers and military leaders for each decision point. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
conflict between civilian policymakers and military leaders is not inevitable, though a variety of 
factors may make preference divergence a distinct possibility. Further to this, given the 
general proclivity of the policymaking process towards compromise and consensus building, 
preference divergence need not be a dichotomous variable. Rather, there may be differing 
degrees of difference between civilian and military preferences for the outcomes of 
policymaking. Accordingly, this variable has three values, ranging from low to high, definitions 
of which are provided below in Table 5.  
 




Value of IV Coding Description 
0 Low  A coding of low preference divergence is given when civilian 
policymakers and military leaders share the same preferences 
for the outcome of the decision point or when either civilian 
policymakers or military leaders defer to the preferences of 
the other. 
1 Medium  A coding of medium preference divergence is given when 
civilian policymakers and military leaders broadly agree on a 
particular preferred outcome, but disagree over the details of 
that outcome.  
2 High  A coding of high preference divergence is given when civilian 
policymakers and military leaders hold preferences for 
mutually exclusive outcomes.  
8 Indeterminable Insufficient information for coding. 
9 Not applicable Variable not relevant.  
 
 
To code this variable, the preferences of the civilian policymakers and military leaders involved 
are identified within the empirical literature. The two preference sets are then compared to 
determine the degree of preference divergence evident between them. Codings of low 
preference divergence may reflect the positive agreement between civilian policymakers and 
military leaders over the preferred decision point outcome or situations in which no 
preference divergence is registered, such as when civilian policymakers defer to the 
preferences of the military or when military leaders defer to the preferences of civilian 
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policymakers. For example, DP 14.3 receives a coding of low preference divergence as both 
civilian policymakers and military leaders independently held views that a second operation in 
Fallujah in November 2004 was essential to facilitating the upcoming Iraqi election in January 
2005 (Rumsfeld, 2011; West, 2009, Woodward, 2008). DP 4.1 is also coded as a low preference 
divergence as civilian policymakers deferred to the preference of General Franks for changing 
the timing of the start of the ground war during the initial invasion of Iraq (Rumsfeld, 2011; 
McKiernan, 2004).  
 
Decision points are coded as medium preference divergence when the preferences of civilian 
policymakers and military leaders overlap to a degree, but still contain elements of difference. 
This coding mostly occurs when civilian policymakers and military leaders are broadly in 
agreement over the preferred outcome, but differ over the details of the decision. This is 
illustrated in DPs 2.2 and 9.6. In DP 2.2 a coding of medium preference divergence reflects the 
broad level of agreement between key civilian policymakers and military leaders over a light 
footprint of US troops for the initial invasion of Iraq (Franks, 2005), but also captures tensions 
between the two over the exact number of necessary forces (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). In DP 
9.6, the coding of medium preference divergence reflects the agreement of civilian 
policymakers and military leaders regarding the need for military action in Fallujah in April 
2004, but a disagreement over issues of timing (Sanchez, 2009; Bremer, 2006). 
 
Decision points are coded as high preference divergence when civilian policymakers and 
military leaders hold distinctly different preferences regarding the desired outcome. DP 6 
illustrates high preference divergence as civilian policymakers and military leaders were clearly 
divided in their views over the nature of the war in Iraq at the time; General Abizaid sought to 
recognise an emerging ‘guerrilla war’ (Knowlton, 2003), while civilian policymakers vehemently 
opposed this assessment (Ricks, 2007; Woodward, 2006).  
 
If there is insufficient information to determine preferences, decision points are coded as 8. A 
precondition of all codings for the civil-military preference divergence variable is involvement. 
Participants may be involved and not hold a specific preference, but a decision point cannot be 
coded as low preference divergence if it does not involve the active participation of both 
civilian policymakers and military leaders. In cases of non-involvement of either civilian 
policymakers or military leaders, the decision point is coded as 9 as the variable is not relevant 




In addition to the coding descriptions provided above, the complexity of the policymaking 
process and the variety of contextual conditions between decision points raises two key issues: 
1) how to code when there are multiple preferences within either the civilian or military group; 
and 2) how to code when either civilian policymakers or military leaders change their 
preference during the course of a decision point.  
 
While the focus of this variable is inevitably on the degree of difference between the 
preferences of civilian policymakers and military leaders, the coding process needs to 
acknowledge the possibility of multiple civilian and military preferences. When there are 
multiple preferences amongst either the civilian or military groups, the degree of divergence is 
measured between the two dominant preferences held within those groups. The dominant 
preference is identified according to the circumstances of each decision point. If there are 
multiple preference points between civilians then deference is usually paid to the preference 
of the president. However, if the president does not express a clear preference on a particular 
issue, the dominant preference is taken as either that held by the majority or those most 
closely involved. In cases of multiple views between military leaders, the preference held by 
the majority is also identified as the dominant preference, though on occasions where no 
majority is present, deference is given to the senior military commander on the ground, 
usually either the CENTCOM commander or the ground commander. 
 
While only occurring in a very small number of decision points, civilian policymakers or military 
leaders occasionally changed their mind regarding their preferred option during the course of 
the decision point thereby presenting the issue of whether the coding should be made at the 
beginning or the end of the decision point process. On these instances, decisions regarding the 
final coding were made depending on the context of the decision point itself. If participants 
appeared to genuinely change their mind or if their opposition was not explicitly articulated 
within the policymaking process, the decision point was coded as having low preference 
divergence. For example, in DP 15.1, President Bush had reservations about extending the 
military’s existing advisory role to the Iraqi Security Forces (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009) though he 
ultimately approved the recommendations of the 2005 Department of Defense review to 
extend the US military’s ISF advisory programme. Though Bush may have had reservations, 
these do not appear to have been clearly articulated within the policymaking process and the 
decision point was coded accordingly as low preference divergence. If participants appeared to 
effectively cease opposing an alternative option, rather than actively agreeing with it, then the 
decision point is coded as high preference divergence. For example, in DP 5.3, military leaders 
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disagreed with Rumsfeld over whether or not the in-bound units to Iraq should be off-ramped 
following the end of major combat operations or allowed to proceed (Gordon and Trainor, 
2007). Rumsfeld was keen for the troops to be off-ramped, while Generals Franks and 
McKiernan initially preferred that the units continue their transport to Iraq as planned. 
According to the empirical evidence, although Franks eventually acquiesced, this appears to be 
more a response to the pressure being applied by Rumsfeld, rather than a genuine change of 
heart (Gordon and Trainor, 2007).  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE TWO (IV2): CIVILIAN ASSERTIVENESS 
 
This variable measures how assertive civilian policymakers are in advancing their preferences 
vis-a-vis the military. Using the empirical evidence available, the level of civilian assertiveness 
is determined by considering how strongly civilian policymakers pursue their preferences in 
the policymaking process and the extent of the monitoring which civilians engage in to ensure 
that their preferences are being carried out. Civilian assertiveness is measured on a scale from 
0 to 5, with 0 being the lowest level of assertiveness and 5 being the highest. The scale reflects 
behaviours of increasing intensity from civilian policymakers from deferring to military leaders 
or expressing no preference, through to an articulation of a preference, argument and debate, 
continued advocacy of a preference and finally, to over-ruling military advice and using civilian 
authority to order the military to undertake an action. 
 
The continuum used within this thesis is based on that devised by Steve Yetiv (2001) in his test 
of the governmental politics model in US decision-making in the Persian Gulf War. In seeking 
to test the assumption that participants in the policymaking process will ‘promote different 
recommendations, bargain over outcomes, and generate conflict’ (Yetiv, 2001, p57), Yetiv 
devises a continuum of actions that reflect increasing levels of bargaining or governmental 
politics. The continuum starts with explanation, increases to bargaining and then advocacy, 
and culminates at rivalry. Although the assertiveness variable as employed within this thesis is 
not premised on the presence of preference divergence, Yetiv’s (2001) continuum nonetheless 
provides a basic framework for distinguishing between different types and strengths of 
behaviour and, as such, forms the basis for the assertiveness scale.  
 
Adaptations have been made to Yetiv’s (2001) model to more accurately capture the variations 
in assertiveness more relevant to the civil-military relationship, including an additional level of 
assertiveness to reflect occasions in which civilian policymakers may not have the opportunity 
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to express a preference, or may delegate or defer to the military, and an additional level to 
reflect the ultimate ability of civilian policymakers to issue an order to the military. The civilian 
assertiveness scale also incorporates increasing levels of assertive behaviour in terms of the 
levels of civilian monitoring and oversight of the military. This may be reflected in an increase 
in levels of civilian involvement in a decision point, changes in the level of civilian control 
exercised over the specifics of military actions (such as the wording of mission statements or 
control of resources), or wide-scale civilian-led reviews of US military strategy. Codings for this 
variable may therefore reflect civilian assertiveness in terms of both the advancement of 
preferences and the level of monitoring, or one or the other. While one might expect a 
correlation between the strength of preferences (reflected in different degrees of 
assertiveness from articulation to authority) and the level of monitoring and oversight, this 
may not always be the case. Civilians may order the military to execute a particular decision, 
but not necessarily be as assertive in ensuring it is complied with or may be intimately involved 
in a particular decision point, even though there is a significant degree of consensus between 
civilian policymakers and military leaders over what to do. A summary of the coding 
descriptions for each value of the civilian assertiveness variable is summarised in Table 6 and 
discussed in greater detail below. 
 





0 A coding of 0 is given when civilian policymakers express no preferences due to 
non-involvement, hold no specific preferences for the outcome of the decision 
point, or defer to the military to determine the outcome of the decision point. 
1 A coding of 1 is given when civilian policymakers articulate a preference regarding 
the outcome of the decision point which has a substantive impact on the 
outcome. 
2 A coding of 2 is given when civilian policymakers engage in debate or argument in 
favour of their preference and/or demonstrate low levels of monitoring and 
oversight of military leaders. 
3 A coding of 3 is given when civilian policymakers advocate for a particular 
outcome, holding and working towards preferences over a sustained period of 
time and/or demonstrate medium levels of monitoring and oversight of military 
leaders. 
4 A coding of 4 is given when civilian policymakers engage in highly orchestrated 
efforts to realise their preferences in the outcomes of decision points and/or 
demonstrate high levels of monitoring and oversight of military leaders. 
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5 A coding of 5 is given when civilian policymakers issue an express order to the 
military to carry out a particular preference.  
8 Insufficient information for coding. 
 
The lowest level of assertiveness, a coding of 0, is allocated when civilians have no preferences 
to assert, either through neutrality or a total delegation or deferment to the advice, 
recommendations or decision-making capabilities of military leaders. For example, a number 
of the decision points during the implementation phases of the initial invasion of Iraq and the 
surge are coded as 0 to reflect the high level of civilian deference to military leaders to 
determine the outcomes of decision points. Civilian assertiveness is also coded as 0 when 
civilians play no part in the decision point outcome. DP 15.2 is coded as such as civilian 
policymakers appeared to play no direct role in the military led review of 2005.  
 
Civilian assertiveness is coded as 1 when civilian policymakers articulate an independent 
preference regarding the outcome of a decision point, though engage in no further effort to 
advance preferences beyond this initial communication. For example, DP 5.2 receives a coding 
of 1 for civilian assertiveness as civilian leaders expressed their views in support of a post-
invasion drawdown of US forces (Sanchez, 2009; Gordon and Trainor, 2007), but took no 
further action in support of this preference (largely as civilian policymakers and military 
leaders were in agreement and their preference was readily complied with).  
 
A coding of 2 captures a stronger assertion of preferences and a more active interest in getting 
a preference realised, involving engagement in debate and argument in favour of their 
preferred course of action. DP 5.3 is coded as a 2 for civilian assertiveness as Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld and General Franks debated the matter for several days (Gordon and 
Trainor, 2007) before resolving the issue of whether units anticipated in Iraq shortly after the 
end of the invasion should be ‘off-ramped’. Civilian policymakers also engaged in debate and 
discussion with military leaders (Sanchez, 2009; Bremer, 2006), but engaged in no more 
assertive behaviour, over the proposed cease-fire in Fallujah in April 2004 (DP 9.9.1) before 
military leaders acquiesced to the political exigencies of the situation. A coding of 2 may also 
reflect a low-level increase in levels of monitoring and oversight. For example, in response to 
civilian concerns over progress in Iraq, civilian policymakers organised a meeting at Camp 
David in June 2006 where military leaders were called upon to provide updated information 
regarding US military strategy, therefore reflecting an increased environment of civilian 
oversight. (The meeting only reflected a low level of monitoring and oversight, however, as the 
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meeting was primarily explorative, ending in a unanimous agreement for the continuation of 
the current US military strategy.)   
 
A coding of 3 is allocated when civilian policymakers go beyond engaging in debate and 
presenting arguments and enter into clear advocacy of a particular option. The distinction 
between argument and advocacy is usually reflected in a more sustained effort to advance a 
particular preference. For example, in determining the operational concepts for the initial 
invasion plan (DP 2.3) civilian policymakers asserted their preferences for a light and lethal 
military operation repeatedly throughout numerous iterations of the plan (Gordon and 
Trainor, 2007; Woodward, 2004; Ricks, 2007), though once the core elements were in place 
civilians deferred to military leaders to determine the specifics. DP 1.1 is also coded as a 3 for 
civilian assertiveness as civilian policymakers repeatedly brought up the issue of Iraq on the 
post-9/11 national security agenda, in meetings, press briefings and memos (Woodward, 2002; 
Clarke, 2004; Mazarr, 2007). A coding of 3 may also be given when civilian policymakers 
engage in medium level monitoring or oversight, reflected by a consistent level of involvement 
in the decision point. DP 15.3 reflects such an increase in oversight as representatives of the 
State Department visit Iraq throughout the course of 2005 with a view to reviewing US policy 
in Iraq (Woodward, 2006, 2008; Zelikow, 2007). While not specifically focused on military 
strategy, the review was in part motivated by concerns over military practice and the 
worsening situation in Iraq and involved State Department officials observing and speaking to 
military commanders on the ground (Zelikow, 2007).  
 
Level 4 civilian assertiveness reflects highly orchestrated efforts by civilian policymakers to 
realise their preferences in the outcomes of decision points. DP 6 is coded as a 4 as civilian 
policymakers persistently countered Abizaid’s assessment of the war in Iraq as ‘guerrilla war’ 
(Ricks, 2007; Woodward, 2006) and made efforts to control Abizaid’s public announcements 
(Cloud and Jaffe, 2009) as well as controlling the use of terminology to describe the war (Sepp, 
2007a, 2007b). Civilian policymakers were also highly assertive during decision-making in 2007 
in their advancement of the surge plan. An early preference of both President Bush and 
National Security Advisor (NSA) Stephen Hadley (Woodward, 2008; Feaver, 2010), key civilians 
clearly orchestrated their efforts towards instigating change in US military strategy, over the 
opposition of military leaders, and highlighting the surge plan as a viable policy option. Civilian 
efforts were directed towards building consensus over time (West, 2009), insisting that 
military leaders include the surge option in their assessments (Woodward, 2008), instructing 
the JCS to re-examine alternatives to the existing strategy (West, 2009) and giving the military 
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the chance to ‘pitch the surge as its own idea’ (Woodward, 2008, p171). Level 4 also reflects a 
high level of civilian involvement in the decision point and unusually high levels of monitoring 
of military leaders and military activities. For example, in determining the troop levels for the 
first rotation of US forces (DP 7.2) civilian policymakers not only made persistent efforts to 
reduce force levels and contest military troop requests (Wright and Reese, 2008), but also 
retained tight control over force movements as all mobilisation requests depended on 
individual approval by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (Sanchez, 2009). Behaviours at level 4 
represent the highest level of civilian assertiveness without resorting to an explicit order.   
 
Civilian policymakers are at their most assertive when they exercise the authority they possess 
via the chain of command or the prerogative of civilian control to essentially order the military 
to execute a civilian decision. This might be the culmination of a progressive increase in 
assertiveness, although civilian policymakers may not necessarily engage in other lower level 
activities prior to issuing an order. Level 5 civilian assertiveness behaviour is illustrated in the 
civilian decision to launch Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah in April 2004, over the 
opposition of military leaders (DP 9.6). The highest level of civilian assertive is also evident in 
DPs 22.1 and 22.3, during the formulation of the surge plan as President Bush effectively over-
ruled the opposition of his primary military advisors in deciding on a new population security 
objective for US military strategy and the implementation of a new counterinsurgency strategy 
(Feaver, 2011; Metz, 2008).  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE THREE (IV3): MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS 
 
This variable measures how assertive military leaders are in advancing their preferences vis-a-
vis civilian policymakers throughout the various stages of the policymaking process. Using the 
empirical evidence available, the level of military assertiveness is determined by considering 
how strongly military leaders seek to advance their preferences vis-a-vis civilian policymakers 
and the degree of resistance demonstrated by military leaders to civilian preferences. 
Comparable to the civilian assertiveness variable in terms of structure and also based on 
Yetiv’s (2001) continuum of governmental politics behaviour, the military assertiveness 
variable is measured on a continuous scale from 0 to 5. The variations between the different 













0 A coding of 0 is given when military leaders express no preference due to non-
involvement, neutrality or as a result of immediate compliance with civilian 
preferences. 
1 A coding of 1 is given when military leaders express a preference regarding the 
outcome of the decision point, present objective advice, or take autonomous, 
delegated, routine action. 
2 A coding of 2 is given when military leaders engage in debate or argument in 
favour of their preferences or demonstrate low levels of resistance to 
compliance with civilian preferences. 
3 A coding of 3 is given when military leaders advocate for a particular outcome, 
holding and working towards preferences usually over a sustained period of time 
or demonstrate medium levels of resistance to compliance with civilian 
preferences. 
4 A coding of 4 is given when military leaders engage in highly orchestrated efforts 
to advance their preference or demonstrate high levels of resistance to 
compliance with civilian preferences. 
5 A coding of 5 is given when military leaders demonstrate extraordinary initiative 
in autonomous decision-making or when they fail to comply with civilian 
preferences, fail to implement civilian decisions or supplant civilian preferences 
with their own.  
8 Insufficient information for coding.  
 
 
A coding of 0, the lowest level of assertiveness, is allocated when military leaders assert no 
preference as to the outcome of the decision point. This may result from non-involvement, 
neutrality, or through immediate compliance with civilian direction. Military assertiveness is 
coded as 1 when military leaders present a preference via the articulation and explanation of 
advice or recommendations. Preferences are stated, but with no further effort beyond this 
initial communication. This usually arises in situations where civilian policymakers and military 
leaders agree, such as in DP 3 where both civilian policymakers and military leaders expressed 
a preference in favour of legitimating the invasion plan for Iraqi (Myers, 2009; Woodward, 
2004), or when civilian policymakers defer to the preferences of military leaders.  
 
A coding of 2 captures a stronger assertion of preferences where military leaders engage in 
debate and argument in favour of their preferred course of action or demonstrate low levels of 
resistance to civilian preferences. For example, during the determination of the operational 
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concepts for the invasion plan (DP 2.3) military leaders were compelled to contest some of the 
suggestions from civilian policymakers and argue against their inclusion (Franks, 2005; Gordon 
and Trainor, 2007). 
 
A coding of 3 is allocated when military leaders go beyond engaging in debate and presenting 
arguments and enter into clear advocacy of a particular option, holding and working towards 
preferences over a sustained period of time, thereby demonstrating medium levels of 
resistance to civilian preferences. In DP 7.2 military leaders demonstrated such assertiveness 
through their maintenance of a constant preference to maintain a base-line of forces for the 
first rotation of US forces in OIF, despite repeated efforts from civilian policymakers to reduce 
the overall force level (Ball, n.d.).  
 
Level 4 military assertiveness behaviours reflect orchestrated military action in favour of their 
preferred outcome or a high level of military resistance to compliance with civilian 
preferences. This is usually identified in terms of military leaders taking action outside 
decision-making forums to advance their preferences including: the use of the media; making 
public statements which directly oppose civilian preferences; deliberately stalling on the 
implementation of decisions; seeking to offset one civilian group against another; or seeking 
cooperation and support from other sources outside of the military. General John Abizaid’s 
public assessment of the war in Iraq as a ‘guerrilla war’ (DP 6) is an example of level 4 military 
assertiveness behaviour as Abizaid’s comments directly and publicly contradicted the position 
of the Bush administration at the time, which downplayed the emerging violence in Iraq 
(Garamone, 2003; Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). 
 
A coding of 5 reflects the very highest level of military assertiveness capturing instances of 
outright non-compliance or subversion of civilian preferences, when military leaders 
deliberately fail or refuse to comply with or implement civilian direction, or when military 
leaders make significant decisions autonomously or supplant civilian preferences with their 
own.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE FOUR (IV4): CIVILIAN UNITY  
 
This variable measures the degree of unity between civilian policymakers in terms of their 
preferred outcomes for each decision point. The degree of unity is measured by identifying the 
preferences of a core set of civilian policymakers and then assessing to what extent these 
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individuals share the same preferences. The core set of civilian policymakers examined 
comprises of: the President; Vice President; Secretary of Defense; Secretary of State; NSA; and 
the Ambassador or senior civilian authority on the ground. The degree of civilian unity has 
three values reflecting high, medium and low levels of unity.  
 




Value of IV Coding Description 
0 High  A coding of high civilian unity is given when civilian 
policymakers share preferred outcomes for a decision point. 
1 Medium A coding of medium civilian unity is given when the 
preferences of civilian policymakers reflect a degree of 
consensus, but also show some areas of disagreement, or 
when not all civilian policymakers agree over the preferred 
outcome, but those dissenting do not expressly register their 
opposition. 
2 Low  A coding of low civilian unity is given when civilian 
policymakers favour mutually exclusive options. 
8 Indeterminable Insufficient information for coding 
9 Not applicable Variable not relevant.  
 
 
Civilian policymakers are coded as having a high level of unity when all of the core civilian 
policymakers support the same policy position, sharing the same preference for the outcome 
of the decision point. Wherever possible this is determined by collecting evidence attesting to 
the individual preferences of each core policymaker. However, as the available information for 
each decision point varies, it is not always possible to identify the specific preferences of every 
core civilian policymaker. In cases where information regarding the specific preferences of 
each civilian policymaker is incomplete, if there is no indication of any notable disagreement 
amongst civilian policymakers regarding a particular decision point and if there are no other 
indications that civilians may not share very similar preferences regarding the outcome, then 
these cases are coded as having high levels of unity. It is usually a prerequisite that all of the 
core civilian policymakers share the same preferences in order to receive a coding of high 
unity. However, on occasion, a coding of high unity may be given in spite of the existence of 
different preferences between civilian policymakers in situations where a competing 
preference was very marginally supported, usually by one individual, and in circumstances 
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within which the individual supporting the competing preference had little impact on or access 
to the policymaking process. 
 
Civilian policymakers are coded as having medium levels of unity either when their 
preferences reflect a degree of consensus, but also show some areas of disagreement, or 
when there may only be one dominant preference within the civilian core, but there are 
indications that not all civilian policymakers are in active support of that preference. Civilian 
unity can be weakened, though not completely undermined, in this way if one or more civilian 
policymakers expresses significant concern over a particular preference, but do not go so far as 
to register explicit opposition. As Secretary of State, Colin Powell demonstrated such 
behaviour during the formulation of the initial invasion plan (DPs 2.1, 2.3) (Gordon and 
Trainor, 2007; Franks, 2005; Woodward, 2004) as did Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 
his opposition to adopting a ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy’ (Woodward, 2008; Cloud and Jaffe, 
2009). Both Powell and Rumsfeld raised serious concerns over their respective issue, but not 
to the point where they formally objected.  
 
Civilian policymakers are coded as having low levels of unity when core policymakers support 
different preferences for the outcome of the decision point. For example, in the formulation of 
the 2007 surge, civilian policymakers were clearly split in terms of their preferences. The 
President and NSA Stephen Hadley favoured an increase in US resources and a shift towards 
population centric security, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice favoured shifting to a reduced, 
more counter-terrorist focused approach (Feaver, 2011; West, 2009; Woodward, 2008), whilst 
Donald Rumsfeld and the DOD preferred to maintain the existing strategy of the time, to build 
up the Iraqi Security Forces and reduce the US footprint (Woodward, 2008; Rumsfeld, 2011; 
Ricks, 2009).   
 
Decision points are coded as 8 when there is insufficient information to determine the level of 
unity between civilian policymakers. Decision points are coded as 9 when civilian unity is not 
considered relevant, usually as civilian policymakers were not involved. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE FIVE (IV5): MILITARY UNITY 
 
This variable measures the degree of unity between military leaders in terms of their preferred 
outcomes for each decision point. The degree of unity is measured by identifying the 
preferences of a core set of military leaders and then assessing the extent to which these 
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individuals share the same preferences. This core set of military leaders is comprised of the 
CJCS, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), the individual service chiefs of the 
Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy, the CENTCOM commander, and the ground 
commander in charge of US/Coalition forces. Similar to the civilian unity variable, the degree 
of military unity has three values reflecting high, medium and low levels of unity, descriptions 
of which are provided in Table 9, below.   
 




Value of IV Coding Description 
0 High  A coding of high military unity is given when military leaders 
share preferred outcomes for a decision point. 
1 Medium A coding of medium military unity is given when the 
preferences of military leaders reflect a degree of consensus, 
but also show some areas of disagreement, or when not all 
military leaders agree over the preferred outcome, but those 
dissenting do not expressly register their opposition. 
2 Low  A coding of low military unity is given when military leaders 
favour mutually exclusive options. 
8 Indeterminable Insufficient information for coding. 
9 Not applicable Variable not relevant.  
 
 
Military leaders are coded as having high levels of unity when all of the core military leaders 
positively support the same policy position, sharing the same preferences for the outcome of 
the decision point. As with the previous variable, where possible this is determined by 
collecting evidence attesting to the individual preferences of each of the core military leaders. 
Again, in cases where information regarding the specific preferences of each individual military 
leader is incomplete (as is often the case with regards to the individual service leaders within 
the JCS), if there is no indication of any notable points of disagreement amongst military 
leaders regarding a particular decision point and if there are no other indications that military 
leaders may not share very similar preferences regarding the outcome, then these cases are 
coded as having high levels of unity. It is usually a prerequisite that all of the core military 
leaders share the same preferences in order to receive a coding of high unity. However, on 
occasion, a coding of high unity may be given in spite of the existence of different preferences 
between military leaders in situations where a competing preference was very marginally 
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supported, usually by one individual, and in circumstances within which the individual’s 
support of the competing preference had little impact within the policymaking process. 
 
Military leaders are coded as having medium levels of unity when there may only be one 
dominant preference within the military core, but there are indications that not all military 
leaders are in active support of that preference. For example, in a number of decision points, 
the CJCS was much more equivocal over a dominant preference than other military leaders. 
Prior to the Department of Defense review of November 2003 (DP 10), CENTCOM Commander 
General John Abizaid and ground commander General Ricardo Sanchez were actively 
campaigning to gain control over the training programme for the ISF from the CPA. While CJCS 
Richard Myers supported a greater emphasis on training, he did not appear to articulate a 
clear position on whether the training responsibility should continue to reside with the CPA or 
be transferred to military control, arguably weakening the military’s overall level of unity. 
Similarly with regards to the formulation of the surge, whilst the majority of military leaders 
were against the surge, CJCS Peter Pace played more of a mediating role rather than actively 
supporting the general preference of other military leaders for the continuation of the existing 
strategy (Feaver, 2010; Woodward, 2008).  
 
Military leaders are coded as having low levels of unity when there is a clear preference 
divergence, with different leaders supporting different preferences. For example, military 
leaders were divided over the preferred outcome for the September 2007 review of the surge 
(DP 25). While General Petraeus was making his recommendations to President Bush and 
Congress for the continuation of the surge and a gradual reduction in US forces, CJCS Fallon 
was pressing for faster reductions and a redefinition of the US mission in Iraq (Ricks, 2009; 
Woodward, 2008; Baker et al., 2007). 
 
Decision points are coded as 8 when there is insufficient information to determine the level of 
unity between military leaders. Decision points are coded as 9 when military unity is not 
considered relevant as military leaders were not actively involved in the decision point.  
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE SIX (IV6): INFORMATION ADVANTAGE 
 
This variable indicates whether the information advantage relevant to a decision point favours 
the military. In order to determine whether or not the information advantage lies with the 
military, this variable considers four primary facets of information which may favour either 
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civilian policymakers or military leaders in seeking to get their preferred course of action 
realised in the outcome of the decision point: 1) access to substantive information relevant to 
the decision point in question or ‘ground data’; 2) the degree of information sharing, such as 
whether civilian policymakers and military leaders openly exchange or withhold information 
relevant to the decision point (Brooks, 2008); 3) the quality of information shared, including 
whether there is any indication of misrepresentation or distortion of information relevant to 
the advancement of their respective preferences (Brooks, 2008); and 4) the extent to which 
the military’s occupational specialisation in the use of force plays an important role in 
determining the outcome of the decision point. The information advantage variable has two 
values, summarised below in Table 10.  
 




Value of IV Coding Description 
0 Military Information 
Advantage 
A coding of 0 is given when civilian deference to, or 
acceptance of, military expertise plays an 
important role in determining the decision 
outcome, or when military leaders alter, 
misrepresent, or omit any information given to 
civilian policymakers in ways that privilege military 
preferred policy outcomes. 
1 No Military Information 
Advantage 
A coding of 1 is given when civilian policymakers 
withhold information from military leaders, deny 
military leaders access to the policymaking process 
or consult other sources of expertise to off-set a 
military monopoly over technical or situational 
information. 
8 Indeterminable Insufficient information for coding.   
 
A military advantage is considered present when military leaders have an informational 
advantage over civilian policymakers relevant to the outcome of the decision point. Such an 
advantage may occur as a result of situational information derived from their proximity to 
action, from the withholding or distorting of information, due to civilian non-involvement, or 
when the military’s technical expertise is critical in shaping the outcome of the decision point. 
No military information advantage is considered present when the technical or situational 
information held by the military has no direct impact on the outcome of a decision point or 
when civilian policymakers are successfully able to negate any potential advantages military 
information may bring. This may occur as the result of: civilian efforts to off-set a potential 
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military information advantage by gathering their own independent information from 
assessments or evaluations or by seeking other sources of expertise; a rejection or devaluation 
of military expertise; or the military’s exclusion from the policymaking process. Decision points 




Once the coding process was complete, all codings were tabulated to form a final data set to 
serve as the basis for analysis. A full record of all codings is presented in Appendix D. The data 
was then analysed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in accordance with the multi-strategy 
research approach outlined previously.  
 
The quantitative tests run as part of the thesis were conducted with the assistance of a 
colleague (and fellow doctoral researcher) from within the University of Westminster, Boris A. 
Altemeyer, who has a background in quantitative research with extensive statistical 
experience. External assistance was deemed necessary in order to ensure that the statistical 
tests conducted were done so correctly and without error, though it should be clarified that 
Mr Altemeyer’s involvement in the thesis was strictly limited to identifying appropriate 
statistical tests for the data set produced and running the chosen tests using SPSS. Mr 
Altemeyer had no involvement in planning, coding or analysing the data or with any other 
aspect of the research.  
 
As indicated earlier in the chapter, the initial intention for the use of statistical analysis was to 
perform a multivariate analysis. Unfortunately, the data set did not meet the prerequisites for 
multiple linear regression as the dependent variable did not represent a normal distribution of 
data. An ordinal regression was also attempted, which has a lower standard of prerequisites 
than multiple linear regression, including the option to use a dependent variable of an ordinal 
nature, although this was determined not be a viable as the results returned a near perfect 
separation of the data. Correlation analysis, however, was possible and was therefore used as 
a means of measuring the relationship between the dependent variable and each of the six 
independent variables. Although correlation analyses cannot provide evidence of causation, 
they can identify the presence of relationships and associations between variables and 
nonetheless make a valuable contribution to analysis.  
 
Spearmans’ rho was determined as the most appropriate method for measuring correlations 
between the dependent and independent variables as it does not make parametric 
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assumptions and can therefore be used for non-interval scaled data, as well as data that is 
skewed, both of which are features of the data set of this thesis. The Spearman’s rho test 
produces a correlation co-efficient which measures the degree of correlation between two 
variables (Clarke and Cooke, 2004). The value of the correlation co-efficient lies between -1 
and +1, indicating both the direction and the strength of the relationship (Rowntree, 1991). A 
positive correlation co-efficient indicates a positive association between the two variables (as 
one variable increases so does the other) and a negative correlation co-efficient indicates an 
inverse relationship between the two variables (as one variable increases, the other 
decreases). The strength of the relationship is indicated in the proximity of the correlation co-
efficient to either -1 or +1. The closer the correlation co-efficient is to either -1 or +1, the 
stronger the correlation, while the closer the correlation co-efficient is to 0, the weaker the 
correlation (Rowntree, 1991).  A correlation co-efficient of 0 reflects no correlation between 
the two variables. Two-tailed tests have been used so that possible relationships between the 
dependent and independent variable can be tested for in both directions (i.e. positive and 
negative).  
 
Using SPSS, the Spearman’s rho test was run to determine correlations between the 
dependent variable and each of the six independent variables, the full results of which are 
presented in Appendix E. When the outcomes of Spearman’s rho (r) are provided in Chapter 
Six, both the correlation co-efficient and the significance (p) are presented, in the following 
format: (r (x) = y, p <z). The x value refers to the frequency of the data (i.e. the number of 
decision points coded for the variable), the y value is the correlation co-efficient (between -1 
and +1), and z is the significance value (p). The significance value indicates the probability that 
the correlation co-efficient occurred by chance. A probability value of less than .05 is generally 
accepted as being statistically meaningful and ‘indicative of a genuine effect’ (Field, 2005, 
p126).  
 
In order to assist with the interpretation of the correlation co-efficient, the thesis uses the 
following scale (Table 11), based on the guidance outlined by Rowntree (1991) for assessing 











Table 11. Guidance for Interpreting the Spearman’s rho Correlation Co-efficient 
 
Correlation Co-efficient Strength of Relationship Between Variables 
0.0 – 0.2 Very weak 
0.2 - 0.4 Weak 
0.4 – 0.7 Moderate 
0.7 – 0.9 Strong  
0.9 - 1.0 Very strong  
 
Following the quantitative tests outlined above, qualitative analysis was then used to verify, 
illustrate, and further investigate the quantitative results, using the empirical evidence to draw 
out further patterns and trends evident within the data. The results and analysis for the 




The final section of this chapter addresses issues of internal validity, reliability, objectivity and 
external validity. Several steps were taken during the research design and implementation 
process to maximise the internal validity and reliability of the study. As previously discussed, 
the parameters of the thesis and the selection of data points were determined in order to 
ensure that the population sample was as representative of the case-study as possible. Data 
collection was clearly and specifically focused around seven clearly articulated variables so 
that only relevant information was collated. The operationalisation of the variables is also 
rooted in a historical, as well as contemporary, study of US civil-military relations, drawing on 
the appropriate theoretical literature for each variable. The same processes were followed in 
the coding for each of the variables for all of the decision points under consideration in order 
to ensure standardisation throughout. Overall, the methodologies selected for the thesis were 
done so with a view to ensuring that observations, data collection, measurements and codings 
were clear and focused towards the research aims. As the thesis makes no claims to explaining 
causation, the existence of and performance of other independent variables which may impact 
or shape the dependent variable, have little impact on the internal validity of the study. This 
would be much more important in the next phase of the research which would be to expand 
the decision points under consideration, to look for other variables of import and to start to 




All effort has been made to provide explicit details of the methodologies used and the coding 
processes applied in order to help facilitate the replicability of the study. Ideally, the study 
would have been repeated by an external participant in order to verify the accuracy of the 
codings and to test the study’s replicability. Unfortunately, this was not possible. However, the 
coding processes went through several revisions over the course of the research and were 
scrutinised from various angles; for example, codings were individually checked per decision 
point and per variable to ensure consistency and comparability. Explanations for each coding 
were also carefully recorded in the decision point records referred to earlier. Further to these 
measures aimed at strengthening the internal validity of the study, a full data set of results is 
provided in Appendix D, allowing the findings to be available to further examination by both 
researchers and readers alike. The coding systems contained within this thesis are not perfect; 
greater degrees of accuracy may be achievable and variables may be able to accommodate 
greater nuance. However, considering the trade-offs inherent between parsimony and detail, I 
am confident that the coding systems measure the intended variables as accurately as the 
available data allows.  
 
With regards to the external validity of the results produced within this study, it is important 
to note that the thesis makes no claim as to the generalisability of these results to other case 
studies, such as OEF, or to the post-9/11 period as a whole. At this stage, the limitations of the 
results reflect the limitations of the study itself. The results it produces are therefore only 
directly applicable to OIF and the conclusions drawn may not be valid in other circumstances 
or contexts. This study represents a starting point for further research which would then test 
the extent to which the results of this thesis may be generalisable to other cases. However, as 
the thesis is firmly rooted in the existing literature of US civil-military relations and focuses on 
historically significant variables, it is nonetheless well situated to make useful contributions to 
the other contexts.  
 
The next two chapters of the thesis present the results and analysis produced via the research 
processes outlined above. Chapter Five examines the performance of the dependent variable, 









CONTROL OF US MILITARY STRATEGY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE – ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The first core research aim of this thesis is to add clarity to our understanding of the civil-
military relationship within OIF by identifying the pattern of civil-military power shaping the 
formulation and implementation of US military strategy. As discussed in Chapters One and 
Two, the existing literature presents varying propositions regarding the relative balance of 
power between civilian policymakers and military leaders in determining military strategy. 
Focusing on the performance of the dependent variable of this study, the relative balance of 
civil-military power, this chapter presents a comprehensive overview of the civil-military 
power relationship as it evolved over seven years of OIF and provides a response to the central 
empirical question of this thesis. Through a discussion of each of the five variants of the 
dependent variable, this chapter demonstrates to what extent US military strategy in OIF was 
shaped by the preferences of civilian policymakers, military leaders, or both.   
 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE - THE CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER 
 
As described in Chapter Four, the relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and 
military leaders is determined using an assessment of preferences and outcomes as an 
indicator of control. Each of the eighty-nine decision points identified within OIF has been 
coded as one of the five variations of the dependent variable (Civilian Dominance, Shared 
Dominance Civilian, Shared Dominance, Shared Dominance Military, Military Dominance) 
according to whether the outcome of the decision point most closely reflected civilian 
preferences, military preferences, or both. Sixty-seven decision points were successfully coded 
for the dependent variable and, viewed collectively, these codings trace the evolution of the 










Figure 1. Variations in the Relative Balance of Civil-Military Power Throughout Operation Iraqi 
Freedom 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, while there are pockets of continuity, the relative balance of civil-
military power demonstrates significant fluctuation over the course of OIF, with the relative 
balance of power frequently shifting throughout. Despite the notable degree of variation, a 
broad pattern of ebb and flow between Civilian Dominance and Military Dominance is 
discernible. Civilian policymakers dominated the early decision-making concerning OIF, setting 
the agenda, initiating the formulation of military strategy for military action in Iraq and 
establishing the initial objectives, while determining the resources and operational concepts 
was more of a shared process (Phase One). Military Dominance prevailed almost exclusively 
during the implementation of the initial invasion plan and in establishing the US response to 
the emerging security environment of the post-invasion period (Phase Two). Civilian 
policymakers reasserted a degree of control during the implementation of the post-invasion 
phase of US military strategy, although military leaders held the prevailing influence in the 
formulation and implementation of the subsequent ‘train to transition’ approach (Phase 
Three). A clear civilian influence returns with the publication of the National Strategy for 
Victory in Iraq (2005) document (Phase Four) and through the instigation, formulation and 
legitimation of the surge (Phase Five). However, once the fundamental elements of the surge 
strategy were in place, Military Dominance resumed as military leaders were largely 
responsible for the implementation of the surge and determining the review of, and 
subsequent calibrations to, US military strategy until the end of the time-line in April 2008 








The overall frequencies for the five variations of the dependent variable are presented in Table 
12. The first two columns of data in Table 12 present the frequency for each of the five 
variations of the dependent variable individually and the overall percentage of decision points 
this accounts for. The third, fourth and fifth columns present the combined percentages of the 
data in three different groupings: decisions points which have a greater civilian rather than 
military influence overall (Civilian Dominance and Shared Dominance Civilian); decision points 
which are the result of both civilian and military preferences in any variation (Shared 
Dominance Civilian, Shared Dominance and Shared Dominance Military); and decision points 
which have a greater military rather than civilian influence overall (Military Dominance and 
Shared Dominance Military). 
 
Table 12. Coding Frequencies for the Five Variations of the Dependent Variable  
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
Variation of 
DV 



























21 31.3   
Total 67 100 - - - 
                                        
As shown in Table 12, the most prevalent single variation of the dependent variable is Military 
Dominance as the outcomes of twenty-one out of sixty-seven coded decision points, or 31.3%, 
most closely reflected the preferences of military leaders. A comparison of this figure with the 
data for the other four variations of the dependent variable indicates that the overall relative 
balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders in OIF slightly favoured 
the military, although the difference in frequency between Military Dominance and Civilian 
Dominance is small, with the former prevailing in only two more decision points than the 
latter. Individually, each of the three Shared Dominance variations accounts for less of the 
civil-military decision-making in OIF than either Civilian Dominance or Military Dominance, 
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though collectively some variation of Shared Dominance accounts for 40.3% of all decision 
points. The relative advantage of military leaders in shaping US military strategy becomes 
more apparent, however, if we consider the combined percentages of decision points which 
had a greater military than civilian influence on the outcomes of policymaking. Considering the 
combined percentages presented in Table 12, Military Dominance remains by far the most 
prevalent variation with nearly half of all decision point outcomes, 49.2%, reflecting military 
preferences more closely than civilian ones. The gap between the relative influence of civilian 
policymakers and military leaders also appears to extend when considering the combined 
percentages as civilian preferences shaped the outcomes of policymaking to the greatest 
extent in only 34.4% of all coded decision points, the lowest of all three combined results.   
 
The prevalence of Military Dominance, both as an individual frequency and as a combined 
percentage, provides a contrast to the generalised observations of a dominating civilian 
leadership contained within a number of accounts of post-9/11 civil-military relations (Desch, 
2007; Korb 2007; Herspring, 2008; Newbold, 2006). In terms of the percentage of decision 
points primarily reflecting military rather than civilian preferences, this initial assessment of 
the data accords more with the positions held by those such as Philip Zelikow (2007), Douglas 
MacGregor (2007), Robert Kaplan (2008) and Robert Kagan (2007), all of whom recognise a 
strong military influence on US military strategy during OIF. That the balance of power appears 
tilted towards military leaders is not necessarily unexpected given the particular policy area 
under study; defining and implementing military strategy is arguably the activity most closely 
related to the military’s primary purpose, planning and fighting wars, in which we might 
anticipate a significant degree of influence. It is interesting, however, that this apparent 
military prevalence occurred within a domestic political environment closely associated with 
firm civilian control of the armed forces, raising the issue, further explored in Chapter Six, as to 
whether the extent of civilian control within the George W. Bush administration has been 
over-estimated or over-generalised, or whether military influence is successfully able to take 
effect even within such a context.  
  
While the rate of occurrence of each variation of the dependent variable provides valuable 
information regarding the civil-military relationship during OIF, such data does not enable a 
determinative assessment of the relative balance of civil-military power. Frequencies alone 
provide no insight into the mechanisms which might underlie each outcome, nor do they 
distinguish between the relative importance of decision points in terms of shaping the 
substantive form of US military strategy. Analysis of the relative balance of civil-military power 
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therefore necessitates further investigation into the conditions and characteristics of the five 
variants and a closer examination of the individual decision points coded accordingly. A more 
in-depth discussion of each variation of the dependent variable therefore follows, addressed in 




As suggested by the frequency data, the preferences of military leaders had an evident impact 
on the formulation, implementation and evolution of US military strategy in OIF from the 
initial invasion of Iraq through to the operational pause initiated in April 2008.  
 
The implementation of military strategy for the initial invasion of Iraq was clearly dominated 
by military leaders as military preferences determined the outcome in six out of seven of the 
implementation decision points. Civilian leaders provided significant leeway to military leaders 
to run the war with President Bush frequently referring to the ground commander, General 
Tommy Franks, to determine issues such as the timing of the start of the ground war (DP 4.1) 
(Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Rumsfeld, 2011; McKiernan, 2004), when and how forces were 
employed (DPs 4.3, 4.4, 4.5) (Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Franks, 2005), and the Army’s 
‘thunder runs’ into Baghdad (DPs 4.6, 4.7) (Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Franks, 2005). As former 
CJCS General Richard Myers (2009) recalls, ‘Now that the operation had commenced, we 
trusted Franks to execute the plan and felt no need to lean over his shoulder and 
micromanage . . . we gave Tommy Franks considerable autonomy as he started the drive 
towards Baghdad’ (p241). Once US forces had secured their position in Baghdad, it was also 
General Franks who decided when to draw ‘major combat operations’ to a close (DP 5.1), 
thereby effectively determining the ‘end’ of the invasion in April 2003 (Gordon and Trainor, 
2007; Franks, 2005).  
 
Military influence over US military strategy continued into the immediate post-invasion period 
as military leaders largely determined the response to the emerging disorder in Iraq. Despite 
the President’s May 1st 2003 ‘mission accomplished’ declaration and CENTCOM’s subsequent 
order to transition to support operations, the new campaign plan issued in August 2003 
continued to emphasise offensive operations (DP 7.3).  Although since 2001 the US Army had 
promoted full spectrum operations and the ability to conduct simultaneous offensive, 
defensive, and stability or civil support operations (FM 3-0, 2001), the commander of US 
forces, General Ricardo Sanchez, believed ‘the security situation on the ground too tenuous for 
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a transition from [the original invasion plan’s] emphasis on offensive operations (Phase III) to a 
new phase that focused on stability and support tasks (Phase IV)’ (Wright and Reese, 2008, 
p162). The result was a traditionally offensive US military strategy in which US forces were 
directed to ‘defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralise destabilizing influences’ 
(Wright and Reese, 2008, p30), thereby encouraging a highly aggressive operational approach 
which would subsequently garner significant criticism for exacerbating the insurgency (Ricks, 
2007; Gordon, 2008). For their part, civilian policymakers appear to have had little direct 
involvement in the formulation of the post-invasion campaign plan, partly as security concerns 
were frequently dismissed as a temporary reaction to regime change and partly as civilians did 
not have a clear vision as to what the US military should be doing in terms of reconstruction 
and stability operations (Ricks, 2007).  According to Wright and Reese’s (2008) account of the 
genesis of the post-invasion campaign plan, the locus for planning resided with the military’s 
Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) in Iraq, who ‘completed a working draft plan . . . that 
described the direction and goals for the military effort’ (p162), approval for which was later 
sought from relevant civilian authorities.  
 
A year later, in August 2004, the subsequent commander of US forces in Iraq, General George 
Casey, introduced an initial step towards the principles of counterinsurgency (DP 12.3). 
Marking a shift away from the emphasis on offensive operations under Sanchez, Casey’s 
campaign plan directed US forces to implement ‘full spectrum counter-insurgency operations’ 
(Wright and Reese, 2008, p177). According to his contemporaries, Casey’s intent was to alter 
the US approach in Iraq in recognition of the growing insurgency and the changing nature of 
the war (Sepp, 2007a). While the implementation of a comprehensive counterinsurgency 
strategy was still a few years away, Casey nonetheless initiated an important shift in US 
military strategy, away from purely offensive operations. This change was primarily driven by 
Casey’s belief that ‘the Coalition’s main obstacle in Iraq was a complex insurgency’ (Wright and 
Reese, 2008, p177) and that victory could not be achieved by a sole focus on offensive 
operations or ‘killing insurgents’ (Sepp, 2007a). Casey received ‘tacit approval’ (Wright and 
Reese, 2008, p178) for his campaign plan from civilian policymakers, who appear to have 
allowed Casey relative freedom to determine his own operational approach upon his arrival in 
Iraq in June 2004 (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009; Casey, 2012).  
 
The implementation of the surge over the course of 2007 (DP 24) and the subsequent 
amendments to strategy in 2008 (DPs 25, 30) were also primarily dominated by military 
leaders as civilian leaders deferred to Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno to actualise 
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the newly adopted counterinsurgency strategy aimed at securing the population through a 
large injection of US forces. It was therefore largely the two military commanders on the 
ground who decided where, how and for what purpose the additional US forces contributed as 
part of the surge were to be used to implement the new strategy (Robinson, 2008). Military 
assessments were also crucial in determining the gradual transition of responsibility for 
security to the ISF, as well as the associated rate of US force withdrawals culminating in the 
‘operational pause’ of April 2008 (DP 30). Despite opposition from some civilian policymakers 
and military leaders who preferred a faster rate of troop reduction (Lubold, 2008; Ricks, 2008; 
Tyson, 2008; Robinson, 2008), President Bush provided unambiguous support for the 
professional recommendations of General Petraeus for a pause (Robinson, 2008; Bush, 2010), 
which effectively ensured that US force levels remained relatively steady throughout the rest 
of Bush’s term, deferring any continued drawdown to his successor following the November 
2008 presidential elections (Shanker, 2008).  
 
Overall, military preferences played a key role in shaping US military strategy throughout OIF. 
Military leaders had considerable freedom to execute the initial invasion and determined the 
operational concepts which would condition how US military strategy was implemented in the 
field from 2003 to 2005, first in terms of an offensive response and then through an initial shift 
towards the principles of counterinsurgency. The preferences of military leaders were also 
highly influential in implementing the surge from January 2007 onwards and determining the 
transitions which would eventually enable the gradual extrication of US forces from Iraq. While 
military leaders did not operate in a vacuum, and developed plans in conjunction with civilian 
offices and with reference to civilian guidance where available, they nonetheless exercised 
significant autonomy and prerogative in determining key elements of the substantive form and 
direction of US military strategy in OIF.   
 
CIVILIAN DOMINANCE  
 
Civilian Dominance predominantly occurred in four concentrated areas. The first period of 
Civilian Dominance accords with the traditional de jure authority of civilians to determine 
whether, and for what purposes, military power is employed in the pursuit of political 
objectives. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz initially raised Iraq on the immediate post-9/11 national security agenda 
(Woodward, 2004; Clarke, 2004; Ricks, 2007; Collins, 2008) (DP 1.1) and, although military 
leaders expressed their opposition at including Iraq in any initial response to 9/11 (Woodward, 
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2002; Clarke, 2004), the issue continued to be discussed in meetings occurring from 12th to 
17th December 2003 (Clarke, 2004; Woodward, 2004). President Bush settled the issue shortly 
after, determining an ‘Afghanistan first’ approach in the War on Terror (DP 1.2) (Woodward, 
2002). However, once OEF was underway, the president returned to the issue of Iraq and 
ordered the Department of Defense to commence planning for military action in November 
2001 (DP 1.3) (Myers, 2009; Woodward, 2004). It is interesting to note that, in the case of the 
US military intervention in Iraq, there was no formal point of decision which officially 
considered whether military force should to be used. Rather, once on the agenda, the issue of 
Iraq ‘percolated in the administration’ (Woodward, 2002, p329) until President Bush issued 
planning orders, a decision which appears to have been made without direct consultation with 
either his civilian or military advisers (Woodward, 2004).  
 
Contrary to the implementation phase for the initial invasion which featured a high level of 
deference to military leaders, civilian preferences had the greatest impact in five out of the 
twelve implementation decision points of the immediate post-invasion period, from July 2003 
to June 2004. Higher levels of civilian influence during this period stem from the fact that many 
of the decision points were either highly political in nature or constituted a response to a 
particularly salient event. The CPA prevailed over military preferences in the first round of the 
debate over whether the responsibility for the training of the ISF should remain with the CPA 
or transfer to the military (DP 9.3) (Bremer, 2006; Sanchez, 2009). Bush’s insistence on an early 
transfer of political authority to an interim Iraqi government determined the outcome of DP 
9.4 (Woodward, 2006), while the military’s April 2004 plans to take action against the Shia 
cleric and leader of the Mahdi Army militia, Muqtada al-Sadr, were stymied by civilian 
policymakers for fear of the potential political ramifications for the transfer of authority (DP 
9.10) (Bremer, 2006; Sanchez, 2009). Civilian policymakers also intervened in the operational 
details of US military strategy, first insisting on the prompt launch of an offensive in Fallujah in 
response to the Blackwater incident in which four US armed contractors were violently killed 
(DP 9.9.1) and subsequently insisting upon a cease-fire (DP 9.9.2), both decisions which 
military leaders opposed.  
 
The next two clusters of Civilian Dominance, centred on the formulation of NSVI (2005) and 
the surge, hold particular significance in determining US military strategy. The purpose of the 
NSVI document, released in November 2005, was to articulate the broader US strategy in Iraq. 
Partly a communications exercise (Feaver, 2011), NSVI responded to contemporaneous 
concerns over the lack of progress in Iraq. In addition to outlining the political and economic 
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tracks of US policy in Iraq, NSVI set forth a three-part concept of ‘clear, hold, build’ as the 
centrepiece of the US security strategy. An established principle in counterinsurgency doctrine, 
NSVI outlined the ‘clear, hold, build’ approach as follows: ‘Clear areas of enemy control by 
remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and denying them safe-haven; 
Hold areas freed from enemy influence by ensuring that they remain under the control of the 
Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force presence; and Build Iraqi Security 
forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and 
nurture civil society’ (NSVI, 2005, p2). The term ‘clear, hold, build’ as a by-line for US strategy 
in Iraq was adopted by Condoleezza Rice from review reports provided by Philip Zelikow 
(Zelikow, 2007) and stated in a speech at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting in 
October 2005. ‘Clear, hold, build’ was then subsequently formalized in NSVI a month later.  
 
The process of initiating, formulating and legitimating the NSVI document of 2005 was an 
almost entirely civilian driven affair. With the exception of CJCS Peter Pace who had the 
opportunity to comment on the document (Shane, 2005), military participation in the process 
appears to be minimal. The White House admitted that ‘not all top officers in Iraq had 
necessarily seen the strategy document’ (Shane, 2005) and there are a number of indications 
that the new security strategy came as a surprise to General Casey on its announcement 
(Zelikow, 2007; Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). General Casey (2012) later stated that NSVI ‘codified’ 
(p77) the military’s existing approach, although he also recognised that the application of 
counterinsurgency ‘was in fact uneven and very dependent on the individual commander’s 
grasp of the doctrine and how to apply it in Iraq’ (2012, p73). According to Philip Zelikow 
(2007), there was no such articulation of strategy before NSVI. While some units in Iraq were 
utlising concepts of ‘clear, hold, build’ prior to the release of NSVI, this was by no means 
representative of the overall approach taken by US forces at the time whose primary efforts 
were directed towards training and transitioning responsibility to ISF and neutralising the 
insurgency. Key areas were cleared, particularly in preparation for the January 2005 elections, 
but such areas were not subsequently effectively maintained (Metz, 2008) and reconstruction 
efforts varied from area to area.  
 
The process surrounding the inception and formulation of the surge plan follows a similar 
pattern of civilian dominance. Motivated by concerns over the lack of progress and 
deteriorating conditions in Iraq over the course of 2006, civilian policymakers set the agenda 
for change and began examining options for a new way forward in the autumn (DP 21). A 
potential surge in Iraq became an early preference amongst certain key civilian policymakers, 
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including the President (Feaver, 2011; Metz, 2010; Woodward, 2008), and the surge option 
was carefully steered throughout the formulation process (DPs 22.1, 22.2, 22.3), formally 
announced by Bush in January 2007. Given the existing military leaderships’ persistent support 
for the continuation of the train to transition strategy, military leaders were excluded from the 
early agenda-setting meetings (Feaver, 2010) and, although consulted as part of the 
formulation process, had their preferences over-ruled on all three elements of US military 
strategy including the objectives for the new strategy, the resource level and the operational 
concepts used. Further to this, it was President Bush himself who made the key decisions 
which would have the greatest impact on US military strategy, including the decision to shift 
the primary objective from training ISF and transitioning responsibility to protecting the 
population, as well as the decisions to substantially increase the level of US troops in Iraq and 
to adopt a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach (Metz, 2010; Feaver, 2011).  
 
Overall, substantive civilian involvement in shaping US military strategy was variable. After the 
initial decisions regarding the US response to the perceived threat of Iraq in the immediate 
post-9/11 period, civilian preferences only appeared to impact military strategy on primarily 
political issues or in response to highly salient events. Following significant civilian involvement 
in the formulation of the initial invasion strategy, it was not until 2005 that civilians again 
began to engage with substantive issues of military strategy. However, subsequent to this, 
civilian preferences were highly consequential in driving two important shifts in US military 
strategy. Although primarily a policy document, NSVI made important prescriptions with 
regard to the operational concepts of US military strategy, formalising a fundamental tenet of 
counterinsurgency in the adoption of ‘clear, hold, build’. The subsequent surge strategy 
completed the transition to a full counterinsurgency approach with clear objectives to protect 
the population and an increase in resources to be able to do so. These decisions fundamentally 
altered the nature of US military strategy in Iraq and were made by civilians either without 
significant military involvement or, in the case of the surge, over the contrary 
recommendations of the majority of key military leaders at the time. The collective importance 
of these decision points suggests that, while instances of Civilian Dominance were not the 
most frequent, the preferences of civilian policymakers nonetheless played a highly significant, 







SHARED DOMINANCE MILITARY 
 
In addition to the twenty-one decision points of Military Dominance, military leaders were 
able to shape US military strategy in a further twelve decision points in which the preferences 
of both civilian policymakers and military leaders were reflected in the outcome, but in which 
the preferences of military leaders had the greater substantive impact.   
 
During the planning process for the initial invasion plan civilian policymakers put considerable 
pressure on military leaders to think innovatively regarding operational concepts (DP 2.3), 
demanding several revisions of strategy and pushing for shorter deployment times to enable 
flexibility and lighter footprints to enable speed of movement (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). 
While these civilian preferred elements were duly reflected in the final invasion plan, the 
central tenets of speed, flexibility and precision were independently held by Franks whose 
CENTCOM team was primarily responsible for the creation of the war plan (Franks, 2005). 
Following a number of iterations, civilian policymakers and military leaders finally settled on a 
plan in August 2003 entitled ‘the hybrid plan’ which was essentially an amalgamation of two 
previous iterations, ‘Generated Start’ and ‘Running Start’ (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). 
However, subsequent to this, the ground commander, General David McKiernan, devised a 
further iteration, entitled ‘Cobra II’, which addressed a number of resourcing and operational 
issues he had concerns with, with a far lower level of civilian involvement (Gordon and Trainor, 
2007). Despite the incorporation of civilian preferences into the war plan, the final version 
reflected military preferences to a greater extent than civilian ones. As described by Michael 
Gordon and Bernard Trainor (2007), ‘Cobra II did not represent the radical revolution in 
warfare promised by Rumsfeld’s doctrine of transformation’ (p108). 
 
Once the invasion was complete, plans to redeploy US forces out of Iraq were immediately put 
into action (DP 5.2). Civilian policymakers and military leaders held joint preferences for, and 
expectations of, a time-limited military involvement in Iraq. Franks believed that CENTCOM 
would not play a significant role in post-combat operations (Franks, 2005; Sanchez, 2009; 
Metz, 2008), expecting to be able to swiftly transition responsibility to follow-on civilian 
authorities, and civilian policymakers similarly anticipated a far less complex post-invasion 
scenario, reflected in Vice President Richard Cheney’s belief that US forces would ‘be greeted 
as liberators’ (Cheney, 2003). While civilian policymakers and military leaders fundamentally 
agreed on the principle of rapidly redeploying US forces out of Iraq, it was essentially Franks’ 
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decision (Metz, 2008; Myers, 2009; Gordon and Trainor, 2007), albeit one which necessitated 
the agreement of civilian policymakers (Sanchez, 2009). 
  
While military objectives for the immediate post-invasion period (DP 7.1) were based on 
civilian guidance, military leaders determined the details of the August 2003 campaign plan. 
While Sanchez and his team sought co-ordination and approval for the post-invasion campaign 
plan from the CPA, Department of Defense and other parts of the US government (Wright and 
Reese, 2008), it was essentially devised by the military planning team, CJTF-7, under General 
Sanchez. CPA guidance, issued May 2003, stated that ‘As the Commander of Coalition Forces, 
the Commander of U.S. CentralCommand shall directly support the CPA by deterring 
hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and 
destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy 
generally’ (CPA Regulation 1, 2003, p1). The objectives of the campaign plan, however, 
instructed US forces ‘to defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing 
influences . . . in order to create a secure environment in direct support of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority. Concurrently conduct stability operations to support the establishment 
of government and economic development in order to set the conditions for a transfer of 
operations to designated follow-on military or civilian authorities’ (Wright and Reese, 2008, 
p30). While these objectives clearly embody the formal guidance provided by the CPA, General 
Sanchez’s view that the US military was still involved in major combat operations and had not 
yet transitioned to stability and support operations (Wright and Reese, 2008) provides the 
defining influence reflected in the emphasis on offensive operations and ‘defeating’ rather 
than ‘deterring’ hostile forces.  
 
Military leaders were also able to determine the troop resource level for the immediate post-
invasion phase (DP 7.2) in line with their own preferences to a greater extent than civilian 
ones, though the preferences of both were ultimately reflected in the outcome. Following the 
end of major combat operations, civilian preferences were to reduce the overall number of 
forces during the troop rotation from OIF-1 to OIF-2 (Woodward, 2006; Bremer, 2006). The 
initial force structure proposal of July 2003 reflected civilian preferences (and the preferences 
of some military planners concerned over the potential strain on the US Army from a 
prolonged deployment) by outlining a reduction of forces from five divisions or seventeen 
brigade equivalents to two divisions or eight brigade equivalents (Keane, 2003; Ball, n.d.). 
Generals Abizaid and Sanchez, however, demonstrated strong preferences towards 
maintaining a base-line of troops which would allow the replacement of existing combat units 
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over time without a loss of capability (Sanchez, 2009). A second force rotation proposal, made 
in November 2003, still reflected an overall troop reduction, but one which was smaller than 
the July version as the November announcement planned for a reduction of ‘four divisions and 
17 brigade equivalents to about three divisions and 13 brigade equivalents’ (Schwartz, 2003), 
therefore according with the preferences of Abizaid and Sanchez to a greater extent than 
civilians. 
 
The creation of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) (DP 9.1) was a military initiative, yet one 
which required the support and approval of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to be realised. 
Initially conceived of as a way of providing additional resources for security involving Iraqi, 
rather than US, forces, the idea had been blocked by Paul Bremer who adamantly maintained 
the view that the training of the Iraqi police and the new Iraqi Army was the responsibility of 
the CPA and not the US military (Sanchez, 2009). Faced with such resistance from the civilian 
authority on the ground in Iraq, military leaders took their request direct to Rumsfeld, whose 
agreement played an important role in facilitating the creation of the ICDC (Sanchez, 2009). 
Later, Abizaid and Sanchez made two formal requests, in September and November of 2003 
(Sanchez, 2009), to assume command of the full ISF training programme. Although the 
preferences of the US military ultimately prevailed, with their responsibility for ISF training 
later formalised in a May 2004 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), this was only 
possible as a result of a Department of Defense led review which ultimately ratified military 
recommendations (DP 10). While the outcome of the review most closely reflected the long-
held preferences of military leaders regarding the locus of responsibility for ISF training, the 
support of civilian policymakers was crucial for these preferences to be realised.  
 
The objectives for Phase Three of US military strategy (DP 12.1) embodied both civilian and 
military preferences, yet were most directly shaped by the military. Issued in August 2004, 
General Casey’s updated campaign plan stated that ‘In partnership with the Iraqi Government, 
MNF-I [Multi-National Force–Iraq] conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to 
isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists, and organizes, trains 
and equips Iraqi security forces in order to create a security environment that permits the 
completion of the UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1546 process on 
schedule’ (Wright and Reese, 2008, p177). The emphasis on the Iraqi elections and the training 
of the ISF reflected the preferences of both civilian policymakers and military leaders at the 
time. President Bush’s overarching goal in Iraq was for the establishment of a democratic Iraq 
and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had emphasised the importance of ISF training to Casey 
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before assuming his position as MNF-1 commander (Casey, 2012). These priorities, however, 
were already shared by both Generals Abizaid and Casey (Casey, 2012). In taking over theatre 
command in Iraq, Casey (2012) stated that he believed ‘the U.S. objective was to facilitate the 
establishment of a representative Iraqi government that respected the human rights of all 
Iraqis and had sufficient security forces to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe 
haven for terrorists’ (p18).  
 
Despite the dual reflection of civil-military preferences in the stated objectives, the 
formulation process of the campaign plan indicates a greater military, rather than civilian, 
influence. While Casey had close communication with Ambassador John Negroponte, both 
before arriving in Iraq and after, and had received broad guidance from Rumsfeld, direct 
civilian involvement in the formulation process for the campaign plan was limited. A number of 
sources suggest that Casey arrived in theatre with little direct guidance from civilian 
policymakers in Washington DC (Woodward, 2008; Cloud and Jaffe, 2009) and Casey himself 
states that the greatest influence on his thinking when devising the campaign plan came from 
the NSPD of 11th May 2004, President Bush’s speech at the Army War College on 24th May 
2004, and UNSCR 1546 (Casey, 2012). Casey further stated that his ‘most concrete [political] 
direction came from UNSCR 1546’ (Wright and Reese, 2008, p177), which outlined and 
endorsed the ‘proposed timetable for Iraq’s transition to democratic government’ (United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, 2004, p3). While civilian policymakers and military 
leaders were in consensus over the priority objectives for US military strategy at this stage, 
military leaders interpreted and translated a broad political guidance into specific military 
objectives which they themselves saw as the key aims for the US effort in Iraq.    
 
Following the successful parliamentary elections in Iraq in December 2005, General Casey 
recommended that the number of US combat brigades be reduced over the summer of 2006 
(DP 19.1) (Casey, 2012; Robinson, 2008; Rumsfeld, 2011). While reducing the number of troops 
accorded with the preferences of both President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
(Rumsfeld, 2011), and although Rumsfeld in particular was putting pressure on the military for 
drawdowns, it is clear that Casey independently held the view that the US military presence 
was incendiary to the violence in Iraq and that security should increasingly be managed by the 
ISF (Casey, 2012). Civilian support for the proposed troop reductions was essential, but the 
initiation of the drawdown, as well as the details of timing and size, was determined by 
General Casey.  Military preferences were also most closely reflected in the outcome of the 
Camp David meeting of June 2006 (DP 20) which resulted in the continuation of the train to 
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transition strategy being pursued at the time. While both civilian policymakers and military 
leaders all concurred with this decision, military leaders were far more resolute in their 
recommendations than that of civilian policymakers, many of whom harboured serious 
concerns regarding the deteriorating security trend in Iraq (Woodward, 2008; Cloud and Jaffe, 
2009). Indeed, the impetus for holding such a meeting was to precipitate a more in-depth 
review of US military strategy, to ‘evaluate the assumptions and ask the hard questions’ 
(Woodward, 2008, p10). Despite these intentions and some evident civilian uncertainty 
regarding the efficacy of the existing military strategy, it was the preferences of military 
leaders which were most closely reflected in the outcome of the Camp David meeting.  
 
Military recommendations also had a significant impact on the outcome of the September 
2007 congressionally mandated review of the surge strategy (DP25). While the majority of 
Bush administration civilian policymakers were supportive of the continuation of the surge, 
the controversial new strategy faced significant opposition from some quarters of Congress 
and the September 2007 review was set to assess the progress, and future, of the US military 
mission in Iraq. During his testimony, the new MNF-I commander General David Petraeus 
(2007) stated that the ‘military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated 
momentum’ (p6), asserting that a continued counterinsurgency strategy and support for ISF 
would enable the US to achieve its objectives in Iraq over time. Petraeus made 
recommendations for a reduction in troops to pre-surge levels, with further reductions to 
follow, on a progress dependent, unspecified time-line (Petraeus, 2007). While US Ambassador 
Ryan Crocker also provided testimony to Congress, it was the testimony and recommendations 
of General Petraeus that arguably had the greatest impact in the outcome of the review. Bob 
Woodward (2008) reflected on the degree of influence held by the General and his ‘ability to 
shape public opinion unmatched’ (p392). In his discussion of the September Review, Bing West 
(2009) also observed that ‘the most important testimony of the Bush administration would be 
delivered by a military professional who was writing his own script without consulting the 
White House’ (p317). Although the outcomes of the September Review were not solely 
defined by Petraeus, the political precariousness of the president’s position over Iraq 
dramatically heightened the importance of an ‘objective’ military testimony. While there were 
variations in preferences concerning the proposed rate of US force reductions, with some 
civilian and military leaders preferring a faster pace of withdrawal (Ricks, 2009), civilian 
policymakers were not ‘inclined to over-rule Petraeus’ (Robinson, 2008, p294) whose views 




The decision points coded as Shared Dominance Military illustrate a shared power dynamic, 
yet one which is tilted towards the military. Two of the Shared Dominance Military decision 
points reflect the relative strength of the military vis-à-vis civilian policymakers in their ability 
to get their preferences realised in the outcomes of policymaking; in determining the 
operational concepts for the initial invasion plan and the resource level for the post-invasion 
plan, the preferences of military leaders prevailed to a greater extent over the contrasting 
preferences of civilian policymakers. However, in most decision points, greater military 
influence was not the result of a competition of power between civilian policymakers and 
military leaders. Rather, military leaders gained greater influence over outcomes through 
either being the initiators of policy, as with the creation of the ICDC and the recommendations 
for force reductions, or by adopting the primary role in determining the outcomes of decision 
points in the absence of a strong civilian involvement.  Furthermore, while military preferences 
prevailed over those of the CPA in the creation of the ICDC and responsibility for ISF training, 




The preferences of civilian policymakers and military leaders jointly shaped US military 
strategy, demonstrating a relative parity in influence, in eleven decision points throughout the 
course of OIF. The majority of these Shared Dominance decision points were operational 
decisions, arising during implementation periods, rather than decisions which fundamentally 
shaped or altered US military strategy, and were largely the result of a joint involvement and 
mutual dependence. 
 
Prior to the president’s formal order to launch OIF, civilian policymakers explicitly sought the 
approval of the war plan itself from each of the service chiefs and combatant commanders (DP 
3) (Myers, 2009; Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Woodward, 2004). While it is ultimately the 
prerogative of civilian policymakers to initiate military operations, in the case of OIF, this was 
nonetheless based on a joint civil-military approval of the war plan itself. In view of the weight 
of the consequences of such a decision, the views of civilian policymakers and military leaders 
were of equal importance in supporting and legitimating the proposed war plan. Similarly, in 
determining whether or not to launch a strike on Dora Farms following intelligence regarding 
the possible location of Saddam Hussein, a concurrence of civil-military preferences was vital 
in taking action as civilian policymakers determined the political risks of the decision, while 
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military leaders provided recommendations and reassurance as to whether the strike was 
militarily feasible (Woodward, 2004; Myers, 2009; Franks, 2005).  
 
During the implementation phase of the post-invasion campaign plan, civilian policymakers 
and military leaders deliberated over taking action against Muqtada al-Sadr (DP 9.2). Following 
recommendations for military action from the CPA (Bremer, 2006), civilian policymakers and 
military leaders were initially both in agreement that al-Sadr’s arrest warrant should be 
enforced. However, military leaders subsequently concluded that the timing of the operation 
was not prudent, recommending that direct action against al-Sadr be deferred (Sanchez, 
2009). Civilian policymakers also then altered their views, concurring with the views of military 
leaders, having weighed not only military advice, but other intelligence information (Bremer, 
2006). Both civilian and military views therefore shaped the outcome, which reflected their 
shared preference for postponing military action on this issue. A similar civil-military consensus 
and joint influence unpinned later decisions to implement the ‘anaconda’ plan targeting al-
Sadr’s militia lieutenants (DP 9.3) and the pursuit of a two-front offensive in Fallujah and 
Southern Iraq in April 2004 (DP 9.8). 
 
Following the cease-fire in the first military operation in Fallujah, military leaders sought 
approval from civilian policymakers for a second Fallujah operation in November 2004 (DP 
14.3), which they considered essential in preparation for the upcoming Iraqi elections in 
January 2005. Civilian policymakers approved the military’s recommendation, having 
independently arrived at the same conclusion (Rumsfeld, 2011; West, 2008; Casey, 2012). 
Given the significance of the elections in Iraq in January 2005, both for broader US policy in 
Iraq and US military strategy, civilian and military agreement on a second operation Fallujah 
was crucial. Civilian policymakers and military leaders also shared similar perceptions following 
the February 2006 bombing in Samarra in recognising the changing nature of the war in Iraq 
(DP 19.4) (West, 2009). Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad and General George Casey issued a joint 
statement in April 2006 reflective of their mutual acknowledgement that ‘the fundamental 
conflict in Iraq is between and among its ethnic and sectarian groups’ (cited in Brennan et al., 
2013, p47) as opposed to a conflict fuelled by an anti-American insurgency.                                                                    
 
There were, however, two decision points which resulted in Shared Dominance which were 
not the result of a civil-military consensus or mutual dependence, though the outcomes of 
policy nonetheless reflected a parity of influence. Contrary to popular conceptions of civilian 
policymakers and military leaders struggling for control over policy and the ‘pulling and 
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hauling’ prevalent in the bureaucratic politics model of decision-making, only one decision 
point coded as Shared Dominance was the result of a direct compromise between civilian and 
military preferences. During the planning process for the initial invasion plan, the proposed 
level of US troop numbers fluctuated throughout (DP 2.2). Civilian policymakers, keen for a 
light footprint reflective of the defense transformation agenda, put pressure on military 
planners to reduce troop levels with Rumsfeld fielding an initial figure of around 125,000 
(Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Although military leaders were of the view that the force levels in 
the existing operational plans, created during the 1990s, were too large (Franks, 2005), they 
were nonetheless more cautious than civilian policymakers regarding overall troop numbers. 
At several points in the planning process General David McKiernan was concerned that the 
invasion lacked combat power (Ricks, 2007; Gordon and Trainor, 2007). General Franks was, at 
times, also troubled by the ever decreasing force numbers (Gordon and Trainor, 2007; 
Woodward, 2004). The final invasion plan featured a start force of 149,000 US troops, reaching 
a high point of 285,000 (all personnel) in April 2003 (Belasco, 2009). The compromises made 
throughout the various iterations of planning for the invasion of Iraq sought to balance civilian 
preferences of a light footprint with military concerns over having sufficient combat forces. 
This was to be achieved through a graduated increase in US forces over time over the course 
of the invasion, rather than amassing overwhelming force from the start. Military units were 
scheduled to deploy to Iraq, but the option of off-ramping provided flexibility in terms of 
whether or not those forces were actually employed during the invasion (Gordon and Trainor, 
2007). The final invasion plan therefore involved higher force levels than initially preferred by 
civilian policymakers, lower than military leaders may have felt most comfortable with, but 
with mechanisms in place to adjust the force levels as required during the invasion itself.  
 
The final Shared Dominance decision point under discussion is also relatively unique within OIF 
as it reflects a dual influence on the outcome through a failure to resolve civil-military 
differences. In his first press conference as CENTCOM Commander in July 2003, General John 
Abizaid described the operational environment in Iraq as ‘a classical guerrilla-type campaign’ 
(Knowlton, 2003) reflecting a growing consensus of views within the military, including those 
of the ground commander and deputy ground commander, General Sanchez and Lieutenant 
General Ray Odierno, and the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army General Jack Keane (Ricks, 2007). 
Civilian policymakers, however, both before Abizaid’s July comments and after, continued to 
be dismissive of the conditions on the ground, portraying social disorder as an unavoidable 
product of the end of Saddam’s regime (Garamone, 2003; Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). While civilian 
policymakers repudiated Abizaid’s assessment and took action to restrict the military’s use of 
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terms such as ‘guerrilla war’ (Sepp, 2007b), the outcome of the decision point reflected both 
civilian and military preferences, even though the differences between the two were never 
reconciled. Civilians were able to effectively control the institutional agenda, preventing the 
nature of the ground war confronting US forces from being an active issue for discussion at the 
elite civil-military decision-making level, yet military preferences nonetheless shaped the 
agenda-setting phase as civilians were not able to control the perceptions with which military 
leaders approached the formulation and implementation of military strategy, nor the public 
debate over the emerging nature of the war in Iraq (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). 
 
SHARED DOMINANCE CIVILIAN 
 
The least frequent variation of the dependent variable was Shared Dominance Civilian. Only a 
handful of decision points over the course of OIF had outcomes which were shaped by both 
civilian and military preferences, but which most closely reflected the preferences of civilian 
policymakers than military leaders. While there are not enough examples of this variation to 
be able to draw out reliable characteristics or patterns, the four decision points coded as 
Shared Dominance Civilian nonetheless reveal different dimensions of the civil-military power 
relationship than those evidenced under the other variations of the dependent variable 
discussed above.  
 
In order to limit the number of US forces for the immediate post-invasion period (DP 5.3), 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld sought to ‘off-ramp’ various military units which were pre-
scheduled to arrive in theatre, including the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Armored Division 
(Metz, 2008; Gordon and Trainor, 2007). According to Gordon and Trainor (2007), General 
Franks was initially of the view that he needed both divisions. However ‘after discussing the 
matter for several days with Rumsfeld, Franks relented’ (Gordon and Trainor, 2007, p529). 
Rather than over-rule Franks and issue an order for the incoming forces to off-ramp, Rumsfeld 
instead engaged with the commander to gain his agreement. Given that the Secretary of 
Defense had previously demonstrated his willingness to directly manage US troops with his 
intimate control of the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) during the formulation 
for the initial invasion plan (Ricks, 2007; Gordon and Trainor, 2007), Rumsfeld’s engagement of 
Franks at this point highlights the importance of military agreement and complicity in decision-




The military’s capacity to shape even civilian preferred outcomes is evident in the decision to 
implement a cease-fire in Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah (DP 9.9.1) and the legitimation 
of the surge (DP 23). Shortly after Operation Vigilant Resolve commenced in April 2004, civilian 
policymakers grew increasingly concerned over the potential political ramifications of the 
offensive as, according to Paul Bremer, ‘The [Iraqi] Governing Council . . . was on the verge of 
disintegrating due to Sunni resignations over Fallujah’ (Bremer, 2006, p533). In an effort to 
diffuse the situation, civilian policymakers ordered a cease-fire, over-ruling the objections of 
military leaders (Sanchez, 2009). While military leaders complied with civilian instruction, they 
were able to shape the outcome of the decision point by outlining conditions ‘under which our 
military would agree to suspend offensive operations’ (Bremer, 2006, p335). While General 
Sanchez agreed to stop the offensive he stated that no withdrawal would occur until the US 
military could ‘obtain the right separation of forces’ (Sanchez, 2009, p356) and until US forces 
could do so ‘under more favourable circumstances’ (Sanchez, 2009, p356). Sanchez’s final 
orders to the Marines were to ‘halt the offensive, but to fight back when attacked and 
eliminate any pockets of resistance associated with the attacking forces’ (Sanchez, 2009, 
p357). 
 
Even during the latter stages of the formulation of the surge strategy military opposition was 
apparent. Civilian policymakers worked to achieve consensus over time between those civilian 
policymakers who had already settled on the need for a surge and a military largely resistant 
to such measures (West, 2009; Metz, 2010; Woodward, 2008). By early December, the 
fundamental elements of the surge were in place, reflected in the President’s decision to shift 
the primary objective of US military strategy to population security (Metz, 2010; West, 2009). 
Previous consensus-building had brought the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on board, 
while other key civilian and military personnel who were against the surge were in the process 
of being replaced; Robert Gates was due to replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense 
later that month, General Abizaid was shortly to announce his retirement, and General 
Petraeus was set to assume command of MNF-I from General Casey. Intent on removing the 
remaining ‘obstacles’ (Woodward, 2008, p264) to the realisation of the surge plan, a meeting 
was scheduled between President Bush and the JCS, who remained in opposition to the 
prospect of expanding the US military mission in Iraq. Bush himself emphasises the importance 
of civil-military consensus over the surge stating ‘On a decision this controversial and 
important, it was essential to have unity. Congress and the press would probe for any rift 
within the administration. If they found one, they would exploit it to justify their opposition 
and block the plan. To reach that consensus, one more group needed to be on board, the Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff’ (Bush, 2010, p375). Even though the JCS were not able to get their preferences 
regarding the surge itself realised in the outcome of the decision point, they were nonetheless 
able to establish terms by which their agreement could be acquired in the form of eliciting a 
number of concessions or ‘”sweeteners”, including a budget increase and an increase in the 
size of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps’ (Feaver, 2001, p107).  
 
The fourth and final occurrence of Shared Dominance Civilian demonstrates the ability of 
civilian leaders to indirectly, rather than directly, shape US military strategy (DP 11). Prior to 
Casey’s arrival in Iraq as MNF-I commander, Donald Rumsfeld helped set the agenda for the 
new military campaign plan by emphasising the development of the ISF and the need to allow 
the Iraqis ‘to gain the experience they would need to ultimately take charge’ (Casey, 2012, 
p13). Casey was, in fact, asked by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and CJCS Myers to ‘develop 
an immediate assessment and long-term plan for ISF development as a matter of priority’ 
(Casey, 2012, p13) upon arriving in-theatre. Although Casey received only limited direct 
guidance from civilian policymakers (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009; Casey, 2012), Rumsfeld effectively 
helped to establish an agenda for Casey in determining the new campaign plan, a focus which 
Casey reiterated in his Senate confirmation hearing of June 2004 stating that ‘the goal is to 
have the Iraqis increase their responsibility for internal and external defense as soon as 
possible’ (Casey, 2004, p171). Despite, minimal levels of active civilian involvement in the 
actual process of formulating military strategy, Rumsfeld was successfully able to ensure that 
Casey’s attention was directed to an issue which would subsequently become one of the 
lynchpins of US military strategy from 2004 to 2006.  
 
In addition to the crucial agenda-setting for military action in Iraq, the initiation, formulation 
and legitimation of ‘clear, hold, build’ and the initiation and formulation of the surge discussed 
under Civilian Dominance, civilian policymakers also had a significant shaping influence on 
directing the focus of US military strategy towards training and transitioning, rather than 
defeating the insurgency itself, and the authorisation of a top-down transformation of US 
military strategy through the legitimation of the surge. Shared Dominance Civilian decision 
points highlight that while civilian authority is significant in terms of the ability to over-rule 
military leaders, civilian policymakers are not, de facto, omnipotent. In engaging with General 
Franks over the issue of off-ramping inbound units at the end of the invasion and soliciting 
consensus with the JCS over the surge, civilian policymakers reveal the potential limits to their 
authority to dictate policy outcomes to the military. The cease-fire in Fallujah and the 
legitimation of the surge also highlight the military’s relative ability to shape primarily civilian 
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preferred outcomes by defining conditions or extracting concessions. While these Shared 
Dominance Civilian decision points broadly appear to highlight the relative weakness of civilian 
policymakers, the overall low frequency of this variation may in fact affirm the relative 
strength of civilian authority vis-à-vis the military as civilian policymakers were far more prone 
to issue a direct order to military leaders or over-rule military opposition than they were to 




The sheer variance of the relative balance of power throughout OIF prevents a simple 
conclusion to the question of who controls US military strategy. As each of the five variants of 
the relative balance of civil-military power occurred throughout the course of the policymaking 
process, evidence can be found to support a range of propositions regarding the respective 
levels of influence of civilian policymakers and military leaders. Each of the propositions 
identified within the opening chapter to this thesis are therefore to some extent all valid, 
although no single proposition in itself is adequate to capture the complexity of the civil-
military power relationship as it unfolded over the course of OIF. The question of who controls 
military strategy therefore necessitates a more nuanced and representative response which 
can synthesise the various manifestations of a multi-dimensional relationship and account for 
the fluctuations in the civil-military balance of power.  
 
The fundamental conclusion to be drawn from the empirical analysis presented in this chapter 
is that the substantive decisions which shaped the evolution of US military strategy in OIF were 
determined by both civilian policymakers and military leaders. Military preferences 
determined the outcomes of a number of decision points with high substantive import. From 
the early focus on offensive operations, an emphasis on the training of indigenous Iraqi 
security forces, the initial introduction of counterinsurgency concepts, the implementation and 
adaptation of the surge plan, and decisions surrounding the proposed pace of withdrawals of 
US forces in 2008, military leaders had a clear and consequential impact on US military 
strategy in Iraq. Alongside this military influence, however, was a crucial civilian influence on 
both the substance and direction of US military strategy at key points. Civilian policymakers 
were singularly responsible for the initiation of military operations in Iraq and were highly 
influential in instigating key changes to US military strategy including the shift to ‘clear, hold 
and build’ and the transformative decisions made as part of the initiation and formulation of 
the surge.  
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This joint influence over military strategy is not, however, primarily the result of the direct 
power sharing dynamic captured by the three shared dominance variations of the dependent 
variable. Although some shared dominance variation occurred in 40% of decision points, the 
majority of policymaking outcomes (around 60%) were determined either by civilian 
policymakers or military leaders. In this respect, civilian policymakers and military leaders 
demonstrated a near parity of influence with Civilian Dominance occurring in 28.4% of all 
coded decision points and Military Dominance occurring in 31.3%. Further to this, those 
decision points which best explain how US military strategy evolved from a highly offensive, 
enemy centric approach to a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, were also 
determined either by civilian policymakers or military leaders. US military strategy in OIF was 
therefore primarily shaped by two separate strains of influence, occurring sequentially rather 
than concurrently, ultimately reflecting a balance of power shifting between the two ends of 
the civil-military power spectrum rather than of a constant equilibrium of power.   
 
Having examined the relative balance of power over the course of OIF from an empirical 
perspective, the next chapter turns to the theoretical aspect of the thesis, focusing on the 
performance of the independent variables and an exploration of the extent to which these 
variables are insightful in explaining why one variation of the relative balance of power 




















CHAPTER SIX   
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN THE RELATIVE BALANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY POWER: 
INDPENDENT VARIABLES – ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
  
Chapter Five addressed the first core research aim of this thesis by presenting the results and 
analysis for the dependent variable and drawing balanced conclusions regarding the relative 
balance of civil-military power in determining US military strategy in OIF. The focus of Chapter 
Six is to address the second core research aim of the thesis, presenting the results and analysis 
for the six independent variables in order to explore the potential utility of these variables in 
explaining how and why a particular balance of civil-military power presents. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ONE (IV1): CIVIL-MILITARY PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE 
 
While much of the existing civil-military relations literature is premised on the expectation of 
civil-military conflict over issues regarding the use of force (Pearlman, 1999; Feaver, 2003; 
Desch, 2001), the overall degree of divergence between the preferred outcomes of civilian 
policymakers and military leaders during OIF was low. There was no notable divergence 
between civilian and military preferences in 70% of decision points and high preference 
divergence, where civilian policymakers and military leaders supported mutually exclusive 
preferences, occurred in only 22.2% of all decision points. Medium preference divergence, 
when civilian policymakers and military leaders broadly agreed on a particular preferred 
outcome, but disagreed over the specific details of that outcome, accounted for 7.4% of all 
decision points (see Table 13, below).   
 
Table 13. Coding Frequencies for IV1, Civil-Military Preference Divergence 
IV Coding Frequency Percentage 
0 [Low] 38 70.4 
1 [Medium] 4 7.4 
2 [High] 12 22.2 
Total  54 100 
 
Civilian policymakers and military leaders shared a genuine consensus over preferred 
outcomes at several points during the evolution of US military strategy in OIF. Senior civilian 
policymakers and military leaders both supported an Afghanistan first approach in response to 
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the war on terror (DP 1.2) (Woodward, 2002) and unanimously approved the initial invasion 
plan (DP 3) (Myers, 2009; Gordon and Trainor, 2007). The call to end major combat operations 
in April 2003 (DP 5.1) and the subsequent announcement of an immediate drawdown of US 
combat forces (DP 5.2) were both based on mutual expectations of a short conflict, shared 
between the majority of Bush administration civilians and General Franks (Franks, 2005; Metz, 
2008). The ‘train to transition’ strategy pursued from 2004 to 2006 also benefited from high 
level support from civilian policymakers, including President Bush, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and Ambassador John Negroponte, and military leaders, including CENTCOM 
Commander General John Abizaid and MNF-I Commander General George Casey. All were in 
agreement with the principle concepts in terms of agenda-setting for a new approach (DP 
12.1) (Rumsfeld, 2011; Casey, 2012), adjusting the objectives of US military strategy (DP 12.2) 
(Rumsfeld, 2011; Casey, 2012) and determining the appropriate resource level (DP 12.2) 
(Gordon, 2007; Woodward, 2008). As the war progressed and evolved, civilian policymakers 
and military leaders jointly recognised that the major threat to security had shifted from being 
a primarily anti-American insurgency to that of sectarian violence (Casey, 2012; West, 2009). 
Although the surge plan of 2006 was initially a highly divisive issue for civilian policymakers 
and military leaders, once agreed upon, the continuation of the surge throughout 2007 and 
2008 relied heavily upon the consensus of President Bush, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and 
General David Petraeus in the face of significant domestic opposition from other civilian and 
military quarters alike (DPs 25, 30). Solid civil-military consensus also underpinned a number of 
operational decisions including the US pursuit of Muqtada al-Sadr (DP 9.7, 9.8) and the 
conduct of a second military operation in Fallujah in November 2004 (DP 14.4).  
 
As well as a result of civil-military agreement over preferred outcomes, the overall low level of 
preference divergence is also a consequence of the frequent deference which civilian 
policymakers and military leaders accorded one another throughout OIF. Civilian policymakers 
allowed significant leeway to military leaders to determine the outcomes of operational issues 
arising during the implementation of the initial invasion of Iraq and of the surge, often 
expressly deferring to the preferences of either General Franks or General Petraeus. A high 
level of civilian deference is also seen in formulation decision points, particularly during the 
second and third phases of OIF as Generals Sanchez and Casey were both largely left to 
determine and legitimate the objectives and operational concepts for their respective 
strategies. In these cases civilian policymakers either held no formative preferences of their 
own, or were largely happy to defer to military leaders regarding the specifics given a broad 
consensus over the more fundamental aspects of strategy.  
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A degree of civil-military consensus also underpinned those decision points which reflected a 
medium level of preference divergence. For example, in determining the resources and 
operational concepts for the initial invasion plan (DPs 2.2, 2.3), the core principles of lighter 
troop levels and innovative operating concepts were essentially shared by Rumsfeld and 
Franks. While the transformation agenda did indeed provoke considerable tensions between 
Rumsfeld and the uniformed military, especially within the US Army, CENTCOM Commander 
Franks, a self-described ‘maverick’ who was ‘frequently on the outside of the Army’s 
conservative mainstream’ (Franks, 2005, p367), appeared to share Rumsfeld’s vision to a 
certain extent with regards to thinking creatively about the war plan (Franks, 2005; Feith, 
2008). However, within this shared viewpoint, differences did arise regarding the specific troop 
levels to be employed in the invasion and the acceptable degree of risk involved in challenging 
the conventions of traditional approaches to military strategy (Franks, 2005; Gordon and 
Trainor, 2007). Civilian policymakers and military leaders also agreed to an extent regarding 
the required troop levels for the first rotation of US forces following the initial invasion (DP 
7.2) as neither advocated for an increase in ground strength. Preference divergences did, 
however, emerge over the exact number of troops required as Generals Abizaid and Sanchez 
preferred to maintain a higher base-line of forces (Sanchez, 2009; Ball, n.d.), while civilian 
policymakers preferred a greater reduction. Medium preference divergence also occurred with 
regard to the launch of Operation Vigilant Resolve following the Blackwater incident in March 
2004 as while civilian policymakers and military leaders concurred on the need to respond, 
differences emerged over the timing of military action. As Sanchez (2009) describes, ‘while 
there was a steady drumbeat from Washington to take swift action, there was also caution on 
the part of the military with regard to timing. The Marines, for example, were reluctant to 
launch too quickly’ (p331), preferring to first improve their ‘situational awareness and 
composition of forces’ (p332).  
 
Despite the overall low levels of preference divergence in OIF, civil-military views significantly 
differed in just over 20% of decision points. Civilian policymakers and military leaders held 
contrasting views regarding the prospect of including Iraq on the immediate post-9/11 
national security agenda, as a potential target in the War on Terror (DP 1.1). Civilian 
policymakers such as George Bush, Dick Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice all seemed receptive to 
the efforts of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowtiz to get Iraq on to the agenda, whereas the 
only two military leaders involved in these early high level meetings, CJCS General Hugh 
Shelton and VCJCS Richard Myers, expressed opposition to considering Iraq as a target in the 
War on Terror at such an early stage (Woodward, 2002; Clarke, 2004; National Commission on 
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Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Franks and Rumsfeld also disagreed over the 
issue of off-ramping forces following the end of major combat operations (DP 5.3) with 
Rumsfeld keen to limit the inflow of US troops into Iraq, while Franks preferred to continue 
with the existing planning arrangements (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). A broad civil-military split 
appeared again in the immediate post-invasion phase as the majority of civilian policymakers 
rejected military assessments that the emerging disorder in Iraq was reflective of a burgeoning 
guerrilla war (DP 6) (Ricks, 2007; Woodward, 2006; Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). The military had a 
series of disputes with civilians from the CPA over the training of Iraqi security forces, firstly 
with regards to the creation of the ICDC (DP 9.1) and secondly over whether the responsibility 
for ISF training should reside with the CPA, who preferred the ISF to focus on training for 
external threats (Rumsfeld, 2011; Bremer, 2006), or the military, who sought to use the ISF to 
help combat the growing violence in Iraq (DPs 9.3, 10). The most enduring area of preference 
divergence between civilian policymakers and military leaders centred around the surge (DPs 
21.1, 22.2, 22.3, 23), which the majority of military leaders maintained firm opposition to from 
the initial agenda-setting phase in October 2006 through to the legitimation of the plan in 
January 2007.  
 
Four hypotheses were advanced for civil-military preference divergence regarding its proposed 
relationship with the dependent variable, the relative balance of civil-military power: 
 
H1:  Low preference divergence facilitates Civilian Dominance;       
H2:  Low preference divergence facilitates Military Dominance;      
H3:  Low preference divergence facilitates Shared Dominance;    
H4:  High preference divergence facilitates Shared Dominance.     
 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of this variable provides the greatest support for 
hypothesis two, that when preference divergence between civilian policymakers and military 
leaders is low, military leaders are more likely to determine the outcome of the decision point. 
The Spearman’s rho test conducted reveals a moderate negative correlation (r (54) = -.546, p 
<.000) between the dependent variable and the degree of civil-military preference divergence, 
suggesting that as the level of preference divergence lowers, Military Dominance over decision 
point outcomes becomes more likely. As illustrated in Table 14, the majority of low preference 
divergence decision points have an outcome of either Military Dominance or Shared Military 
Dominance (65.8% combined), strongly supporting the notion of a relationship between low 
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preference divergence and the military’s ability to get its preferences realised in the outcomes 
of policy.  
 
Table 14. Low Civil-Military Preference Divergence Decision Points and Dependent Variable 
Outcomes 
 
DV Coding Frequency of IV1 Coding of 0  Percentage 
0 [Civilian Dominance] 3 7.9 
1 [Shared Dominance Civilian] 1 2.6 
2 [Shared Dominance] 9 23.7 
3 [Shared Dominance Military] 8 21.1 
4 [Military Dominance] 17 44.7 
Total  38 100 
 
While nearly a quarter of all low preference divergence decision points resulted in Shared 
Dominance, as predicted by hypothesis three, qualitative analysis provides the greatest 
support for hypothesis two. All seventeen decision points coded as Military Dominance, also 
coded for civil-military preference divergence, reflected a low civil-military preference 
divergence and on no occasion when civilian and military preference divergence was high did 
military preferences prevail. Shared Dominance Military prevailed on two occasions of high 
preference divergence, but significantly in both cases, military preferences prevailed over 
those of Paul Bremer and the CPA, rather than civilian policymakers in Washington DC (DPs 
9.1, 10) and in both cases required civilian support from either President Bush or Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld in order to be able to do so.  
 
There is little evidence to support hypothesis one as civilian policymakers had the determining 
influence over only a small proportion of those decision points featuring low preference 
divergence. Contrary to the assumption within hypothesis one, Civilian Dominance decision 
points tended to reflect a higher overall level of preference divergence. Although only ten of 
the nineteen Civilian Dominance decision points are also coded for preference divergence, six 
of these featured a coding of high preference divergence (with one scoring a coding of 
medium preference divergence) with civilian policymakers over-ruling military opposition on 
six occasions (DPs 1.1, 9.3, 9.10, 22.1, 22.2, 22.3). It is also interesting to note that the three 
Civilian Dominance decision points coded as low preference divergence were all primarily 
political decisions in which military preferences were unlikely to play a significant role (DPs 1.2, 
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2.1, 9.4). Decision points coded as Shared Dominance Civilian also show a higher overall level 
of preference divergence with three out of the four decision points coded as Shared 
Dominance Civilian also coded as high preference divergence. All three of these high 
preference divergence, Shared Dominance Civilian decision points involved civilian preferences 
prevailing with grudging military agreement: General Franks reluctantly agreed with Rumsfeld 
to off-ramp inbound units at the end of the initial invasion period (DP 5.3) (Gordon and 
Trainor, 2007); Generals Abizaid and Sanchez acquiesced to the implementation of a cease-fire 
in Operation Vigilant Resolve, Fallujah, despite their opposition (DP 9.9.1) (Sanchez, 2009; 
Bremer, 2006); and the JCS only agreed to the legitimation of the surge following President 
Bush’s concessions on other issues in exchange for their support (DP 23) (Woodward, 2008; 
Feaver, 2011).  
 
Hypothesis four proposed that high preference divergence would facilitate Shared Dominance 
as a result of a reconciliation between different preferences through compromise building. 
However, only one instance of high preference divergence resulted in Shared Dominance and 
not as a result of compromise or bargaining. The only decision point with high preference 
divergence to result in Shared Dominance was DP 6 which reflected the failure of civilian 
policymakers and military leaders to reconcile their very different views over the emerging 
nature of the war in Iraq and whether the growing violence and lack of security reflected a 
guerrilla war. Rather than resulting in the traditional bureaucratic ‘pulling and hauling’, higher 
levels of preference divergence instead appear to precipitate greater civilian control. As 
illustrated in Table 15, out of the twelve decision points coded as high preference divergence, 
75% resulted in either Civilian Dominance or Shared Dominance Civilian. 
 
Table 15. High Civil-Military Preference Divergence Decision Points and Dependent Variable 
Outcomes 
 
DV Coding Frequency of IV1 Coding of 2 Percentage 
0 [Civilian Dominance] 6 50 
1 [Shared Dominance Civilian] 3 25 
2 [Shared Dominance] 1 8.3 
3 [Shared Dominance Military] 2 16.7 
4 [Military Dominance] 0 0 




The overall low levels of preference divergence evident within OIF were primarily the result of 
a genuine civil-military agreement on key points of US military strategy and high levels of 
civilian deference to military leaders to determine the outcomes of decision points. The fact 
that the majority of low preference divergence decisions points were the result of positive 
civil-military agreement suggests that, within the context of OIF, there were fewer policy 
differences between the core elite civilian policymakers and military leaders than much of the 
existing literature suggests. The occurrence of high preference divergence decision points, 
however, suggests that civil-military disagreement was not pathologically repressed, even 
within the environment of Rumsfeld’s enhanced civilian control and in spite of charges of an 
‘overly acquiescent’ military (Newbold, 2006; Ignatius, 2005; Margolick, 2007; Cook, 2008). 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE TWO (IV2): CIVILIAN ASSERTIVENESS 
 
Although levels of civilian assertiveness varied throughout the course of OIF, civilian 
policymakers predominantly demonstrated low levels of assertiveness, either expressing no 
direct preference or an articulation of a preference, in over 50% of decision points. Civilian 
policymakers were, however, both willing and able to assert their policy positions when 
needed or desired, utlising a range of assertiveness behaviours including those at the very 
highest levels.  
 
Table 16.  Coding Frequencies for IV2, Civilian Assertiveness.  
IV Coding Frequency Percentage 
0  20 30.8 
1  16 24.6 
2  3 4.6 
3 10 15.4 
4 7 10.8 
5 9 13.8 
Total 65 100 
 
As illustrated in Table 16, the most frequent coding for civilian assertiveness was that of 0, 
when civilian policymakers expressed no preference as a result of non-involvement, neutrality 
or by deferring to military leaders to determine the outcomes of decision points. Analysis of 
the twenty decision points coded at the lowest end of the assertiveness scale demonstrates 
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that the overall low level of civilian assertiveness was largely the result of a significant degree 
of civilian deferment to military leaders, either explicitly or implicitly, to determine the 
outcomes of decision points. Two different types of civilian deference to military leaders 
emerge, what might be termed ‘deliberate’ deference and ‘default’ deference.  
 
Decision points which feature ‘deliberate’ deference to military leaders reflect conscious 
choices by civilian policymakers to submit to the views of the military, usually as an 
acknowledgement of their expertise or superior situational knowledge. Many of these 
instances take place during implementation phases of the policymaking process. In the 
execution of the initial invasion of Iraq, civilian policymakers expressly sought military advice 
or specifically delegated particular decisions to military leaders including: changing the timing 
of the start of the ground war, advancing the main land attack by one day (DP 4.1) (Rumsfeld, 
2011); excluding the 4th Infantry Division from the military advance into Baghdad (DP 4.3) 
(Franks, 2005); initiating an operational pause before entering Baghdad (DP 4.4) (Rumsfeld, 
2011); determining whether more forces were required for the strike into Baghdad (DP 4.6) 
(Perdum, 2004); and both the decisions to conduct a ‘Thunder Run’ into the Iraqi capital (DP 
4.6) (Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Franks, 2005) and to remain in the city thereafter (DP 4.7) 
(Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Civilian leaders also appear to have largely deferred to General 
Franks to determine the end of the invasion and the call for a close to major combat 
operations (DP 5.1) (Franks, 2005; Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Deliberate deference to military 
leaders occurred sporadically throughout other implementation phases (DP 14.4, 19.7), until a 
more systematic civilian deference to the military resumed during the surge in which military 
leaders were given significant leeway to not only determine implementation decisions (DP 
24.3, 24.4), but also to set the agenda for the subsequent iteration of the surge plan (DP 26), 
decide upon the necessary resources (DP 27.2) and to action a strategic pause as a result of 
the April 2008 review (DP 30). 
 
‘Default’ deference to military preferences primarily occurred as a result of low levels of 
civilian involvement. For example, in contrast to the close civilian involvement during the 
formulation of the initial invasion plan, there was a notable lack of direct guidance from both 
the CPA and Washington DC during the immediate post-invasion phase (Ricks, 2007; 
Woodward, 2006). In the absence of clear civilian instruction, the burden of responsibility to 
determine an appropriate post-invasion military strategy largely fell to General Sanchez and 
his team in Iraq (Ricks, 2007; Wright and Reese, 2008). Sanchez’s successor, General George 
Casey, similarly appears to arrive in Iraq as MNF-I commander with a significant degree of 
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freedom to determine US military strategy (Kagan, 2007; Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). According to 
Cloud and Jaffe (2009), ‘Bush had told himself he would not micromanage his generals, the 
way Lyndon Johnson had done . . . but Bush took his own maxim to the extreme, leaving his 
commanders without any real instructions except for the advice they got from Rumsfeld’ 
(p169). This absence of civilian guidance appears to extend from the formulation phase into 
the legitimation phase also (DP 13). While the campaign plan was a joint document signed by 
both Ambassador Negroponte and Casey (West, 2009), Casey states that the plan was shared 
with the Ambassador and Embassy staff and briefed to the President and the NSC, only once 
the plan was effectively complete (Casey, 2012). 
 
While low levels of assertiveness can also result if civilian policymakers are denied the 
opportunity to express a preference or to engage substantively in policy decision-making, this 
occurred rarely in OIF. Civilian policymakers did not participate directly in the military-led 
review of strategy in September 2005 (DP 15.2), though civilian officials at the Department of 
Defense and the Department of State were at the time both engaged in their own reviews of 
strategy (DP 15.1, 15.3). Civilian policymakers also appear to have been excluded from the 
decision-making processes surrounding the creation of the Fallujah Brigade (DP 9.9.3). The 
origins of the Fallujah Brigade are a little vague, but the consensus appears to be that it was 
fashioned by Lieutenant General Jim Conway of the Marines (Sanchez, 2009; Ricks, 2007) as a 
means of resolving the ongoing stalemate in Fallujah following the launch (DP 9.9.1) and 
subsequent cessation (DP 9.9.2) of Operation Vigilant Resolve in April 2004. Since a cease-fire 
was declared in Fallujah on April 9th, the Bush administration had been unable to determine 
whether or not to resume the offensive or to withdraw from the area, which left the US forces 
stationed in Fallujah in a precarious position. Indications from several sources suggest that the 
creation of the Fallujah Brigade, as a solution to the stalemate, was a decision taken in the 
field without full prior approval from appropriate civilian authorities and presented as a fait 
accompli to civilian policymakers (West, 2006; Bremer, 2006; Feith, 2008; Allawi, 2007). 
 
The second most frequent coding for the civilian assertiveness variable was level 1, an 
articulation of a preference, which occurred in around a quarter of all decision points. All 
decision points coded as 1 for civilian assertiveness were also coded as low preference 
divergence, suggesting that civil-military consensus over preferred outcomes rendered higher 
level civilian assertiveness behaviours unnecessary. This in large part proved correct as for 
each decision point in which civilian assertiveness was limited to an articulation of a 




While the majority of civilian assertiveness occurred at the lower end of the assertiveness 
scale, civilian policymakers were not reluctant to assert their preferences, demonstrating a 
variety of more assertive behaviours in order to ensure that their preferences were realised in 
the outcomes of policymaking. From debate and argument with military leaders to civilian 
policymakers engaging in varying degrees of advocacy or oversight, civilian policymakers 
engaged in higher level assertiveness behaviours in over 40% of decision points, including nine 
occasions of the ultimate expression of civilian assertiveness, issuing military leaders with a 
clear and direct order.  
 
Civilian policymakers argued with military leaders, but engaged in no more assertive 
behaviours, on issues such as whether to off-ramp incoming US forces following the end of 
major combat operations (DP 5.3) and whether to initiate a cease-fire in April 2004 Fallujah 
(DP 9.9.1). Once motivated to actively pursue their policy preferences, however, civilian 
assertiveness only rarely remained at this level. Civilian policymakers were more likely to 
purposefully and persistently advocate for a particular outcome, holding and working towards 
particular policy preferences over a sustained period of time and by raising the level of 
oversight of military leaders. In comparison to only 4.6% of decision points in which civilian 
policymakers argued or debated policy options with military leaders (level 2 civilian 
assertiveness), civilian policymakers actively advocated for their preferred outcome or 
increased civilian oversight of military leaders in 15.4% of decision points (level 3 civilian 
assertiveness).  
 
Key civilians made a sustained effort to raise and maintain Iraq as an issue on the immediate 
post-9/11 agenda (DP 1.1), over military opposition. Iraq was repeatedly brought up in the NSC 
and war cabinet meetings and press briefings from 12th to 17th September (Woodward 2002) 
and actively pursued though memos (Mazarr, 2007; Ricks, 2007) and official proposals for 
action (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Civilian policymakers also persistently pressed for 
particular preferences for military action, whilst maintaining close involvement in the planning 
processes, for the first iteration of US military strategy. During the formulation of the initial 
invasion plan civilian preferences for operational concepts of speed, surprise and flexibility 
were clearly communicated to military leaders in the early stages of planning and repeatedly 
asserted (DP 2.3). In addition, civilian policymakers referred military leaders to ideas or plans 
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which embodied their preferences for a light, swift military operation4 (Ricks, 2007; Gordon 
and Trainor, 2007) whilst rejecting numerous iterations of the invasion plan which were not 
seen to reflect the desired operational principles (Woodward, 2004; Gordon and Trainor, 2007; 
Franks, 2005).  
 
As well as positively advocating for their own particular policy preferences, civilian 
policymakers also resisted military efforts to advance their own preferences. Paul Bremer 
demonstrated continued resistance to military endeavours to establish the ICDC (DP 9.1) and 
assume responsibility of ISF training (DP 9.3) as he was championing the CPA’s own proposal to 
create an entirely new Iraqi Army (Rumsfeld, 2011; Feith, 2008) to be focused on combatting 
external threats rather than maintaining internal security (Bremer, 2006). A similar civilian 
resistance is notable in the efforts to determine a solution to the Fallujah cease-fire situation 
(DP 9.9.2). From the start of the cease-fire on April 9th to the creation of the Fallujah Brigade 
at the end of April 2004, indecision ruled as to whether or not to resume the offensive. Several 
times over that period military leaders pressed to resume the offensive (Sanchez, 2009; 
Bremer, 2006; West, 2009; Feith, 2008), but civilians policymakers continually resisted their 
recommendations to continue. 
 
Increased levels of civilian involvement and monitoring were also evidenced in the civilian led-
reviews which took place over the course of 2005. In January, the Department of Defense 
launched an ‘unusual “open-ended” review of the military’s entire Iraq policy’ (Schmitt and 
Shanker, 2005), prompted by the ‘deep concern by senior Pentagon officials and top American 
commanders over the direction that the operation in Iraq is taking’ (Schmitt and Shanker, 
2005). At the same time, Condoleezza Rice initiated her own State Department led review as 
she felt she wasn’t ‘getting the straight story from the military’ (Woodward, 2008, p30). The 
State Department review involved several visits to Iraq, in February, May and September 2005, 
by Philip Zelikow, counselor to the State Department and senior policy adviser to Condoleezza 
Rice, with the purpose of assessing the state of progress in Iraq. While the purpose of 
Zelikow’s visits was a broader assessment of US policy in Iraq, the review inevitably considered 
the efficacy of current military practice and Zelikow spent time on the ground, meeting with 
military personnel such as General Peter Chiarelli and Colonel H.R. McMaster in their 
respective areas of Iraq (Zelikow, 2007). Zelikow (2007) concluded from his visits that there 
                                                 
4
 These include: the suggestion of an “Afghan Model” utilising airpower and Special Operations Forces 
combined with indigenous forces (Ricks, 2007, p36); briefings on a rapid, decisive strike on Baghdad with 
a US troop force of around 15,000 (Gordon and Trainor, 2007, pp 48-40); and a study on ‘Shock and 
Awe’ (Gordon and Trainor, 2006, p40) emphasising the decisive impact of air power.  
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was no country-wide military strategy in operation in Iraq and that the military was ‘just 
improvising and inventing almost ad hoc from unit to unit, from brigade to brigade or division 
to division’. As a result of the increased civilian oversight over the course of 2005, Zelikow 
made a series of recommendations to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice which provided the 
foundation for the subsequent prioritisation of the ‘clear, hold, build’ concept, the adoption of 
which aimed to redress the perceived strategic void and ‘help people internalize that there's a 
strategy, and here's what it means’ (Zelikow, 2007). 
 
In 10.8% of decision points, civilian policymakers engaged in level 4 civilian assertiveness 
behaviours demonstrating an extended advocacy in favour of specific policy outcomes. Civilian 
policymakers repeatedly and consistently asserted their preferences for a light footprint for 
the initial invasion plan (DP 2.2), challenging military requirements throughout the iterative 
development of the war plan and prompting continual refinements and alterations to the 
strategy in terms of both reducing the troop numbers and compressing the deployment times 
(Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Ricks, 2007). The war planning effort, particularly with regard to 
the resource element, was also accompanied by very high levels of civilian involvement and 
monitoring, including numerous, ongoing military briefs to civilian policymakers and 
Rumsfeld’s intimate management of the TPFDL, a force deployment process traditionally 
managed internally by the military (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Civilians made ‘incessant 
requests’ (Wright and Reese, 2008, p151) for changes to the deployment schedule following 
the end of the initial invasion (DP 7.2) and, according to Sanchez (2009), the military faced 
‘never-ending’ (p291) resistance from Washington in determining the troop rotation in 2004. 
Civilian policymakers also publicly countered General Abizaid’s assessment of the war in Iraq 
as ‘guerrilla war’ throughout the summer and autumn months of 2004 and engaged in a 
sustained effort, both inside and outside of the military, to control terminology and the 
testimonies of its military leaders in order to re-establish a different problem definition more 
in line with their own preferences (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009; Sepp, 2007a). Rumsfeld even sent 
General Abizaid a memo on 23rd July 2003 which stated ‘Attached are the definitions of 
“guerrilla warfare”, “insurgency” and “unconventional warfare”. They came from the Pentagon 
dictionary. I thought you might like to see them’ (Rumsfeld, 2003a, p1). 
 
Civilian assertiveness surrounding the resources for the surge plan also demonstrates a highly 
orchestrated civilian effort to get preferences realised in the outcomes of policy. Despite the 
fact that President Bush and the NSC held definite preferences for the surge option early on in 
the formulation process (Woodward, 2008; West, 2009), a variety of options were under 
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debate, over which civilian policymakers and military leaders were divided.  Advocates of the 
surge, led by NSA Stephen Hadley, worked hard to demonstrate the feasibility of the surge, 
gradually advancing the plan to ensure that the option remained active and that it was 
ultimately accepted and implemented. According to Bing West (2009), over the two months of 
internal deliberations, Hadley and the NSC ‘orchestrated the surge by quietly gathering 
consensus among insiders’ (p30). Civilian policymakers commissioned their own operational 
concept for a surge from within the NSC to ensure that it was considered a viable option 
(Woodward, 2008) and gathered support from sources outside of the core military leadership, 
such as General Jack Keane who, according to Thomas Ricks (2009) played an ‘unprecedented 
and astonishing’ (p79) role in the formulation of the surge, as well as from academic and 
experts from the American Enterprise Institute (Ricks, 2009; Feaver, 2011). Civilian 
policymakers prodded the JCS ‘to consider the surge alternative without having it be a formal 
NSC tasking’ (Feaver, 2011, p103) and provided opportunities for military leaders ‘to pitch the 
surge as its own idea’ (Woodward, 2008, p170). According to Peter Feaver (2010), an adviser 
to the Bush administration at the time of the surge decision-making, the evolution of the surge 
plan was a deliberately slow and incremental process aimed at gradually building consensus 
within the administration and ‘hemming in a reluctant military’ (p34). 
 
Out of sixty-five coded decision points, civilian policymakers reached the highest levels of 
civilian assertiveness nine times. On four of these occasions, civilian policymakers issued a 
direct order to military leaders, over-ruling their recommendations. Civilian policymakers over-
ruled military preferences for delaying military operations in Fallujah ordering an immediate 
execution of Operation Vigilant Resolve in April 2004 (DP 9.6) and denied proposed military 
action against key Iraqi targets such as Muqtada al-Sadr (DP 9.10) (Sanchez, 2009; Bremer, 
2006). Civilian policymakers also effectively over-ruled military preferences in determining the 
objectives (DP 22.1) and the operational concepts (DP 22.3) for the new surge plan, both of 
which were decisions ultimately made by President Bush. In debating changes to US military 
strategy, one of the core issues was whether population security should become the primary 
mission for US forces or whether US military strategy should continue to emphasise the train 
to transition approach. As an issue which divided both Bush’s civilian and military advisers, the 
issue was eventually resolved by the President (Feaver, 2011; Woodward, 2008, Robinson, 
2008) who determined that US forces could no longer ignore the sectarian violence in Iraq. 
Once the new objective was determined, changes in the operational concept, toward a 




The remaining five decision points involving the highest level of civilian assertiveness involved 
civilian policymakers presenting military leaders with a fait accompli outcome, in which 
military leaders had no input. The decision to commence planning for military action in Iraq 
(DP 1.3) and to start ‘looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam 
Hussein’ (Woodward, 2004, p2) appears to have been a presidential decision made without 
explicit consultation with either civilian or military advisers (Woodward, 2004). Military leaders 
also appear to have been largely excluded from Condoleezza Rice’s agenda-setting effort in 
October 2005 regarding the concept of ‘clear, hold and build’ (DP 16) and the legitimation of 
the subsequent NSVI document which formalised this concept as the centerpiece of the US 
security strategy in Iraq (DP 18). Casey was apparently ‘upset that [Philip] Zelikow hadn’t 
sought him out to discuss the idea before he and Rice took it public’ (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009, 
p208), expressing concern that ‘the process hadn't included him the way he thought it should’ 
(Zelikow, 2007). According to David Cloud and Greg Jaffe (2009), Casey reportedly later asked 
Condoleezza Rice ‘Well, if it’s my strategy, don’t you think it would have been appropriate for 
someone to ask me about it?’ (p208). Primarily political decisions, such as the timing of Iraqi 
elections (DP 14.5), were also presented to the military without their involvement or 
consultation. As described by Bob Woodward (2006), ‘the elections were yet another matter 
on which the top military man, JCS Chairman General Myers, did not get a vote’ (p371). 
Military leaders were also largely excluded from the agenda-setting for the surge (DP 21). 
Civilian policymakers made a clear seizure of initiative in instigating a change in US military 
strategy in late 2006, with initial reviews of strategy being conducted with ‘no official liaison . . 
with either the JCS or MNF-I’ (Feaver, 2011, p22). 
 
As set forth in Chapter Three, the following hypothesis was advanced for the civilian 
assertiveness variable: 
 
H5:  Civilian Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian assertiveness is high. 
 
The Spearman’s rho test conducted reveals a strong negative correlation (r (65) = -.846, p 
<.000) between the dependent variable and civilian assertiveness, supporting the hypothesis 
that greater civilian assertiveness facilitates Civilian Dominance. In sixteen of the nineteen 
occasions of Civilian Dominance, civilian assertiveness scored a three or above, indicating a 
strong association between the ability of civilian policymakers to get their preferences realised 
in the outcomes of policymaking and the extent to which they take action to advance those 
preferences within the policymaking process. A similar pattern is demonstrated in decision 
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points coded as Shared Civilian Dominance, as these all feature a civilian assertiveness level of 
two or above. The reverse is also supported as all twenty-one decision points resulting in 
Military Dominance were accompanied by very low levels of civilian assertiveness, 
predominantly the result of civilian policymakers deferring to military judgment to determine 
outcomes, either deliberately by default.  
 
If high levels of civilian assertiveness tend to feature in Civilian Dominance decision points and 
low civilian assertiveness tends to feature in Military Dominance decision points, we may 
expect Shared Dominance decision points to be accompanied by mid-level civilian 
assertiveness levels, although this is not the case. Shared Dominance decision points 
predominantly reflect a low level of civilian assertiveness as eight out of the eleven decision 
points coded for Shared Dominance feature a coding of 1 for civilian assertiveness with civilian 
assertiveness limited to an expression of a preference. The contrary performance of the 
variable in this respect is largely the result of a civil-military consensus over outcomes which 
facilitated Shared Dominance on the basis of agreement, rather than as a result of compromise 
or bargaining, for which we would anticipate higher levels of assertiveness.  
 
Shared Dominance Military decision points also do not seem to reflect the identified trend 
between the dependent variable and civilian assertiveness. According to the hypothesis and 
the evidence outlined above, we would expect instances of Shared Dominance Military to 
generally reflect lower levels of civilian assertiveness. However, out of the eleven Shared 
Dominance Military decision points also coded for civilian assertiveness, only five are coded as 
1 for civilian assertiveness with the other six decision points reflecting higher levels of civilian 
assertiveness behaviour coded as 2, 3 or 4. The apparent non-congruence with the hypothesis 
can, however, be qualitatively explained through some of the peculiarities of the decision 
points involved. In two instances, the Department of Defense review of January 2005 (DP 15.1) 
and the June 2006 Camp David meeting (DP 20), the higher civilian assertiveness behaviours 
are the result of increased levels of civilian monitoring, rather than assertiveness linked 
directly towards advancing a particular preference, as both decision points reflect an increase 
in oversight as the result of civilian-led reviews of US military policy. In a further two instances, 
during the formulation of the operational concepts for the initial invasion (DP 2.3) and the 
setting of the resources for the immediate post-invasion strategy (DP 7.2), civilian 
policymakers eventually deferred to military leaders despite having actively worked to 
advance their own preferences during the formulation process. The final two instances where 
civilian assertiveness was high in decision points which resulted in Shared Dominance Military, 
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one coding captures the assertiveness of the CPA (DP 9.1), subsequently over-ruled by 
Rumsfeld, and the other (DP 19.1) reflects civilian policymakers advocating for a preference 
already articulated by the military. 
 
Much of the existing literature on the civil-military relationship within the George W. Bush 
administration depicts a highly intrusive civilian leadership, with civilian policymakers involving 
themselves in areas of traditionally military prerogative (Desch, 2007; Korb, 2007; Herspring, 
2008; Kaplan, 2008), whilst frequently ignoring, side-lining or outright over-ruling professional 
military advice (Desch, 2007; Korb 2007; Camancho and Hauser, 2007). While civilian 
policymakers, at times, held clear preferences for outcomes and actively sought to advance 
those preferences, even if that involved close civilian involvement in a decision point or over-
ruling military recommendations, this is not a wholly representative assessment as in over 50% 
of all decision points civilian policymakers deferred to the military or limited their 
assertiveness to an expression of a preference. Low levels of civilian assertiveness were 
facilitated by a tendency to defer to the military, either deliberately in recognition of military 
expertise or by default through low levels of civilian involvement, and by the overall low levels 
of civil-military preference divergence, which as illustrated in the discussion of the previous 
independent variable, tend to facilitate greater civilian deference to the military.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE THREE (IV3): MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS 
 
For the majority of OIF, military leaders largely operated within their bounds as military 
advisers and as the primary implementers of US military strategy with military assertiveness 
limited to expressing a preference or taking routine, delegated action in 63.5% of all decision 
points coded. Military leaders were only more assertive than this in 26.9% of decision points 












Table 17.  Coding Frequencies for IV3, Military Assertiveness  
IV Coding Frequency Percentage 
0 6 9.5 
1 40 63.5 
2 5 7.9 
3 5 7.9 
4 6 9.5 
5 1 1.6 
Total 63 100 
 
For the most part, military leaders were able to express a preference regarding the outcomes 
for decision points arising during OIF, although they were excluded on a number of issues. 
Military leaders were not consulted regarding the President’s decision to commence planning 
for an invasion of Iraq (DP 1.3), the timing of the Iraqi election (DP 14.5), the State Department 
Review of 2005 (DP 15.3), agenda-setting for ‘clear, hold and build’ (DP 16), the legitimation of 
NSVI (DP 18) and the agenda-setting for the surge (DP 21). While some of these decision points 
were primarily political decisions which may not necessarily involve the views and preferences 
of military leaders, others had a more significant impact on the evolution of US military 
strategy.  
 
Beyond the statement of preferences, military leaders sought to advance their preferences by 
argument and debate, engaging in level 2 military assertiveness behaviours, either to assert an 
alternative recommendation to civilian preferences or to try and persuade civilian 
policymakers of the benefits of their own preferences. Military leaders engaged in argument 
and negotiation with civilian policymakers regarding various operational elements of the initial 
invasion plan, resisting some civilian ideas which were not considered either feasible or 
appropriate from a military perspective (DP 2.3) (Franks, 2005; Gordon and Trainor, 2007). 
General Franks also temporarily resisted Donald Rumsfeld’s efforts to off-ramp the inbound 
units in the immediate post invasion phase (DP 5.3) (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Military 
leaders argued against the immediate launch of Operation Vigilant Resolve (DP 9) (Sanchez, 
2009; Allawi, 2007) and later, for the resumption of the operation after an extended cease-fire 
(DP 9.9.2) (Sanchez, 2009; Bremer, 2006), but were nonetheless over-ruled on both occasions. 
Several appeals were also made by Sanchez and Bremer to take action against Muqtada al-
Sadr in April 2004 (DP 9.10) (Sanchez, 2009). 
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Military leaders demonstrated higher levels of assertiveness (level 3) in advocating more 
seriously for their preferred options in 7.9% of decision points. During the planning for the 
initial invasion, military leaders resolutely sought to maintain what they considered to be 
appropriate troop levels in the face of persistent civilian preferences for a lighter footprint. 
While the successive iterations of the plan from February 2002 until the final invasion plan 
agreed in March 2003 varied in terms of the level of troops that the invasion plan would start 
with, the overall levels remained relatively consistent at around 250,000 to 275,000. Rather 
than compromise on forces thought necessary to successfully undertake the invasion, military 
leaders devised compromises to satisfy particular civilian requests, but which maintained the 
integrity of the fundamental requirements, by compressing the deployment times for an 
invasion and through the concept of off-ramps. Military leaders were therefore quite assertive 
in maintaining the force level they considered fundamentally necessary, particularly in view of 
the persistence of civilian policymakers on this issue. The rotation process for OIF-2 was 
equally as contentious (Sanchez, 2009) with military leaders reversing a previous decision to 
commence the drawdown and working together to present a unified front to civilian 
policymakers in order to retain a base-line level of forces against civilian pressures to reduce 
troop numbers (DP 7.2) (Ball, n.d.).  
 
The military’s setting of conditions for the cease-fire in Operation Vigilant Resolve (DP 9.9.1) 
also reflects increased levels of assertiveness as, although military leaders effectively complied 
with civilian preferences, their acquiescence was tempered by their battlefield demands 
(Sanchez, 2009; Bremer, 2006). Military endeavours to expand the US military’s advisory effort 
(DP 15.1) also reflected level 3 military assertiveness as General Casey repeatedly briefed 
Rumsfeld in an effort to gain approval and continued to push the initiative despite civilian 
uncertainty (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). Even once the formulation of the surge plan was nearly 
complete, military leaders continued to oppose the civilian-led initiative. Amidst high levels of 
civil-military tension (Ricks, 2009) during a pivotal meeting between Bush and the JCS mid-
December 2006, the JCS continued to hold out their approval for the surge which effectively 
prompted the president to offer ‘”‘sweeteners” (Feaver, 2011, p107) including a budget 
increase and an increase in the size of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps (DP 23). 
 
Military leaders demonstrated level 4 assertiveness in 9.5% of decision points. General 
Abizaid’s July 2003 description of the war in Iraq as ‘guerilla war’ (DP 6) was highly significant 
as, at the time, it publicly and openly contrasted statements made by key civilian policymakers. 
Up until late June there was a joint effort to paint the post-war situation as a temporary 
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response to regime change, with a ‘disparate and disorganised’ (Shovelan, 2003) Iraqi 
opposition ‘forming pockets of resistance’ (Rumsfeld, 2003b). However, over the course of July 
2003, a more explicit civil-military divergence arose with Abizaid’s public acknowledgement of 
a ‘guerrilla war’ clearly undermining the position of Bush administration policymakers. Military 
leaders engaged in an extended advocacy in their sustained effort for approval for the creation 
of the ICDC (DP 9.1). Following continued resistance from Paul Bremer, military leaders 
circumvented the CPA entirely and consulted directly with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to 
gain his approval. According to Sanchez (2009), ‘With Washington now on our side, we 
reengaged Ambassador Bremer and he reluctantly gave his formal approval’ (p254). While the 
CPA was not part of the official chain of command and had no authority over US military 
activities, military leaders, although not acting with formal impropriety, deliberately sought 
support from Rumsfeld in order to ensure that Bremer could no longer refuse. The military 
attempted to take similar actions regarding assuming responsibility for training ISF later in 
2003 (DP 9.3), although Rumsfeld was less compliant with this request, instead responding 
‘why don’t you all talk about it down there’ (Sanchez, 2009, p251).  
 
Military leaders were also highly persistent in their opposition to the surge plan during both its 
formulation and legitimation phases. Generals Abizaid and Casey maintained their support of 
the train and transition strategy throughout 2006, from the recommendations of the Camp 
David meeting in June through to the deliberations regarding the surge in November and 
December (Ricks, 2009; Woodward, 2008). Abizaid’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in November 2006, when the pre-surge review was in full flow, continued to 
emphasise the transition to Iraqi forces as the lynchpin of US military strategy, reporting that 
‘In discussions with our commanders and Iraqi leaders it is clear that they believe Iraqi forces 
can take more control faster . . . as we increase our efforts to build Iraqi capacity, we envision 
coalition forces providing needed military support and combat power to Iraqi units in the lead 
to eventually set the conditions for the withdrawal of our major combat forces’ (Abizaid, 2006, 
p2). Reflecting the depth of military opposition to the surge, as late as December 2006, when 
key decisions regarding the surge had already been made, General Casey continued to make 
competing recommendations for a reduced surge force (Metz, 2010), arguing that additional 
forces could then be deployed if needed at a later date (Feaver, 2011). Even in the face of a 
clear civilian preference for a change in strategy and a new approach in Iraq, military leaders 




Military leaders reached the highest assertiveness level only once during the course of OIF in 
the creation of the Fallujah Brigade (DP 9.9.3) as a means of resolving the ongoing cease-fire 
called shortly after the commencement of Operation Vigilant Resolve. Military leaders 
demonstrated extraordinary initiative creating the Fallujah Brigade which, according to the 
majority of the literature, was presented as a fait accompli to civilian policymakers (West, 
2006; Bremer, 2006; Feith, 2008; Allawi, 2007). Although Sanchez (2009) maintains that civilian 
policymakers were aware of the plan, Paul Bremer (2006) recalls finding out about the 
creation of the Fallujah Brigade on CNN international (p344) while former Undersecretary of 
Defense Douglas Feith (2008) reports that the news surprised civilian policymakers in 
Washington DC as well as the CPA. Despite warranting a coding of the highest level of military 
assertiveness, it is important to note that the creation of the Fallujah Brigade, as a temporary 
‘resolution’ to the problem of an unending cease-fire, only evolved after a significant period of 
vacillation as to what to do. It was therefore arguably less a usurpation of civilian prerogative 
than an example of military leaders taking action in a void of civilian indecision in order to 
resolve an issue that was placing US forces in a complex and precarious position in the field.  
 
The hypothesis advanced for this variable was:  
 
H6:  Military Dominance is more likely to occur when military assertiveness is high. 
 
The Spearman’s rho test conducted reveals no correlation between the dependent variable 
and military assertiveness (r (63) = -.071, p =.579). Within the broader civil-military relations 
literature military assertiveness is usually presented as a threat to civilian control based on the 
presumption that a more assertive military is a more influential one. The data from OIF, 
however, suggests that military assertiveness ultimately had little determinative impact on the 
relative ability of military leaders to get their preferences realised in the outcomes of 
policymaking. Nineteen of the twenty-one decision points coded as Military Dominance also 
featured a low level of military assertiveness, with one decision point uncoded for military 
assertiveness and the other the military’s only demonstration of the highest assertiveness 
level (DP 9.9.3). Shared Dominance Military decision points demonstrate a slight overall 
increase in military assertiveness, but still predominantly reflect low levels of military 
assertiveness with seven out of twelve Shared Dominance Military decision points all involving 




Overall, increased military assertiveness tended to favour greater civilian dominance as in the 
seventeen decision points where military assertiveness scored a 2 or above, ten of these 
resulted in either Civilian Dominance or Shared Dominance Civilian. In all of these instances, 
countermanding civilian assertiveness or eventual military acquiescence to civilian preferences 
limited the impact of military assertiveness on the outcome of the decision point. In some 
cases greater military assertiveness did correspond with greater military influence on the 
outcome, but this relational link was inconsistent. A case in point is the impact of military 
assertiveness during the surge. Despite persistent, high level military resistance during the 
planning and formulation of the surge plan, civilian policymakers were able to get their 
preferences realised in the outcomes of decision-making as a result of their ability to over-rule 
military advice and recommendations. The highly controversial nature of the surge decision 
shows that, even in the most difficult of domestic political situations, civilian policymakers can 
ensure that their preferences triumph even in the face of significant military resistance and 
opposition. Within the context of OIF, the apparent unimportance of military assertiveness in 
determining control of US military strategy ultimately appears explained by the essential 
hierarchy of the civil-military relationship.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TWO AND THREE: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS 
 
Four further hypotheses concerning the civilian and military assertiveness variables were 
articulated in Chapter Three: 
 
H7:  High levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Shared Dominance; 
H8:  Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Civilian Dominance;  
H9: Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Military Dominance; 
H10:  Low levels of both civilian and military assertiveness facilitate Shared Dominance. 
 
Analysis of the data suggests that a high level of both civilian assertiveness and military 
assertiveness is more favourable to civilian policymakers vis-a-vis military leaders in getting 
their preferences realised in the outcomes of decision points. Table provides a breakdown of 
the dependent variable outcomes of those decision points which feature both high levels of 
civilian assertiveness and military assertiveness (coded as level 2 or above). The majority of 
decision point outcomes in which both civilian and military assertiveness are high favour 
civilian policymakers. Civilians had a decisive shaping impact on seven of these decision points 
and a significant impact on a further three. Equally as important is the fact that military leaders 
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were not able to dominate any of the decision points in which both civilian and military 
assertive levels were high, although they were able to get their preferences realised to some 
extent in the outcomes of the Shared Dominance and Shared Dominance Military decision 
points as a direct result of their assertiveness. The strong preferences military leaders 
maintained regarding necessary force numbers (DP 2.2) and appropriate operational concepts 
(DP 2.3) during planning for the initial invasion were reflected in the outcomes of these 
decision points. Military assertiveness demonstrated in allocating resource levels for OIF-2 (DP 
7.2), the creation of the ICDC (DP 9.1) and the military review which resulted in the extension 
of the US advisory programme (DP 15.1) also played a role in ensuring that military 
preferences were at least in part reflected in the outcomes.    
 
Table 18. High Civilian Assertiveness and High Military Assertiveness Decision Points and 
Dependent Variable Outcomes 
 
DV Coding Frequency 
0 [Civilian Dominance] 7 
1 [Shared Dominance Civilian] 3 
2 [Shared Dominance] 2 
3 [Shared Dominance Military] 4 
4 [Military Dominance] 0 
Total 16 
 
Data and analysis therefore provides tentative support for hypothesis seven as the majority of 
decision points in which civilian and military assertiveness were both high resulted in one of 
the three shared dominance variations of the dependent variable. The most frequent single 
coding, however, was Civilian Dominance. As four out of seven of the Civilian Dominance 
decision points included a coding of maximum civilian assertiveness, hypothesis seven could 
potentially be amended to state that when both civilian and military assertiveness is high, 
Shared Dominance is more likely unless civilian assertiveness is at its highest in which case 










Table 19. Low Civilian Assertiveness and Low Military Assertiveness Decision Points and 
Dependent Variable Outcomes 
 
DV Coding Frequency 
0 [Civilian Dominance] 3 
1 [Shared Dominance Civilian] 0 
2 [Shared Dominance] 8 
3 [Shared Dominance Military] 5 
4 [Military Dominance] 19 
Total 35 
 
Hypotheses eight, nine and ten speculate on the outcome of decision points when civilian 
assertiveness and military assertiveness are both low. There is a clear indication in the data 
that scenarios in which both civilian and military assertiveness are low favour greater military 
influence, therefore providing the greatest support for hypothesis nine. As presented in Table 
19, military leaders had an important or decisive impact on the outcomes of decision-making 
in twenty-four of thirty-five decision points featuring low civilian and low military assertiveness 
(coded as 1 or below). This echoes the findings from the analysis of the civil-military 
preference divergence variable as all of these Military Dominance decision points reflect the 
same dynamic of civilian policymakers deferring to the military, either deliberately or by 
default. Further to this, the three Civilian Dominance decision points reflected in Table 19 were 
all highly political decisions in which a strong military role would not necessarily be anticipated 
(DPs 1.2, 2.1, 9.4). Again, there is some evidence of shared dominance with thirteen decision 
points featuring low civilian and low military assertiveness resulting in either Shared 
Dominance or Shared Dominance Military (although all of these shared dominance decision 
points stem from consensus between civilian policymakers and military leaders, rather than 
compromise). Overall, however, the data lends clearest support to hypothesis nine and the 
notion that when both civilian and military assertiveness are low Military Dominance is more 
likely to prevail.   
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE FOUR (IV4): CIVILIAN UNITY 
 
Over the course of OIF, civilian policymakers generally maintained high levels of internal group 
unity, sharing preferences in around 60% of all decision points. Some degree of intra-civilian 
divergence occurred in around 40% of decision points. In 22% this divergence was significant 
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enough to prevent a fully unified position, yet did not quite extend to an explicit split amongst 
civilian policymakers regarding their preferred preferences. The remaining 18% of decision 
points featured clear divisions amongst civilian policymakers and low levels of unity as 
multiple, mutually exclusive preferences competed for dominance.   
 
Table 20. Coding Frequencies for IV4, Civilian Unity 
IV Coding Frequency Percentage 
0 [High levels of unity] 35 59.3 
1 [Medium levels of unity] 13 22.0 
2 [Low levels of unity] 11 18.7 
Total 59 100 
 
Internal civilian unity was generally high throughout OIF, though it should be noted that this 
not only indicates an active agreement over preferred policy outcomes between civilian 
policymakers, but may also incorporate instances in which not all of the core civilian 
policymakers were involved and instances in which there is no evidence of disagreement, even 
if the individual preferences of each core civilian policymakers cannot be identified (see 
Chapter Four).  
 
Civilian policymakers actively concurred over the final invasion plan (DP 3) and supported a 
general deference to military leaders during its implementation (DPs 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7). 
A broad foundation of civilian consensus also underpinned the series of decisions which 
marked the end of Phase One of US military strategy in Iraq (DPs 5.1, 5.2 5.3), including the 
end of major combat operations and the commencement of the US drawdown. There is no 
evidence of disagreement between civilian policymakers in the guidance provided to military 
leaders in the immediate post-war period (DP 7.1) nor in their acceptance of the post-invasion 
campaign plan (DP 8). Civilian unity was high during a number of the post-invasion 
implementation decision points (DPs 9.6, 9.7. 9.8, 9.10), including the decision to implement a 
cease-fire in Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah (DP 9.9.1). High levels of deference to 
General Casey in determining the new campaign plan of August 2004 were facilitated by a 
broad civilian consensus over the importance of ISF training and the establishment of new 
political institutions in Iraq (DPs 11, 12.1, 12.2, 13). Civilian policymakers were also united in 
their view of the need for an additional military operation in Fallujah in November 2004 (DP 
14.3) and in supporting General Casey’s recommendation for an increase in force strength in 
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preparing for the upcoming Iraqi elections in January 2005 (DP 14.4), as well as in the their 
response to the February 2006 bombing of Samarra (DP 19.1) and the subsequent change in 
the threat assessment (DP 19.2). Although both the formulation process for both NSVI and the 
surge created divisions between civilians, once the surge plan was decided upon and initiated, 
civilian unity broadly resumed as all core civilian policymakers supported its implementation 
and continuation following the September 2007 (DP 25) and April 2008 (DP 30) reviews. 
 
Although a number of authors have noted how the shared experiences and ideological 
viewpoints of many of Bush’s senior civilian advisers facilitated high levels of consensus within 
the administration (Mann, 2004; Mazaar, 2007), this did not prevent differences of opinion 
from emerging during the course of the policymaking process. Medium civilian unity was 
measured in thirteen decision points as a result of some disagreement between core civilian 
policymakers, but yet with no clear split in terms of preferred outcomes. In the early stages of 
decision-making for the war, then Secretary of State Colin Powell registered concerns 
regarding the inclusion of Iraq on the immediate post-9/11 agenda (DP 1.1), the objectives of 
military action in Iraq (DP 2.1), the level of troop resources for the invasion force (DP 2.2) and 
the core operational concepts of the invasion plan (DP 2.3). Although descriptions of the 
extent of Powell’s outlier role vary, the majority of sources record Powell voicing his concerns 
within the policymaking process, although this does not appear to culminate at any point into 
explicit opposition or with a view to advancing alternative options. For example, while Powell 
warned President Bush over the consequences of an invasion of Iraq (Woodward, 2004) and 
demonstrated a ‘lack of commitment’ (Feith, 2008, p246) to military action, Powell 
nonetheless agreed with the launch of OIF in March 2003 and never directly expressed his 
opposition. Similarly, although Powell expressed doubt over the light footprint and concern 
over the overall speed of the initial invasion plan, Franks states that Powell did not clearly 
dissent; rather he just highlighted his concerns (Franks, 2005). Civilian unity over the decision 
to focus on an Afghanistan first approach (DP 1.2) was also slightly impaired with Rumsfeld 
‘abstaining’ (Woodward, 2002, p91) from this particular decision point. 
 
Paul Bremer similarly expressed concern at several points without reaching explicit dissent. 
Contrary to the dominant dismissive view held by most civilian policymakers regarding the 
growing insurgency in Iraq (DP 6), Bremer states that ‘for weeks I’d sensed that the Pentagon 
did not grasp the need to crush a mounting Baathist-jihadist insurgency, and to crush it early 
on’ (Bremer, 2006, p105). However, there are no clear indications that Bremer expressed 
these views to civilian policymakers in Washington (Woodward, 2006; Bremer, 2006; Allawi, 
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2007). According to one of Bob Woodward’s source, ‘Bremer would agree in the field, but 
would not really engage in the debate back in Washington. He would never come clean in front 
of Rumsfeld’ (Woodward, 2006, p266). A further split arose between Rumsfeld and Bremer as 
the Secretary of Defense refused to support Bremer in his opposition to the military assuming 
responsibility for training the ISF, preferring to abstain and allow the CPA and the military to 
work out their differences between themselves (DP 9.3) (Sanchez, 2009).  
 
During the agenda-setting and formulation for NSVI (DPs 16, 17.1, 17.3), Rumsfeld clearly 
registered concern regarding the adoption of ‘clear, hold, and build’, but without rising to 
outright opposition to the changes in strategy proposed. As the State Department was 
endeavouring to ‘articulate a strategy for success in Iraq’ (Zelikow, 2007), Rumsfeld ‘reacted 
with consternation, both because the secretary of state was enunciating military strategy and 
also laying out a long-term commitment that he opposed (West, 2009, p110). More 
specifically, Rumsfeld was concerned over the implications of the strategy for US forces in 
relation to the strategy of training and transitioning responsibilities to the ISF, arguing that ‘it 
is the Iraqis’ country. They’ve got 28 million people there. They are clearing; they are holding; 
they are building’ (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009, p208). According to Woodward (2008), Rumsfeld 
even tried to get the phrase ‘clear, hold and build’ removed from one of the president’s 
speeches. However, possibly in part a result of NSVI’s vagueness as to exactly whose 
responsibility it was to ‘clear, hold and build’ (whether it was that of the US military or the ISF 
or both), Rumsfeld never appeared to definitively object. 
 
Issues of explicit contention between civilian policymakers causing low levels of unity occurred 
sporadically over isolated decision points over the course of OIF, as well as reflecting more 
fundamental fractures. The role of the 4th Infantry Division in the initial invasion (DP 4.3) 
caused Powell to split from the majority of civilian policymakers (who were happy to defer to 
the military) by insisting on the division’s participation (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Differences 
between the CPA and civilians in Washington DC caused a more sustained lack of unity over 
the course of 2003 to 2004 as the preferences of Paul Bremer diverged from the other core 
civilian policymakers on a variety of issues. Paul Bremer presented a lone dissenting view in his 
argument for higher troop numbers in the immediate post-invasion period (DP 7.2), expressing 
these preferences a number of times throughout June, July, September and November to a 
variety of Washington policymakers including the President, Rice and Rumsfeld (Bremer, 2006; 
Woodward, 2006). Bremer also opposed the establishment of the ICDC (DP 9.1) (Sanchez, 
2009; Wright and Reese, 2008), advocated for the arrest of Muqtada al-Sadr (DP 9.2) (Bremer, 
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2006; Sanchez, 2009), argued for a later transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis (DP 9.4) (Bremer, 
2006; Feith, 2008) and contested the military’s request to assume responsibility for the 
training of Iraqi forces (DP 10) (Bremer, 2006). A number of times in his memoir Bremer (2006) 
indicates his separation from the dominant civilian views held within the George W. Bush 
administration at one time stating ‘I got the impression that Secretary Rumsfeld had cast me 
as the odd man out, swimming against the stream. I suppose I was’ (p206).  
 
Sustained civilian disunity was perhaps most evident during the planning process resulting in 
the surge (DP 21, 22.1, 22.2, 22.3) as the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the 
President and the NSA all advanced different preferences for the future of US policy in Iraq 
(Woodward, 2008; Feaver, 2011; Metz, 2010; West, 2009). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
opposed the idea of US forces assuming responsibility for population security (Feaver, 2011; 
West, 2009), arguing that US objectives had been achieved in Iraq and that the way forward 
was to ‘withdraw most US forces and focus the remaining forces on raids on [Al Qaeda], 
leaving Iraqis to sort out their sectarian differences’ (West, 2009, p204). The Department of 
Defense favoured accelerating the existing train and transition plan (Feaver, 2011; Metz, 2010; 
Ricks, 2009) based on the view that increased numbers of US forces would not produce a clear 
advantage unless accompanied by political improvements in Iraq (Metz, 2010). President Bush 
and NSA Stephen Hadley, however, were clear and early advocates for the surge (Woodward, 
2008). Although a consensus amongst civilian policymakers was eventually reached in support 
of the surge plan, significant intra-civilian divergences had to be overcome in the process.  
 
The hypothesis for this independent variable was articulated as follows: 
 
H11:  Civilian Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian policymakers are unified.  
 
The Spearman’s rho test conducted reveals a moderate negative correlation between the 
dependent variable and civilian unity (r (59) = -.492, p <.000). The strength of the correlation 
identified indicates an association between civilian unity and the relative balance of civil-
military power, although the direction of the relationship is contrary to that outlined in the 
stated hypothesis. Despite the assumption within the existing literature regarding the 
importance of civilian unity as source of strength and a means of ensuring military obedience, 
the negative correlation identified between the relative balance of power and civilian unity 
suggests that rather than civilian unity facilitating Civilian Dominance and civilian disunity 
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facilitating Military dominance, civilian unity in fact shows a greater association with Military 
Dominance, while civilian disunity demonstrates greater association with Civilian Dominance. 
Out of the seventeen occasions of Civilian Dominance also coded for civilian unity, high levels 
of civilian unity were recorded only twice. More striking, however, is that in all fourteen 
Military Dominance decision points, which were also coded for civilian unity, civilian unity was 
high. Rather than the degree of civilian unity being important in terms of internal cohesiveness 
facilitating the prevalence of civilian preferences, the absence of divergent preferences within 
the civilian group seems more important in facilitating military dominance. Even in cases of 
high preference divergence, civilian unity does not appear to be essential in ensuring Civilian 
Dominance as in the six decision points with high levels of preference divergence also coded as 
Civilian Dominance (DPs 1.1, 9.3, 9.10, 22.1, 22.2, 22.3), civilian policymakers were recorded as 
having high levels of unity in only one. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE FIVE (IV5): MILITARY UNITY 
 
Similar to the overall level of unity experienced by civilian policymakers, internal group 
cohesion amongst military leaders in OIF was also predominantly high, prevailing in around 
two thirds of all decision points coded. Medium levels of unity occurred in 8.6% of decision 
points, while low levels of unity, with military leaders clearly supporting different, competing 
preferences, occurred in 24.1% of decision points.  
 
Table 21. Coding Frequencies for IV5, Military Unity 
IV Coding Frequency Percentage 
0 [High levels of Unity] 39 67.2 
1 [Medium levels of unity] 5 8.6 
2 [Low levels of unity] 14 24.1 
Total 58 99.9 
 
The overall high level of military unity is in part due to a significant degree of intra-military 
consensus. The military leaders involved in the initial deliberations regarding the US response 
to 9/11 shared preferences against the inclusion of Iraq on the immediate post-9/11 national 
security agenda, while supporting an Afghanistan first approach (DPs 1.1, 1.2). Military leaders 
were also in agreement regarding their approval of the invasion plan (DP 3), most of its 
implementation (DPs 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7) and the termination of major combat operations 
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(DP 5.3). The second, third and fourth phases of OIF were also reflective of a highly unified 
military leadership, in no small part due to the shared viewpoints between the CENTCOM 
commander, General John Abizaid, and the ground commanders, General Ricardo Sanchez, 
who oversaw the initial post-invasion phase, and General George Casey, who oversaw the 
subsequent two phases of US military strategy. Generals Abizaid and Sanchez presented a 
united front regarding the creation of the ICDC (DP 9.1) and in gaining responsibility for 
training ISF (DPs 9.3, 10). They also both opposed the immediate launch of Operation Vigilant 
Resolve in Fallujah (DP 9.6) and the subsequent cease-fire (DP 9.9.1). CJCS Myers, Abizaid and 
Casey held similar views regarding the train to transition strategy of Phase Three. As Myers 
(2009) states, ‘our overall strategic objective was simple; increase the size and competency of 
the Iraqi forces so they could eventually replace U.S. and coalition forces’ (p259). Abizaid, an 
expert on Middle Eastern affairs, considered US forces as ‘antibodies’ in Iraq (Owens, 2008; 
Sanchez, 2009), while Casey’s previous military experience had taught him that ‘can-do 
Americans can’t want peace more than the people they are trying to help’ (Cloud and Jaffe, 
2009, p169).  
 
Military unity was also strengthened, at least on the surface, by the tendency of the JCS to 
defer to the CENTCOM and ground commanders and the tendency of the CENTCOM 
commander to, in turn, defer to the ground commander. The overall involvement of the JCS in 
the substantive formulation and implementation of US military strategy in OIF was sporadic. 
According to Ricks (2007), Abizaid focused predominantly on strategic CENTCOM issues across 
the whole of the region leaving Sanchez and Casey to largely determine the details of their 
respective strategies. The limited involvement of the JCS and the tendency to defer to the 
senior level person on the ground reduced the potential for intra-military disagreements, both 
in terms of the policymaking process itself and for the measurement of the unity variable in 
the context of this research as, for methodological purposes, when the individual views of the 
JCS could not be identified and there was no suggestion of opposition or dissent, military unity 
was coded as high.  
 
Senior military leaders, however, were not so unified at all times. Military leaders faced 
internal differences over the objectives for the initial invasion plan, causing medium levels of 
unity. According to Ricks (2007), some military leaders, including members of the JCS, were 
arguing for aggressive containment for Iraq rather than regime removal (DP 2.1), although 
specific examples of expressed opposition, clearly attributable to any of the core military 
leaders are not identifiable. Within the formulation phase of the invasion plan, specific 
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concerns were raised by a number of military leaders, including General David McKiernan 
(Ricks, 2007; Gordon and Trainor, 2007) and Marine Commander James L. Jones (Rennie and 
La Guardia, 2002). While no one military leader expressly objected to the evolving operational 
concepts reflected within the invasion plan (DP 2.3), the presence of such divergent viewpoints 
during the formulation phase indicated that military leaders were not positively unified as a 
group. For example, General McKiernan opposed the decision to off-ramp forces, including the 
1st Cavalry Division (DP 5.3), following the end of major combat operations, although he did 
not pursue his objections (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). In the immediate post-invasion period, 
while there was a growing consensus amongst military leaders that the resistance US forces 
were encountering in Iraq was indicative of a low intensity war (DP 6), CJCS General Richard 
Myers remained somewhat equivocal preferring to stay in step with Rumsfeld (Ricks, 2007).  
 
Military leaders faced significant internal divisions indicative of low military unity in fourteen 
decision points throughout OIF. Around a third of these divisive policy issues occurred in the 
planning and implementation of the initial invasion, though the majority took place in the final 
periods of the war, prompted largely by the formulation of the surge plan and the subsequent 
strategy which evolved. While all military leaders eventually signed off on the final invasion 
plan, the planning process was fraught with a number of divisions. Military leaders held 
distinct views on the appropriate level of resources for the initial attack on Iraq (DP 2.2) and 
were not consistent in presenting a unified front in their interaction and negotiation with 
civilian policymakers regarding the necessary force levels required for the invasion, both in 
terms of major combat operations and the post-invasion stability and support phase. It 
appears that the central planning team under McKiernan had greater concern with lower 
troop numbers than CENTCOM under Franks (Ricks, 2007; Gordon and Trainor, 2007), 
particularly regarding the reconstruction phase of the initial invasion plan. The JCS took 
contradictory positions on the issue of required force levels for the invasion. The result of the 
‘Prominent Hammer’ wargames held in March 2002 resulted in evidence in support of a larger 
number of troops (Ricks, 2007), although a July 2002 classified study entitled ‘Operational 
Availability’ contributed to the pressure for a smaller force as it supported the concept of a 
strategy built around speed, requiring a smaller combat force with fewer logistical demands 
(Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Individually the JCS expressed varying degrees of concern over the 
evolving strategy, with the greatest concern coming from the Chief of Staff of the Army, 
General Eric Shinseki, who was concerned that smaller troop numbers would cause difficulty in 
maintaining US supply lines (Ricks, 2007; Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Woodward, 2004). Franks 
clashed several times with McKiernan during the implementation of the invasion including the 
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use of the 4th Infantry Division (DP 4.3), whether to reinforce US troops before advancing on 
Baghdad (DP 4.5), and over the beginning of the drawdown following the end to major combat 
operations (DP 5.2) (Gordon and Trainor, 2007).  
 
The limited involvement of the JCS and the tendency of the CENTCOM commander to defer to 
the ground commander enabled a lengthy period of high levels of military unity during the 
middle phases of the war as military leaders largely concurred on the major issues of offensive 
operations during the post-war period, the emphasis on training of Iraqi forces and the 
nascent shift to counterinsurgency. Military unity over the final two phases of US military 
strategy, however, was much more fractured and the building pressure for change, coinciding 
with several changes of personnel, resulted in higher levels of intra-military disagreement. 
While at the nascent stages of planning for the surge most core military leaders were 
advocating a continuation of the existing strategy, the new deputy ground commander, 
General Ray Odierno, increasingly expressed his opposition to Casey and support for a surge 
(West 2009; Ricks, 2009). The military’s ability to present a unified front in the planning for the 
surge was also diminished by the inability of the JCS to present a clear alternative 
recommendation. According to one NSC aide, ‘the four service chiefs in Washington didn’t 
agree on one strategy to present as an alternative’ (cited in West, 2009, p 202), weakening 
their overall position in influencing the debate. Once the surge plan had been agreed, the 
arrival of General David Petraeus as Casey’s replacement as MNF-I commander and a new, 
more assertive CJCS, Admiral James Fallon, laid the groundwork for further military 
disagreement.  
 
CJCS Fallon, who was ‘determined . . . not to send any more [personnel] than necessary’ 
(Woodward, 2008, p 343) to Iraq, clashed with Generals Petraeus and Odierno on a number of 
occasions regarding the issue of resources, including the additional resources requested to 
implement the surge (DP 24.2) (Robinson, 2008; Woodward, 2008; Ricks, 2009) and the 
recommendations of the September Review (DP 25). In the build-up to the September review, 
a ‘running feud’ (Ricks, 2009, p160) evolved between Petraeus and Fallon in terms of 
determining the future of the surge plan. Fallon advocated a substantial drawdown of US 
forces, arguing that the US was short of vital strategic reserves of forces and equipment for 
other regional demands (Robinson, 2008), while Petraeus and Odierno argued for a measured 
and situation-dependent timetable for troop reductions. According to Woodward (2008), 
Petraeus reported ‘It’s very frustrating that you have to stand up against your chain of 
command every single day, to have to fight for this, as opposed to being supported by it’ 
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(pp391-392). The April 2008 review of strategy (DP 30) also featured divergent priorities 
between US military leaders on the proposed pace of withdrawals, prompted in part by a 
growing debate on whether to shift more US forces to the war in Afghanistan. At the same 
time that Petraeus was making his recommendations for an operational pause, other top 
military officers sought continued withdrawals throughout 2008 (Ricks, 2008).   
 
The hypothesis for the military unity variable asserted that: 
 
H12:  Military Dominance is more likely to occur when military leaders are unified. 
 
The Spearman’s rho test conducted revealed no significant correlation between the dependent 
variable and military unity (r (57) = -.069, p <.609)5. This is contrary to much of the existing 
civil-military relations literature, outlined in Chapter Three, which portrays military unity as a 
relative source of strength against civilian policymakers, sometimes to the extent that military 
leaders are considered to possess a ‘veto’ over some decisions (Stevenson, 2006).  
 
At first assessment of the empirical evidence the hypothesis initially seems to be supported as 
military unity was generally present in instances of Military Dominance. For example, in the 
twenty-one Military Dominance decision points military leaders were coded as having high 
levels of unity in fifteen. However, an examination of the performance of the variable for the 
other variations of the dependent variable casts some doubt upon this initial association. If the 
stated hypothesis for this variable was correct we would expect military unity to be low in 
decision points resulting in Civilian Dominance. However, the degree of military unity 
remained high in six out of the ten Civilian Dominance decision points also coded for military 
unity. Similarly, military unity remained high in half of decision points which resulted in Shared 
Civilian Dominance. The inconsistency of the military unity variable in terms of its relationship 
with the dependent variable explains the lack of correlation identified by the correlation co-
efficient. Further to this, qualitative analysis of the relevant decision points indicates that 
military unity rarely appears to have substantively contributed towards the relative strength of 
the military in policymaking. The only decision point where the significance of military unity in 
                                                 
5
 The total number of codings for the military unity variable is 58. The Spearman’s rho test uses only 57 
of these as one of the codings for military unity does not have a corresponding coding for the 
dependent variable. DP 27.1 is coded as 2 for military unity as a result of divisions within the senior 
military leadership over the primary objectives for US military strategy following the September 2007 
review of the surge, though there was, overall, insufficient information for this decision point to code 
for the dependent variable. The Spearman’s rho test therefore does not consider the military unity 
coding made for DP 27.1 and tests only the remaining 57 which all have corresponding codings for the 
dependent variable.  
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this respect is explicitly noted in the literature is in determining the resources for the post-
invasion plan (DP 7) when the CJCS directed the Marine Corps Commandant to support the 
effort to maintain a base-line of US forces so that a unified position would be presented to the 
Secretary of Defense (Ball, n.d.).  
 
According to the existing literature military unity provides military leaders with a relative 
advantage vis-a-vis civilian policymakers and makes it harder for civilians to overrule their 
recommendations. Neither of these advantages, however, materialised within OIF as on a 
number of occasions civilian policymakers overruled even a unified military leadership (DPs 
9.6, 9.10, 22.1) and in other instances simply denied the military, unified or otherwise, an 
opportunity to participate in the policymaking process (DPs 1.3, 14.5. 16, 18, 21). While the 
military unity variable does not operate as expected, in accordance with the stated hypothesis, 
it is worth noting that the performance of the variable could be undermined by a number of 
specific contextual factors relevant to OIF. The relatively low levels of overall preference 
divergence between civilian policymakers and the military, and within their respective groups, 
as well as the relative lack of involvement from the JCS and the tendency of military leaders to 
defer down the chain of command, may not necessarily provide the best test for this variable.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOUR AND FIVE: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY UNITY 
 
Two further hypotheses relevant to the unity variables were articulated in Chapter Three, both 
of which suggested that Shared Dominance was the most likely outcome when civilian 
policymakers and military leaders were either both internally divided or both internally 
unified:  
 
H13:  Shared Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian policymakers and military 
leaders are both internally divided; 
H14:  Shared Dominance is more likely to occur when civilian policymakers and military 
leaders are both internally unified. 
 
Due to the overall high levels of civilian and military unity present in OIF, the data set only 
contains limited examples of when civilian policymakers and military leaders were both 
internally divided, making a determinative conclusion as to the accuracy of hypothesis thirteen 
difficult. Out of the four occasions where civilian policymakers and military leaders both 
presented with low levels of unity, three resulted in Civilian Dominance and one in Military 
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Dominance. The three Civilian Dominance decision points were all connected to the 
formulation of the surge and reflect the core role of the president in the decision-making 
process. During the planning process for the surge in late 2006, civilian policymakers were at 
split over the optimum direction of US policy in Iraq. As a result of these internal 
disagreements, ‘where the staffs could not agree, Hadley brought the issues to the NSC 
principals and to the president for decision’ (Feaver, 2011, p106). It was therefore ultimately 
the President’s responsibility to determine the way forward in Iraq. As Steven Metz (2010) has 
noted in his assessment of decision-making during the surge, ‘Because President Bush saw the 
[War on Terror] as the preeminent task of his administration and Iraq as its central battlefield, 
he made the key strategic decisions himself’ (p14). While it is reasonable then to expect that, 
when civilian policymakers and military leaders both have low levels of unity, Shared 
Dominance may prevail as cross-cutting civil-military coalitions may form, the limited evidence 
provided by OIF instead seems to suggest that decision-making scenarios which are fraught 
with divisions within both groups may in fact precipitate strong civilian leadership in order to 
determine between the various options. 
 
Table 22. High Civilian Unity and High Military Unity Decision Points and Dependent Variable 
Outcomes 
 
DV Coding Frequency 
0 [Civilian Dominance] 2 
1 [Shared Dominance Civilian]  2 
2 [Shared Dominance] 8 
3 [Shared Dominance Military] 4 
4 [Military Dominance]  10 
Total 26 
 
As illustrated in Table 22, out of twenty-six decision points featuring high levels of unity 
amongst both civilian policymakers and military leaders the outcomes predominantly result in 
either Military Dominance or Shared Dominance. The results do not conclusively support or 
reject hypothesis fourteen as while Military Dominance is the most single prevalent outcome, 
fourteen of the twenty-five decision points featuring high civilian and high military unity 
resulted in some form of shared dominance. The predominance of Shared Dominance and 
Military Dominance in scenarios of high civilian and high military unity can in large part be 
explained by the overall low level of civil-military preference divergence and low levels of 
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civilian and military assertiveness. When civilian and military leaders both express a preference 
and both share the same preference, Shared Dominance variants may be more likely as civilian 
policymakers and military leaders are both able to get their preferences realised in the 
outcomes of decision points by way of consensus. When civilian policymakers tend to defer or 
delegate to the military to determine the outcome, according to the analysis of the civilian 
assertiveness variable, Military Dominance is more likely to result.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE SIX (IV6): INFORMATION ADVANTAGE 
 
As illustrated in Table 23, military leaders possessed an information advantage relevant to the 
outcome of the decision point in just under half of all decision points coded for this variable, 
examined within OIF. Despite criticisms that civilian policymakers within the Bush 
administration frequently disregarded or ignored military advice (Korb, 2007; Camancho and 
Hauser, 2007; Desch, 2007), military expertise played an important role in determining the 
outcomes of a significant number of decision points. 
 
Table 23. Coding Frequencies for IV6, Information Advantage 
IV Coding Frequency Percentage 
0 [Military Information Advantage] 30 46.9 
1 [No Military Information Advantage] 34 53.1 
Total 64 100 
 
Civilian policymakers explicitly yielded to military preferences on the basis of their superior 
professional knowledge on a number of decision points. During both the initial invasion and 
the implementation of the surge, President Bush allowed Generals Franks and Petraeus great 
leeway to determine the outcomes of decision-making. As reported by Myers (2009), Franks 
was given considerable autonomy to make implementation decisions as the invasion unfolded, 
with Bush on more than one occasion directly deferring to Franks’ views (Woodward, 2004; 
Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Once the foundations of the surge plan were in place, Generals 
Petraeus and Odierno determined the specifics of the implementation of the surge, including 
the distribution of US forces throughout Iraq and the allocation of their primary missions 
(Robinson, 2008). While the original surge plan, as formulated by civilian policymakers, 
focused on population security in Baghdad, Generals Petraeus and Odierno were given the 
necessary freedom to be able to adapt the surge plan according to situational demands. They 
subsequently determined that, in addition to population security operations in Baghdad, a 
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proportion of forces would be responsible for undertaking offensive operations in the 
surrounding areas, specifically focused on targeting Al Qaeda (Robinson, 2008; West, 2009).  
 
Civilian policymakers also approved military recommendations which were not necessarily 
fully in line with their own preferences, in deference to their superior ground information and 
expertise. For example, the final invasion plan, approved by all civilian policymakers, contained 
the slightly higher troop levels desired by military leaders and some operational amendments 
to previously agreed iterations of the war plan as they were deemed necessary by ground 
commanders (DPs 2.2, 2.3) (Gordon and Trainor, 2007). Civilian policymakers also deferred to 
military expertise in increasing the troop levels at particular stages of the war (DPs 14.4, 24.3, 
24.4), as well as in determining the pace of proposed drawdowns to US forces following the 
surge (DPs 25, 30). Prior to the January 2005 Iraqi elections, Casey requested a temporary 
increase in forces to assist US forces with security efforts (Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). Despite, 
Rumsfeld’s consistent preference for reducing US troop level increases (Rumsfeld, 2011), 
Rumsfeld deferred to the judgments of the senior military leader on the ground that more 
forces were temporarily necessary (DP 14.4). Similar deference was also given to Petraeus 
following his request for additional support forces above the 21,500 troops already committed 
by President Bush to implement the surge (DP 24.3). Only a week before Petraeus’ request, 
the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, had informed the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that fewer additional forces would be required (Baker et al., 2007) and of his hope 
to begin withdrawing troops (Woodward, 2008). However, despite individual preferences, the 
additional force requests were approved on the recommendation of the new MNF-I 
commander and ‘Gates got Petraeus the troops’ (Baker et al., 2007) he had requested.  
 
As well as civilians explicitly deferring to military expertise, information advantages stemming 
from the military’s proximity to the ground and their professional specialisation also arose by 
default, due to a lack of civilian participation. While civilian policymakers were intimately 
involved in some aspects of policymaking for US military strategy in Iraq, for others military 
leaders appear to have been delegated to almost entirely. In the immediate post-invasion 
period General Sanchez received little guidance or input from civilians in Washington in 
planning US military strategy after the end of major combat operations (Ricks, 2007; Wright 
and Reese, 2008). Similarly, apart from a few broad directives, General Casey was largely left 
to determine the specifics of the train to transition strategy employed in 2004 through 2006 
(Cloud and Jaffe, 2009; Casey, 2012). In such circumstances military leaders relied upon their 
professional experience and expertise in the absence of civilian instruction or guidance. 
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While the empirical evidence used within this thesis is by no means absolute, there are very 
few indications that military leaders manipulated an informational advantage over civilians by 
restricting their access to relevant information, poor information sharing or by 
misrepresenting information. Civilian policymakers were excluded on a few occasions of 
predominantly military decision-making, such as the military led review in 2005 (DP 15.1) and 
the creation of the Fallujah Brigade (DP 9.9.3), though none of these resulted in a 
transformational outcome for US military strategy. Although strained relations between 
civilian policymakers and military leaders impaired information sharing at times (between the 
military and the CPA, for example) key relationships, such as those between Franks and 
Rumsfeld, Negroponte and Casey, and Petraeus and Crocker, overall, appear to have facilitated 
the sharing of ground information between military and civilian leaders. For example, 
Negroponte and Casey both recognised the crucial importance of their relationship as 
Ambassador and MNF-I commander to the mission. According to Casey (2012), he and 
Negroponte both acknowledged from the outset ‘that a close, cooperative relationship . . . 
would be absolutely essential’ (p10), emphasising a ‘One-Team/One-Mission’ approach (Casey, 
2012, p10).   
 
There are hints within the literature that, at certain points, civilian policymakers were not 
satisfied by the quality of the information being provided by military leaders. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice initiated her own series of State Department reviews of Iraq policy 
based in part on her view that she was ‘not getting the straight story from the military’ 
(Woodward, 2008, p30). Similarly, during the review of Iraq policy in 2006, in the build-up to 
the surge, there were concerns that military reporting was not reflecting the seriousness of the 
situation in Iraq in their progress reports (Robinson, 2008; Cloud and Jaffe, 2009). While it is 
impossible to determine the absolute veracity of military reporting during OIF, there are at 
least no explicit charges of military leaders withholding or misrepresenting specific 
information, for their own benefit, in their interactions with senior civilian policymakers.  
 
Military information advantages, however, were not ubiquitous within OIF as in over half of 
the decision points coded there was no notable military information advantage. On a handful 
of occasions military expertise, the possession of better ground information and information 
sharing were not relevant to the decision point. In situations of high political salience such as 
the initial decision of whether to include Iraq as part of the War on Terror (DP 1.1), the 
transfer of authority (DP 9.4), the cessation of Operation Vigilant Resolve (DP 9.9.1) and the 
deliberations over the timings of the Iraqi elections (DP 14.5), those information sources which 
144 
 
typically create military information advantages played a minimal role as political 
considerations were prioritised over military ones. The relative importance of military 
expertise was also sometimes diminished by the various sources of information that can often 
compete in the policymaking process. For example, in determining whether or not the US 
should seize the opportunity to strike Dora Farms (DP 4.2), civilian policymakers considered a 
variety of source information from both military and intelligence agencies (Bush, 2010) before 
making their final decision. On the majority of occasions, however, there was no military 
information advantage as civilian policymakers were effectively able to neutralise any 
potential military informational advantages.  
 
While on several occasions civilian policymakers deferred or delegated to military leaders, 
civilian policymakers were selective in determining how and when military expertise was 
recognised and accepted and, as a result, the importance of military expertise in determining 
the outcome of decision points varied. Civilian policymakers frequently challenged, rejected or 
over-ruled military advice. Rumsfeld rejected several iterations of the initial invasion plan 
(Gordon and Trainor, 2007; Woodward, 2002) and General Shinseki’s estimation regarding the 
proposed level of forces required for military action in Iraq was publicly disparaged, with 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz describing it as ‘wildly off the mark’ (Herspring, 
2005, p395). The professional recommendations of the majority of the senior military 
leadership, including the ground commander and the JCS, also had little impact on the 
deliberations of late 2006, largely because they were not in support of the civilian preferred 
surge.   
 
Civilian policymakers were also able to off-set military expertise with close civilian oversight 
and alternative sources of expertise. Rumsfeld’s intimate involvement with the TPFDL (Gordon 
and Trainor, 2007) acted as a countervailing influence in a traditional area of military expertise 
and ensured greater information equality between civilian policymakers and military leaders 
regarding force levels. Alternative sources of expertise were also used by civilian leaders to 
counteract military preferences. The most notable use of this occurred during the planning for 
the surge as civilian policymakers sought support from external sources of expertise and 
alternative sources of military expertise. The American Enterprise Institute provided support 
for a surge as did some military officers, both retired and active, outside of the core military 
leadership, including former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane and General 
David Petraeus, the latter of whom had recently completed a new publication of the US Army 
and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual in December 2006. As Peter Feaver (2011) 
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has noted, these military officers played a ‘vital (perhaps even essential role) in giving the pro-
surge case military respectability’ (p114).  
 
Military leaders were also excluded from some decision points, thereby preventing their input 
and any possible influence over outcomes. Military leaders were not consulted in the decision 
of whether to commence planning for a potential military attack on Iraq (DP 1.3) and the core 
military leadership played no formal role in the State Department reviews of 2005 (DP 15.3). 
Even in some decisions which had a clear bearing on military strategy, military participation 
was minimalised such as in the formulation of the NSVI policy document (DPs 16, 17.1, 17.2, 
17.3) and in the review of military strategy and subsequent initiation of planning for the surge 
in late 2006 (DP 21). Bob Woodward (2008) describes how, during initial surge planning, the 
commanding general on the ground, General Casey, was ‘so out of the loop, it seemed as if he 
were speaking from another planet’ (p231).  
 
The hypotheses for this variable were as follows: 
 
H15:  Information advantages favour the military; 
H16:  Information advantages which favour the military facilitate Military Dominance; 
H17:  No military information advantage facilitates Civilian Dominance.  
 
Due to the fact that the majority of decision points demonstrated no military information 
advantage, hypothesis fifteen has been proven to be false. Military leaders do not, de facto, 
possess an information advantage over civilians and, even if a military advantage exists, there 
is no guarantee that this advantage will effectively influence the outcome of the decision point 
as civilian policymakers have means to neutralise these advantages. The process of 
determining US military strategy in OIF demonstrates both the varying relevance of military 
information advantages to decision-making, as well as the various mechanisms civilians can 
choose to counteract these sources. Despite considerable potential for military information 
advantage stemming from professional expertise, proximity to events and ground information, 
as well as bureaucratic opportunities for withholding or manipulating information, there is too 
much variance to determine military information advantages as being axiomatic within the 
formulation and implementation of US military strategy.  
 
Hypotheses sixteen and seventeen, however, are supported by qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. The Spearman’s rho test conducted for this variable indicates a strong negative 
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relationship between the relative balance of civil-military power and information advantage (r 
(64) = -.849, p <.000). As anticipated by hypotheses sixteen and seventeen, when military 
information advantages favour the military, Military Dominance is more likely; when no 
information advantages exist in favour of the military, Civilian Dominance prevails. While this 
relationship may seem to be self-evident, the result of the correlation analysis nonetheless 
reaffirms the strong correlational relationship information advantages have with the relative 




The focus of Chapter Six has been to explore the relevance and impact of six independent 
variables on the relative balance of civil-military power. Through both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, this chapter has illustrated whether or not the hypotheses articulated for 
each variable are supported within the data for OIF. Analysis reveals that four of the six 
independent variables have moderate or strong correlations with the dependent variable, 
although not all independent variables performed in ways anticipated in the original 
hypotheses. Civil-military preference divergence demonstrated a moderate negative 
correlation with the relative balance of civil-military power, indicating that low levels of 
preference divergence facilitate Military Dominance, while high levels of preference 
divergence facilitate Civilian Dominance. Civilian Assertiveness showed a strong, negative 
correlation with the dependent variable, supporting the hypothesis that greater civilian 
assertiveness facilitates Civilian Dominance. While civilian unity demonstrated a moderate 
negative correlation with the dependent variable, the direction of the relationship between 
civilian unity and the relative balance of civil-military power was inverse to that anticipated in 
the hypothesis as, rather than high levels of civilian unity facilitating Civilian Dominance, high 
levels of civilian unity in fact tended to favour greater military influence. Tests of the 
information advantage variable confirmed the importance of information in facilitating either 
Civilian Dominance or Military Dominance, depending on where the advantage lay, although 
the assumption that military leaders always possess superior information relative to the 
decision point has been questioned. Analysis also revealed that two of the independent 
variables showed no correlation with the relative balance of civil-military power, despite 
assertions to the contrary within the existing civil-military relations literature. While greater 
military assertiveness at times strengthened the position of the military vis-à-vis civilian 
policymakers, there was no consistent link between military assertiveness and outcomes. 
Military unity similarly showed limited potential in explaining the relative balance of civil-
147 
 
military power as civilian policymakers were able to over-rule even a unified military 
leadership.  
 
In preparation for the concluding chapter of the thesis, Chapter Seven, a summary of the 
hypotheses and results of each of the independent variables discussed in Chapter Six is 


















































H2: Low preference divergence facilitates 
Military Dominance. 
YES 
H3: Low preference divergence facilitates 
Shared Dominance. 
NO 





H5: Civilian Dominance is more likely to 






H6: Military Dominance is more likely to 
occur when military assertiveness is high. 
NO None 




H7: High levels of both civilian and military 
assertiveness facilitate Shared Dominance; 
INCONCLUSIVE - 
H8: Low levels of both civilian and military  
assertiveness facilitate Civilian Dominance. 
NO - 
H9: Low levels of both civilian and military 
assertiveness facilitate Military Dominance 
YES - 
H10: Low levels of both civilian and military 




H11: Civilian Dominance is more likely to 







H12: Military Dominance is more likely to 
occur when military leaders are unified. 
NO None 




H13: Shared Dominance is more likely to 
occur when civilian policymakers and 
military leaders are both internally divided.  
INCONCLUSIVE - 
H14: Shared Dominance is more likely to 
occur when civilian policymakers and 












H16: Information advantages which favour 
the military facilitate Military Dominance. 
 
YES 
H17: No military information advantage  











This thesis set out to study post-9/11 US civil-military relations in the formulation and 
implementation of military strategy in OIF with a particular focus on determining whether 
civilian policymakers, military leaders, or both, had the greatest impact on shaping the 
substantive form and direction of strategy and exploring the conditions under which different 
balances of civil-military power occur. This concluding chapter provides a synthesis of the 
empirical and theoretical findings presented in Chapters Five and Six and draws out the 
implications of the thesis for both the study and practice of US civil-military relations. The 
chapter ends with some reflective thoughts regarding the contributions and limitations of the 
thesis, as well as outlining potential directions for future research.  
 
WHO CONTROLS US MILITARY STRATEGY? 
 
Due to the deficiencies of the existing literature on post-9/11 US civil-military relations, the 
first research aim of this thesis was to undertake a comprehensive empirical study of the civil-
military power relationship as it unfolded over the course of OIF with a view to identifying the 
relative balance of power between civilian policymakers and military leaders. By 
deconstructing OIF into a series of decision points from the initial agenda-setting phase in 
September 2001 through to the final George W. Bush administration review of military 
strategy in April 2008, this study has identified the relative balance of civil-military power 
shaping each decision point and illustrated how this balance of power shifted and changed 
over the course of OIF. The findings of the thesis with regards to whether civilian policymakers, 
military leaders or both had greatest control over the substantive form of US military strategy 
in OIF ultimately demonstrate the need for a more balanced and nuanced conclusion than that 
which currently exists within the post-9/11 literature.  
 
In the introductory chapter I outlined three major propositions evident within the 
contemporary post-9/11 literature regarding the dominant civil-military power dynamic 
present during OIF, each of which broadly align with three of the variations of the relative 
balance of civil-military power used within this thesis: Civilian Dominance, Military Dominance 
and Shared Dominance. The analysis of the performance of the dependent variable presented 
in Chapter Five raises questions over both the accuracy and representativeness of these 
propositions. Assertions of civilian dominance, as advanced by those such as Desch (2007), 
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Korb (2007) and Herspring (2005), are essentially unsatisfactory as while there were indeed 
peaks of civilian control over military strategy in OIF, this was far from consistent. The highs of 
civilian involvement and intervention were usually condensed, intensive periods focused on 
particularly salient or politically important issues, precipitated by civilian concern, rather than 
the standard of civil-military interaction. Propositions of military dominance, as suggested by 
Zelikow (2006), MacGregor (2007) and Kaplan (2007) reflect the significant impact military 
leaders had on defining and implementing US military strategy, but fail to acknowledge the 
vital role civilian policymakers played in determining pivotal decisions which substantively 
altered the form of US military strategy. The shared dominance thesis advanced by Kohn and 
Myers (2007) and supported by Keane (2007) and Luti (West, 2007) resonates within the 
empirical evidence to a degree, but cannot account for the fact that nearly 60% of all coded 
decision points within OIF were in fact determined either by the preferences of military 
leaders or by civilian policymakers. While evidence can be found throughout the course of OIF 
to support each of these three arguments, the summative findings of the thesis do not 
demonstrate the conclusive superiority of any one proposition. Rather than choosing between 
equally unsatisfactory alternatives, conclusions to the question of who controls US military 
strategy demand a more sophisticated synthesis which better captures the reality of civil-
military relations and decision-making for OIF. 
 
The comprehensive study of OIF presented within this thesis ultimately demonstrates that US 
military strategy was the product of both civilian policymakers and military leaders. 
Recognition of the shaping influences of both civilian policymakers and military leaders is 
essential to any understanding of how US military strategy evolved during the war in Iraq. 
From the early focus on offensive operations, the emphasis on the training of indigenous Iraqi 
security forces, the initial introduction of counterinsurgency concepts, through to the 
implementation and adaptation of the surge plan, the preferences of military leaders had a 
clear and consequential impact on the shape and nature of US military strategy in Iraq. While 
in terms of the overall number of decision points determined the relative balance of power 
tilted slightly towards military leaders, civilian policymakers nonetheless had a crucial impact 
at key points in the evolution of US military strategy. Civilian policymakers were the dominant 
influence in setting the parameters for the use of military force in Iraq, in prioritising a core 
tenet of counterinsurgency, ‘clear, hold, build’, and in dramatically altering the objectives, 
means and methods of US military strategy in Iraq through the surge plan. The dual civil-
military influence over US military strategy is not, however, indicative of a shared balance of 
power in constant equilibrium. While shared dominance variations of the relative balance of 
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power were common within OIF, accounting for around 40% of decision points, the majority 
were determined either by the preferences of military leaders or by the preferences of civilian 
policymakers. Although US military strategy was ultimately shaped by both civilian 
policymakers and military leaders, their influences were often sequential rather than 
synchronous, with the relative balance of power shifting alternately between the two 
throughout the course of OIF, indicative of a significant degree of civil-military separation in 
the formulation and implementation of US military strategy.  
 
EXPLAINING THE RELATIVE BALANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY POWER AND CONTROL OF US 
MILITARY STRATEGY  
 
The complexity of the performance of the dependent variable and the extent of its mutability 
over the course of a single conflict emphasises the importance of the second research aim of 
this thesis; to theoretically explore the circumstances under which different balances of civil-
military power occur. In Chapter Two, I highlighted the deficiencies of the existing theoretical 
frameworks for explaining civil-military relations, both in terms of specific civil-military 
relations theories and the application of theories drawn from other areas of political science, 
namely principal-agent theory and the bureaucratic politics approach. This lack of confidence 
in existing theories, as well as a theoretical neglect of the post-9/11 period, necessitated this 
thesis to a large extent to engage in theoretical exploration, rather than theory testing. 
Identifying and testing the performance of six independent variables has allowed the thesis to 
achieve three related aims: 1) to provide an empirical assessment of each variable as it 
performed within OIF; 2) to determine the presence and strength of the relationships between 
the independent and dependent variables; 3) to prove or disprove the stated hypotheses for 




As with the analysis of the dependent variable, the individual analyses of the independent 
variables act as a corrective to some of the generalisations and empirical inaccuracies evident 
within the current post-9/11 civil-military relations literature, thereby providing a more 
balanced assessment of the relationship between civilian policymakers and military leaders 




Firstly, this study has demonstrated that decision-making within OIF was not as contentious at 
the elite level as the numerous contemporaneous reports of civil-military discord indicate. 
Although the formulation and implementation of military strategy in Iraq was undoubtedly a 
most challenging endeavour, the overall level of preference divergence between senior civilian 
policymakers and military leaders during OIF was remarkably low. Senior civilian policymakers 
and military officials agreed over the preferred policy outcome, or at least registered no formal 
disagreement, in over 70% of decision points. This is not to say that there were not multiple 
issues causing discord between civilian-policymakers and military leaders, but rather that 
these were not always evident in the decision-making processes taking place at the highest 
level of civil-military interaction. By focusing specifically on those individuals at the elite level 
with the greatest proximity to decision-making and by seeking evidence of divergent views 
being clearly articulated in the policymaking process, this thesis relies on evidence of impact 
on the policymaking process rather than a generalised observation of civil-military conflict. 
Despite the clear indications of tension and dissonance within the broader civil-military 
relationship under George W. Bush, it remains evident from this thesis that decision-making 
for OIF reflects a significant degree of civil-military agreement or at the very least an absence 
of preference divergence.  
 
The George W. Bush administration, and more particularly the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld as 
Secretary of Defense between 2001 and 2006, is closely associated with a resurgence of a 
more active civilian control over the armed forces. Contemporary reports of the Bush 
administration’s civil-military relationship frequently contain charges of a highly assertive 
civilian leadership (Desch, 2007; Korb 2007; Camancho and Hauser, 2007) challenging 
traditional military prerogatives. Such high levels of civilian assertiveness were in fact only 
intermittent as in over 50% of decision points, civilian policymakers either deferred or 
delegated to the military or limited their assertiveness to the expression of a preference. The 
inconsistency of civilian policymakers in their willingness or ability to articulate and advance a 
preference is not only a more accurate observation of civilian assertiveness during OIF, but is 
also more insightful in terms of understanding the way in which US military strategy in Iraq 
evolved. A similar redress is necessary regarding the behaviour of military leaders, who have 
been charged with being overly acquiescent and compliant (Newbold, 2006; Ignatius, 2005; 
Margolick, 2007; Cook, 2008). While military leaders did not necessarily embody their frequent 
depiction of a tough bureaucratic opponent, military leaders did actively seek to advance their 
preferred options in around a quarter of decision points. Military leaders pursued certain 
policy preferences in the formulation of the initial invasion plan, in the creation of the ICDC, in 
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their persistent recommendations to continue the train to transition strategy and their 
ongoing opposition to the surge. 
  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
In addition to providing greater empirical clarity, the testing of the independent variables 
enabled the thesis to demonstrate the presence or absence of correlational relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables. As illustrated in the results and analysis 
presented in Chapter Six, four of the independent variables have been shown to demonstrate 
a significant correlational relationship with the relative balance of civil-military power, with 
information advantage and civilian assertiveness demonstrating strong associations with the 
dependent variable and civil-military preference divergence and civilian unity demonstrating 
moderate associations. Even though these four variables did not all perform in accordance 
with the assumptions embodied within the existing literature or in accordance with the 
hypotheses stated within this thesis, the presence and strength of the correlational 
relationships identified demonstrates the potential the four independent variables may hold in 
a more formal, multivariate theoretical model of civil-military relations. 
 
Whether or not the relative information advantage lay with the military or with civilian 
policymakers appears to be a good indicator of the relative balance of power as this variable 
presented the strongest correlation with the dependent variable. In accordance with the 
relationship envisioned with the hypotheses articulated for information advantage, when 
military leaders possessed an informational advantage, either from their expertise, ground 
knowledge or by default due to low civilian involvement, Military Dominance or Shared 
Dominance Military were more likely. When civilian policymakers were able to counter or 
negate military information advantages, Civilian Dominance, Shared Dominance Civilian or 
Shared Dominance were more likely. While the analysis of this variable confirms the 
relationship between information advantage and the relative balance of power, it challenges 
the underlying assumption of military information superiority present in the contemporary 
literature. The performance of this variable throughout OIF highlights that even if military 
leaders do almost automatically gain advantages from their technical and situational 
information, the impact of this advantage on the outcome of the decision point is not 
guaranteed. Not only do civilian policymakers possess the potential means to be able to 
neutralise any military information advantage, but the political expertise of civilian 
policymakers can often be of equal or greater relevance in decisions of high political salience. 
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Civilian assertiveness also showed a strong correlation with the dependent variable. In 
accordance with the original hypothesis, high levels of civilian assertiveness showed clear 
linkages with occasions of Civilian Dominance as 85% of all decision points resulting in Civilian 
Dominance also featured higher levels of civilian assertiveness. The absence of civilian 
assertiveness was also an evident factor in facilitating Military Dominance as all twenty-one 
occasions of Military Dominance featured the lowest level of civilian assertiveness. Although 
civilian policymakers were not consistent in their active intervention in the formulation and 
implementation of US military strategy, frequently deferring or delegating to the military, the 
efficacy of higher levels of civilian assertiveness in terms of shaping the outcomes of decision-
making was rarely in doubt.  
 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the civil-military preference divergence variable 
revealed a moderate correlation with the dependent variable. The hypotheses for this variable 
reflected the different propositions within the theoretical literature regarding the impact of 
either low or high preference divergence on the relative balance of civil-military power. The 
results of analysis provided greatest support for the hypothesis which suggested that low 
preference divergence facilitates Military Dominance as all Military Dominance decision points 
occurred on occasions of low civil-military preference divergence. This accords most closely 
with the ally principle within the principal-agent literature, outlined in Chapter 3, which 
suggests that as the policy preferences of politicians and bureaucrats converge, civilian 
policymakers allow greater discretion to military leaders to determine the outcomes of 
decision-making. Decision points with high preference divergence tended to demonstrate the 
opposite effect, with the majority resulting in Civilian Dominance. Rather than the traditional 
‘pulling and hauling’ leading to Shared Dominance, as predicted in the original hypothesis 
articulated for this variable, higher levels of civil-military preference divergence precipitated 
greater civilian control.  
 
Civilian unity demonstrated a moderate correlation with the relative balance of civil-military 
power. The data, however, did not support the stated hypothesis which posited that higher 
levels of civilian unity would facilitate Civilian Dominance. Instead, analysis of this variable 
revealed a negative correlation between the independent and dependent variables, revealing 
how as civilian unity increased Military Dominance became more likely. Rather than a means 
of ensuring military obedience, agreement between civilian policymakers regarding preferred 
outcomes encouraged a greater degree of deference or delegation to the military, similar in 
effect to the civil-military preference divergence variable. These results provide a different 
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insight into the unity variable than the propositions currently advanced within the existing 
literature which assert that unity is a source of relative strength to those that possess it 
(Huntington, 1985) or that military leaders are more likely to obey when civilians are unified 
(Avant, 1993). 
 
The existence and strength of the relationships identified between information advantage, 
civilian assertiveness, civil-military preference divergence, civilian unity and the dependent 
variable, the relative balance of civil-military power, suggest the promise these variables may 
hold in a new multivariate model of civil-military relations. Of equal, or perhaps even greater, 
interest are the performances of the remaining two independent variables under study within 
this thesis which demonstrated no correlational relationship with the dependent variable. Not 
only do the results for these two variables challenge assumptions within the existing literature, 
but it is highly interesting to note that the only two variables which did not show any 
identifiable association with the relative balance of civil-military power were the variables 
directly concerned with the behaviour and capabilities of the military, military assertiveness 
and military unity.  
 
In Chapter Three, I highlighted the uncertainty within the existing literature as to whether the 
source of civilian control of the armed forces stems primarily from the military’s voluntary 
subordination to civilian superiority or as a result of the willingness of civilian policymakers to 
assert control. The poor performance of the two military variables in accounting for the 
relative balance of civil-military power, compared with the stronger performances of the 
civilian-centred and mutual variables, affirms the contention that, in the case of OIF, the key 
variables in accounting for the relative balance of civil-military power at any given decision 
point were derived primarily from civilian, rather than military, attributes. This assertion is 
supported by a qualitative analysis of OIF which consistently highlights how occasions of 
Military Dominance were primarily facilitated by the absence of a countervailing civilian 
power, rather than through an overt assertion of military power or a usurpation of civilian 
prerogative.  
 
Neither military assertiveness nor military unity appeared to have a consistent impact on the 
outcomes of decision points. Even with high levels of assertiveness, such as during the surge, 
the actions of military leaders had very little consequence as to which policy option was 
adopted and implemented. Although on occasions, military assertiveness did result in a 
stronger military position, the behaviour of military leaders was far less effective than that of 
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civilian policymakers in terms of getting their preferences realised in the outcomes of 
policymaking. Similarly, military unity did not appear to provide any advantages in terms of 
shaping decision-making as civilian policymakers were consistently able to over-rule even a 
unified military leadership. In sum, whether in terms of how assertively military leaders were 
advancing their preferences or how internally unified they were in their interactions with 
civilian policymakers, military behaviour only had a minimal impact on the ability of military 
leaders to get their preferences realised. The exception to this appears to be when civilian 
policymakers deem military behaviour, either in terms of their assertiveness or their unity, 
significant such as when civilian policymakers actively wish to establish a civil-military 
consensus or by placating military opposition through the allowance of concessions. 
    
Analysis of the performance of the dependent and independent variables throughout OIF 
enable us to build patterns of association for when we can expect either Military Dominance 
or Civilian Dominance to occur. Occasions of Military Dominance in OIF were predominantly 
enabled by the same series of factors; low civil-military preference divergence, low civilian 
assertiveness, high levels of civilian unity, and a military information advantage. These factors 
tended to facilitate greater civilian deference or delegation to military leaders to determine 
the outcome of decision points, thereby realising Military Dominance. Although military 
leaders were occasionally able to alter the outcome of decision points by way of an increase in 
assertiveness or gain a relative advantage through the strength of their internal unity, for the 
majority, if any of the aforementioned facilitators of Military Dominance were removed, the 
military’s ability to shape the outcome of the decision point was reduced accordingly. These 
prevalent conditions of Military Dominance highlight the importance of the behaviour and 
actions of civilian policymakers in determining such an outcome. Our expectations of Civilian 
Dominance are conditioned by a reversed set of circumstances, which primarily stem from 
positive civilian action. Throughout OIF occasions of Civilian Dominance tended to occur in 
instances when civilian policymakers held preferences of their own regarding the desired 
outcome of a decision point and were willing to assert those preferences, when civilian 
policymakers and military leaders held divergent preferences, when internal civilian 
disagreements demanded strong civilian leadership, and when civilian policymakers were both 
willing and able seek to alternative sources of information or assert their own expertise. For 
OIF at least, the conclusion is that the relative balance of power was determined to a far 





IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
The emphasis this thesis has placed on the need for accuracy and nuance in our assessments 
of civil-military relations reflects more than the demand for empirical clarity for its own sake; it 
is essential if such studies are to be of practical use in shaping and informing future civil-
military relationships. As can be seen within the existing post-9/11 civil-military relations 
literature, analyses of the civil-military relationship are inevitably accompanied by 
recommendations for change. In his 2007 article, Michael Desch argued that the solution to 
civil-military problems within the George W. Bush administration would be to ‘return to an old 
division of labor: civilians give due deference to military professional advice in the tactical and 
operational realms in return for complete military subordination in the grand strategic and 
political realms’ (2007, p97), while David Ignatius (2005) advocated for the next generation of 
military leaders to be willing and able to ‘push back’. The propriety of such proposals are 
ultimately questionable unless the result of thorough empirical and theoretical research. 
Although further study is necessary to determine whether the conclusions of this thesis are 
relevant to other examples of civil-military interaction in the formulation and implementation 
of US military strategy outside of OIF, the findings contained herein nonetheless provide 
insight into the civil-military relationship and prompt a number of considerations for both the 
study and practice of civil-military relations.  
 
To begin with, this thesis has successfully challenged some of the dominant assumptions 
embedded with the broader civil-military relations literature. The low levels of civil-military 
preference divergence evident within OIF question the predominant focus of civil-military 
relations on the recognition and study of conflict between the two spheres (Feaver, 1999), as 
well as the assumption that civilian policymakers and military leaders will hold ‘systematic 
differences’ (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004, p5) in their views regarding the use of force. Instead, this 
thesis highlights the under-examined impact that the absence of civil-military conflict can have 
on the relative balance of civil-military power. The thesis also highlights the need to link 
studies of military behaviour in advancing their preferences with the impact on outcomes, as 
well as readjusting conceptions of the ‘threat’ of military influence in contemporary 
policymaking. Affirmative military action for a particular preference within OIF did not 
necessarily result in any gains in the outcome, nor did it often disadvantage the ability of 
civilian policymakers to realise their own preferences in the outcomes of policymaking. 
Analysis further suggests that civilian behaviour may be more illuminating than military 
behaviour in explaining the sources and impact of military influence. The relative importance 
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and effect of both civilian and military unity in shaping the broader civil-military power 
relationship also warrant review. Internal unity did not provide inherent advantages for either 
group, as suggested by Huntington (1985), nor were the proposed weaknesses of disunity 
particularly exposed (McMaster, 1997; Avant, 1993). Finally, the thesis challenged the 
assumption that information advantages lie with the military by recognising both the 
capabilities of civilian policymakers to neutralise potential military information advantages and 
an independent sphere of civilian expertise.  
 
In Chapter Three I outlined a number of conceptual frameworks for understanding the civil-
military relationship. These varied from dichotomous approaches which viewed civilian 
policymakers and military leaders as separate entities to fusionist approaches which blurred 
the boundaries between the two spheres. From the evidence provided within OIF, it appears 
that the traditional dichotomy of civil-military relations retains its relevance for both the study 
and practice of civil-military relations. Despite a significant degree of shared views between 
civilian policymakers and military leaders, the post-9/11 civil-military relationship within the 
George W. Bush administration continued to reflect a relatively clear separation between 
civilian policymakers and military leaders as US military strategy was predominantly shaped by 
alternating civilian and military influences rather than as a result of a simultaneous exercise of 
shared power. There is little evidence within OIF to support Roman and Tarr’s (2001) rejection 
of traditional civil-military distinctions in favour of a more fusionist model. As well as being 
divided in terms of practice, civilian policymakers and military leaders were also divided by the 
inherent hierarchy in the relationship. This is clearly evidenced in the relative significance of 
civilian and military assertiveness, ultimately rooted in the principle of civilian control 
according civilian policymakers ultimate authority over military leaders. The general dynamic 
of civil-military interaction therefore conceptually lends itself more to a principal-agent 
relationship such as that described by Feaver (2003), than that of relative equals within a 
bureaucratic game of ‘pulling and hauling’ as suggested by either Allison and Zelikow (1999) or 
Stevenson (2006).  
 
In seeking to link the findings of the thesis to the practice of civil-military relations it is clear 
that the major issues facing the contemporary civil-military relationship do not stem from a 
problem of civilian control. From 2001 to 2008, civilian preferences, when expressed, were 
consistently reflected in the outcomes of decision-making and instances of Military Dominance 
were usually the direct result of civilian delegation or deference to military leaders. At no point 
during the seven years of OIF under consideration in this thesis was there cause for concern on 
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the fundamental democratic imperative of civilian control. In this respect, the concerns of the 
post-Cold War period regarding a worrying increase in military influence vis-a-vis civilian 
policymakers are not replicated. While the principle of civilian control can never be omitted 
from any consideration of civil-military relations, the findings of this thesis provide support for 
an increased prioritisation of the functional imperative of civil-military relations over the 
democratic imperative in the study of the civil-military relationship. The primary issue for civil-
military relations scholars should therefore be focused on the mechanisms or characteristics 
which facilitate optimum policymaking rather than a limited focus on ensuring that civilians 
are able to execute ‘their right to be right’ (Feaver, 2003).  
 
In the theatre of war, one of the prime functional imperatives of the civil-military relationship 
is to reconcile the means and ends of US military strategy to produce an effective plan for 
achieving the political objectives using the military resources available. Several commentators 
have acknowledged a strategic deficit in Iraq (Gray, 2005; Strachan, 2006) as a direct result of 
failures in the civil-military relationship. Various contemporary assessments of the civil-military 
relationship have concluded with recommendations for calibrations to the relative balance of 
power as a means of improving the civil-military relationship, either in favour of military 
leaders or civilian policymakers (Desch, 2007; Ignatius, 2005; Kitfield, 2006). The findings of 
this thesis indicate that rather than the problems of civil-military relations being solved by 
strengthening civilian control or respecting military prerogatives, civilian policymakers and 
military leaders need to operate more within the bounds of shared dominance in terms of 
finding and maintaining an equilibrium of power between the two spheres, involving mutual 
and reciprocal interaction, rather than oscillating between the two ends of the spectrum. 
Shared dominance in itself cannot assure the quality of critical dialogue and debate which 
contribute towards optimum policymaking, but it can, at minimum, encourage the active and 
mutual participation between civilian policymakers and military leaders which is a necessary 
foundation for effective strategy-making involving the continual reconciliation of political aims 




This thesis makes three primary contributions to the study of US civil-military relations. Its first 
contribution is to our empirical understanding of civil-military relations during the George W. 
Bush administration. With a clear focus and breadth of scope, the thesis provides a detailed 
and comprehensive examination of the civil-military balance of power in the formulation and 
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implementation of US military strategy as it evolved in Iraq from 2001 to 2008. By tracing the 
evolution of the relative balance of civil-military power throughout OIF, the thesis adds greater 
empirical clarity to our understanding of civil-military relations as well as providing a means of 
reconciling the contrasting propositions evident within the existing literature. The second 
contribution made within this thesis is the provision of a flexible methodological approach for 
capturing and measuring the relative balance of civil-military power. The use of the 
policymaking model as a means of deconstructing complex policymaking processes extends 
the scope of analysis for civil-military power relations beyond that which traditionally focuses 
purely on ‘decision-making’ and a provides a framework transferrable to other cases of US 
military intervention. The strong methodological aspect of the research presented within this 
thesis also strengthens the emerging trend within the study of US civil-military relations away 
from purely descriptive or anecdotal treatments towards more rigorous research with clearly 
defined method and process. Finally, the thesis contributes towards the theoretical body of 
work on civil-military relations, highlighting the validity and utility of challenging the 
assumptions regarding the performance and impact of independent variables consistently 
identified within the existing literature as both relevant and import to explaining the relative 
balance of civil-military power. In doing so, the thesis has revealed new insights into the 
import and impact of a number of independent variables, as well as identifying those which 
demonstrate the greatest theoretical promise for a new multivariate model for explaining the 
relative balance of civil-military power.   
 
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
 
In addition to acknowledging the contributions of the thesis as outlined above, it is equally 
essential to recognise the limitations of the study. Inherent in any methodological approach 
which focuses only on one case-study are the constraints on the broader relevance of the 
conclusions drawn. The conclusions of this thesis, consolidated within this final chapter, are of 
only direct relevance to OIF. In this respect, I have deliberately refrained from making 
generalised conclusions, even regarding the post-9/11 period. Further research is necessary to 
determine whether the results of this thesis are unique to civil-military relations within OIF. 
The study of civil-military relations during OIF presented here has also been bounded by the 
quality and availability of relevant informational sources. New evidence, as it emerges over 
time, may therefore affect both the codings for the individual decision points and the broader 
qualitative and quantitative results, rendering the results of the thesis transitional rather than 
absolute. As this thesis did not generate new empirical evidence of its own, codings for the 
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dependent and independent variables inevitably relied on the available information, the 
imperfect and partial nature of which prevented all eighty-nine decision points within OIF from 
being fully coded for all variables. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The research conducted within this thesis provides a gate-way to a diverse agenda for future 
study. The study of civil-military power relations within OIF would benefit from the generation 
of new empirical research, particularly if driven by clear theoretical purposes aimed at 
investigating specific variables of interest. In exploring the potential for a new multivariate 
theory of civil-military relations, further research would also be necessary in diversifying the 
range of independent variables under examination and experimenting with different 
theoretical models. In extending the relevance of the study to the broader post-9/11 period, 
the next logical step would be to replicate the same study with OEF and the processes of 
formulating and implementing US military strategy-making in Afghanistan. A second case-
study of this nature and depth would provide a better opportunity to establish patterns of 
civil-military relations within the post-9/11 period and provide the basis for a comparative 
study between the two conflicts. This endeavour would also require further empirical research 
given the relative paucity of sources providing insight into civil-military relations during OEF. 
The arguments of this thesis could further be applied to historical case-studies of civil-military 
interaction in the process of determining US military strategy to determine the extent of the 
generalisability of the propositions contained herein. The benefits of an extended longitudinal 
study of civil-military power relations would also be highly valuable in relation to the ongoing 
debate, highlighted in the introductory chapter to this thesis, as to whether or not the post-













APPENDIX A  THE SIX PHASES OF US MILITARY STRATEGY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
 








Phase One covers the George W. Bush administration’s initial acceptance of 
Iraq on to the immediate post-9/11 national security agenda through to the 
end of major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It focuses on 
the process by which military planning in Iraq was initiated and the iterative 
formulation of the initial military strategy for an invasion, setting the core 
components of US military strategy including the determination of 
objectives, allocation of US forces, and definition of the operational 
concepts. Influenced by the Bush administration’s transformation agenda 
and the desire to change the paradigm of warfare for US military operations, 
the final invasion plan embodied a highly offensive, enemy-centric approach 
and a lighter footprint emphasizing speed, precision, and the application of 
new technologies. After only three weeks of war, US forces occupied 
Baghdad and the main military mission was deemed complete. A transition 






2003 - June 
2004) 
Phase Two of US military strategy marks the period following the end of 
major combat operations, as declared by President Bush in May 2003. As the 
final invasion plan did not feature significant post-war planning or 
contingencies for the various scenarios which a post-invasion Iraq might 
resemble, US forces were without major objectives or guidance as to how to 
respond to the disorder which emerged in post-invasion Iraq. The lack of 
security on the ground prevented the shift to post-war operations and US 
troops continued to engage hostile forces. A new campaign plan was issued 
in August 2003, featuring changes to the three core components of US 
military strategy including the definition of new objectives for US forces, a 
recalibration of forces levels for the immediate post-war period, and a 
traditional offensive approach. US military strategy pursued during this 
period was subsequently criticised for failing to adapt to conditions on the 











Phase Three captures the adaptations to US military strategy which took 
place under General George Casey. The new campaign plan, issued in August 
2004, featured significant changes to the objectives and operational concepts 
of military strategy, including a prioritisation of training Iraqi forces (as a 
means of shifting security responsibility), providing protection for the 
elections for the new Iraqi government scheduled for January 2005, and the 
introduction of new operational guidance for US forces in the form of full 
spectrum counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The application of COIN 
principles, however, was uneven amongst US units and, overall, US military 
strategy during this period became more focused on containing the 
insurgency in order to minimise the US presence in Iraqi towns and 
neighborhoods and to reduce the potential for unplanned engagements to 
keep US troop casualties low. The ‘train to transition’ strategy outlined in the 
summer of 2004 would continue to form the broad framework for US forces 
for the next two years. US military strategy during this period was later 
criticised for being a ‘short war strategy’ (Keane, 2007), a strategy of 
withdrawal (Kagan, 2007), and even for reflecting an absolute absence of 
strategy (Krepinevich, 2007; Zelikow, 2007). Motivated by the continuing 
deterioration of security in Iraq, despite increases in the number of ISF and 
the establishment of new Iraqi political bodies, a series of reviews of US 
military strategy took place over the course of 2005.  
 






Phase Four focuses on the initiation, formulation and implementation of a 
new articulation of US military strategy, outlined over October and 
November 2005. Following a series of reviews undertaken by the 
Department of State over 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reported 
on a ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on 19th October 2005. Shortly after, in November 2005, the Bush 
administration released a National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) policy 
document which incorporated ‘clear, hold, build’ as the central concept of 
the US security strategy in Iraq. Partly a response to domestic criticisms and 
concerns surrounding US progress in Iraq, NSVI nonetheless made important 
prescriptions for US military strategy in adopting the ‘clear, hold, build’ 
approach, both in terms of objectives and operational concepts, as this was 
not the overarching strategy being implemented under General George 
Casey at the time. US military strategy was more ad hoc throughout this 
period, with US units using a variety of approaches, adapted to the 
conditions in their respective areas of operation. Building concern over 
progress in Iraq culminated in a Camp David review meeting held in June 










Phase Five reflects the changes to US military strategy brought about by the 
formulation and adoption of the surge plan. Prompted by significant 
concerns over the possible failure of the US intervention in Iraq, a new 
strategy was sought. As the failure of the previous ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy 
was partly attributed to insufficient resources, the surge plan involved a 
commitment of an additional five combat brigades as well a shift in 
objectives to population security and the implementation of a 
comprehensive COIN approach. This shift coincided with the replacement of 
General Casey with General David Petraeus and the publication of a new US 
Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Manual, in December 2006. The surge 
decision marked an overall renewal of US efforts, as opposed to capitulating 
to domestic pressure to withdraw. The decision to implement the surge was 
a pivotal decision for the Bush administration’s Iraq policy, considered by the 
President himself to be ‘the toughest and most unpopular decision’ (Bush, 





2007 - April 
2008) 
The sixth and final phase marks the final alterations to US military strategy in 
Iraq reflecting a transition from the original surge plan to the gradual 
extrication of US forces and a handover of security responsibilities to Iraqi 
Security Forces. Following the evaluation of the surge strategy as a result of 
the September 2007 congressional review, US military strategy shifted 
towards consolidating security gains, formally entitled ‘Security While 
Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch’ (Petraeus, 2007, 
p6). Changes involved reducing US resource levels and amending operational 
goals and methods as US forces began gradually transitioning responsibility 
to the ISF and moving into an overwatch capacity. The timing and pace of the 
drawdown of US forces from Iraq was an issue visited a number of times over 
the course of 2008. In February 2008, a ‘pause’ in the withdrawal of troops 
from Iraq was agreed. While all the additional troops provided by the surge 
were withdrawn by July, the strategic review of April 2008 essentially 
ensured that a significant number of US forces would remain in Iraq into the 
















APPENDIX B   A DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICYMAKING MODEL 
 
 




Problem definition and agenda-setting refer to how proposals for action are 
shaped in response to particular problems, opportunities or trends 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) and how these issues are brought to the 
attention of the appropriate authoritative actors for further consideration. 
Participants in the policy process can shape policy at the problem definition 
and agenda-setting stage by interpreting the nature of the perceived 
problem in a specific way (Jones, 1970; Anderson, 1975; Stone, 1997). By 
controlling the definition of the problem, participants are able to emphasise 
particular causes and link them to particular, preferred solutions (Peters, 
1986; Kingdon, 1997). They can also shape policy by moving the issue onto 
the political agenda, poising it for further action, or by repressing the issue 
to prevent it from being addressed at all (Schattaschneider, 1960; Barach 
and Baratz, 1963).  
 
Formulation Formulation is where the substantive details of policy are debated and 
shaped together into a plan to carry the principles of the policy into effect 
(Anderson, 1975). Policy formulation involves a range of activities including 
the precise definitions of objectives, the instruments to be used, the 
agencies responsible for implementation and the rules to be used in the 
implementation of policy (Knoepfel and Weidner, 2007). The various details 
to be determined in this phase of the policy process highlight the various 
possible points of conflict that can occur, often making the consideration of 
options and the resolution of conflict key features of policy formulation. 
Formulation is therefore a highly political process as plans for action are 
often fashioned between competing preferences, as well a highly strategic 
process as actors are influenced by their awareness of the need to 
eventually get such plans approved by the legitimate authorities (Jones, 
1970). 
 
Legitimation The legitimation or decision-making stage refers to the acceptance, 
modification or rejection of a preferred policy alternative (Anderson, 1975) 
by an appropriate authority. Decision-making can be individual or collective 
(Anderson, 1975) and provides the authority for implementation action to 
take place. Legitimation remains a political process as actors seeking to get 
their preferred proposal accepted may continue to make efforts to influence 
the decision-maker(s) in support of a particular policy proposal (Halperin et 
al., 2006) and may therefore continue to involve processes of compromise, 




Implementation Implementation of policy transforms the intentions expressed within a 
policy decision into action (Hill, 2009). While decisions are the outputs of 
the policy process, the outcomes of policy depend largely on the practical 
application or administration of the decision as the substance of policy can 
alter significantly over the course of its implementation (Peters, 1986). 
Those agencies responsibility for implementation can alter the intent of the 
policy or alterations may arise out of necessity (Peters, 1986). Other actors 
involved in the administration process can seek to control the method and 
impact of implementation, through oversight, rewards and punishments, 
and therefore influence policy as it unfolds in practice (Anderson, 1975).  
 
Evaluation Evaluation is an appraisal of policy or the process of ‘judging the effects of 
policy on public problems’ (Jones, 1970, p108) and may involve a variety of 
actors inside and outside government. The catalysts for and results of 
evaluation are often subject to the same sorts of competing interests and 
motivations which pervade the rest of the policy process (Peters, 1986). 
Criteria by which to measure evaluation may vary (Jones, 1970) and shape 
the outcomes of evaluations accordingly. The possible political 
consequences of evaluation engage the interests of individuals, agencies 
and organisations as outcomes may have a determining impact on the 
future prospects for the substance of policy and its means of 
implementation. Outcomes of evaluation may advocate continued support 
for the policy in its existing form, but can also provide impetus for change, in 
terms of either terminating or adapting policy. Evaluation triggers other 
policy responses (Sarkesian et al., 2008) and further cycles of problem 
definition, agenda-setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation, in a 



























APPENDIX C  THE EIGHTY-NINE DECISION POINTS OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
 








The invasion  
of Iraq 
(November  




Raising and accepting potential military action in 
Iraq as an issue on the immediate post-9/11 
national security agenda. September 
2001 
1.2 
Deciding to pursue an ‘Afghanistan first’ approach 
in the War on Terror and postponing military action 
in Iraq.  
1.3 
Initiating military planning processes within the 





Determining the objectives of military strategy for 





Determining the necessary US force levels for the 
initial invasion plan. 
2.3 
Determining the operational concepts of military 
strategy for the initial invasion plan. 
3 
Accepting a final iteration of the invasion plan, 
approved for action.   
January 2003 
4.1 
Changing the timing of the start of the ground war 
for OIF and advancing the main land attack by one 
day, commencing ground action prior to air strikes.  
March 2003 –  
April 2003 
4.2 
Deciding whether to act on intelligence regarding 
the potential location of Saddam Hussein and strike 
at Dora Farms. 
4.3 
Deciding whether to include the 4th Infantry 
Division as part of the push to Baghdad.  
4.4 
Initiating a pause in military operations before 
entering Baghdad in order to clear resistance and 
secure supply lines.  
4.5 
Deciding whether additional forces are needed for 
the final advancement into Baghdad. 
4.6 Implementing an improvised ‘Thunder Run’. 
4.7 Remaining in Baghdad following the Thunder Run. 
5.1 
Calling an end to major combat operations and 
transitioning to postwar stability, support and 
reconstruction operations. 
April 2003 5.2 
Issuing the order to commence the withdrawal of 
US war-fighting units from Iraq. 
5.3 
Off-ramping US forces, already inbound for Iraq, 
deemed unnecessary for the transition to postwar 






Debating the nature of the war in Iraq and agenda 
setting for the immediate post-war period. 
June 2003 –  
July 2003 
7.1 
Determining new objectives for US military strategy 


























(May 2003 - 
June 2004) 
 
defeating non-compliant forces and neutralising 




July 2003 –  
August 2003 
7.2 
Determining the US force levels needed for the 
post-invasion campaign plan, decreasing US forces 
or maintaining a base-line of troops.  
7.3 
Determining the operational concepts for the post-
invasion campaign plan, reversing the transition to 
post-war operations and maintaining a highly 
offensive operational approach. 
8 
Issuing the post-invasion campaign plan to US 
forces.  
August 2003 
9.1 The creation of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC).  




Whether to arrest Muqtada al-Sadr, Shia Cleric and 
leader of the Mahdi Army militia, following a 
warrant issued by an Iraqi judge  
August 2003 
9.3 
Determining whether responsibility for training 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) should remain with 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) or shift to the 




Proceeding with or delaying the transferal of 




Responding to the Muqtada al-Sadr rebellion south 




Launching Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah in 






Initiating the ‘anaconda’ plan to target key 
lieutenants in the Mahdi Army militia. 
9.8 
Striking two fronts simultaneously, conducting 
military operations in Fallujah and against the 
Mahdi Army militia.  
9.9.1 
Initiating a cease-fire in Operation Vigilant Resolve, 
Fallujah.  
9.9.2 
Determining whether to continue the cease-fire in 
Fallujah or resume the offensive.  
9.9.3 
The creation of the Fallujah Brigade as a means of 
resolving the stalemate of Operation Vigilant 
Resolve.   
9.10 
Whether to launch a major attack against Muqtada 
al-Sadr. 
10 
Review of the ISF training mission resulting in the 
transferal of responsibility for ISF training from the 
CPA to US CENTCOM via a National Security 
Presidential Directive. 
November 








Identifying priority areas of security and ISF training 




June 2003 –  
July 2004 
12.1 
Determining objectives for US military strategy for 
the new campaign plan focused on establishing 























training of ISF.  
12.2 
Determining the troop rotation plan from OIF-2 to 
OIF-3, including projections for US force 
withdrawals.  
12.3 
Determining the operational concepts for the new 
campaign plan and the introduction of full 
spectrum counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.  
13 
Issuing the post-invasion campaign plan to US 
forces. 
14.1 
Clearing insurgent safe havens in An Najaf in 
response to increasing instability and violence. 
August 2004 
14.2 
Conducting military action in Samarra as part of 
military operations to establish security for the 
upcoming Iraqi elections.  
October 2004 




Temporarily increasing US troops to provide 
additional forces for security operations and 





Determining whether to postpone the January 2005 





Accelerating the shift of security responsibilities to 
ISF and transitioning control.   
January 2005 
– March 2005 
15.1 
Open-ended Department of Defense review of 
military’s Iraq policy including ISF training, military 
strategy and US force levels, resulting in 
recommendations to extend US military ISF 
advisory programmes and to shift military mission 
to ISF. 
January 2005 
– June 2005 
15.2 
Military review of US military strategy in Iraq and 
implementation of COIN, recommendations for 
further COIN training for US forces.   




Department of State review incorporating three 
visits to Iraq in February, May and September 2005 

















Motivated by concerns over a lack of a unified 
strategy for Iraq, the Secretary of State sets the 
agenda for a formal shift to clear, hold and build as 
the US security strategy in Iraq during testimony to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee.  
October 2005 
17.1 
Determining short, medium and longer terms 




17.2 Outlining the future US force posture in Iraq.  
17.3 
Formulating the operational concepts for a new 
security strategy for Iraq, with clear, hold, and build 












Legitimating a new security strategy for Iraq, the 
ratification and release of the National Strategy for 




Projecting US troop withdrawals for 2006/7 and the 








 19.3 Re-evaluating proposed force withdrawals. 
19.4 
Changing the threat assessment from a primarily 
anti-American insurgency to Iraqi sectarianism. 
March 2006 
19.5 
Launch of Operation Scales of Justice to establish 




Conception of a joint Department of 
State/Department of Defense initiative to embed 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with US 
military units.  
March 2006 
19.7 




Initiation of Operation Together Forward, an Iraqi-
led operation to secure Baghdad following 
increasing sectarian violence.   
June 2006 
19.9 
Transition to Operation Together Forward II, phase 
two of the Baghdad-centred security operation. 
August 2006 
20 











Informal, civilian inter-agency review begins with a 
view to generating options for a new strategy for 





Changing the objectives of US military strategy to 






Determining appropriate US force levels, injecting 
additional US troops to operationalise changes in 
objectives and operational concepts. 
22.3 
Adopting a US-led comprehensive COIN strategy for 
securing the population and establishing and 
maintaining security. 
23 
Consensus building and the formal announcement 
of a new US surge in Iraq. 
January 2007 
24.1 
Launch of Operation Imposing the Law, the 
Baghdad security plan.  
February 2007 
24.2 
Distributing the additional forces of the surge in 
and around Baghdad and task allocation. 
February 2007 
– June 2007 
24.3 Addition of further US forces.  March 2007 
24.4 
Extending US troop deployments from twelve to 
fifteen month tours. 
April 2007 
24.5 
Launch of Operation Phantom Thunder and the first 





Releasing the official US military campaign plan for 
the ongoing surge. 
July 2007 
24.7 
Launch of Operation Phantom Strike, pursuing Al-
Qaeda north from Baghdad.  
August 2007 
24.8 
Tribal engagement and local reconciliation, 
capitalizing on the Anbar Awakening. 
August 2007 
24.9 
Institutionalising the Sons of Iraq volunteers into 
the local Iraqi police force as part of the Baghdad 
security plan, Operation Blue Shield. 
August 2007 
25 
September 2007 review of the surge, General David 











Setting the agenda for the continuation of the 





Updating US military objectives in revised campaign 





Determining the US posture for the continuation of 
the surge. 
27.3 
Continuing the use of counterinsurgency 
operational concepts, carried out in conjunction 
with ISF. 
28 Issuing the revised campaign plan.  
29.1 








29.3 Transitioning security in Basra. 
December 
2007 
29.4 Withdrawing the second surge brigade from Iraq.  March 2008 
30 
Military recommendations accepted for an 


























DV    
Dependent 
Variable 
IV1     
Preference 
Divergence 
IV2         
Civilian 
Assertiveness 
IV3        
Military 
Assertiveness 
IV4              
Civilian     
Unity 
IV5        





1.1 0 2 3 1 1 0 1 
1.2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
1.3 0 9 5 0 9 9 1 
2.1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
2.2 2 1 4 3 1 2 0 
2.3 3 1 3 2 1 1 0 
3 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
4.1 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4.2 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
4.3 4 0 0 1 2 2 0 
4.4 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4.5 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 
4.6 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4.7 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
5.1 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
5.2 3 0 1 1 0 2 1 
5.3 1 2 2 2 0 1 1 
6 2 2 4 4 1 1 1 
7.1 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 
7.2 3 1 4 3 2 0 0 
7.3 4 0 0 1 9 0 0 
8 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
9.1 3 2 3 4 2 0 0 
9.2 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 
9.3 0 2 3 4 1 0 1 
9.4 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 
9.5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
9.6 0 1 5 2 0 0 1 
9.7 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
9.8 2 0 3 1 0 0 1 
9.9.1 1 2 2 3 0 0 1 
9.9.2  0 8 3 2 2 8 1 
9.9.3  4 9 0 5 9 0 0 
9.10 0 2 5 2 0 0 1 
10 3 2 8 8 2 1 8 
11 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 
12.1 3 0 1 1 0 0 1 
12.2 2 0 1 1 0 0 8 
12.3 4 0 0 1 9 0 0 
13 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
14.1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
14.2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
14.3 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
14.4 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
14.5 0 9 5 0 2 9 1 
14.6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
15.1 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 
15.2 4 9 0 1 9 0 0 
173 
 
15.3 0 9 3 0 9 9 1 
16 0 9 5 0 1 9 1 
17.1 0 8 4 8 1 9 1 
17.2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
17.3 0 8 4 8 1 9 1 
18 0 9 5 0 1 9 1 
19.1 3 0 3 1 0 0 1 
19.2 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
19.3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
19.4 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
19.5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
19.6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
19.7 4 9 0 1 9 0 0 
19.8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
19.9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
20 3 0 2 1 1 0 0 
21 0 9 5 0 1 9 1 
22.1 0 2 5 4 2 2 1 
22.2 0 2 4 4 2 2 1 
22.3 0 2 5 4 2 2 1 
23 1 2 4 3 0 2 1 
24.1 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 
24.2 3 0 1 1 0 2 0 
24.3 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
24.4 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
24.5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
24.6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
24.7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
24.8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
24.9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
25 3 0 1 1 0 2 0 
26 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 
27.1 8 8 8 8 8 2 8 
27.2 4 0 0 1 0 2 0 
27.3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
28 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
29.1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
29.2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
29.3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
29.4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 







































-.546** -.846** -.071 -.492** -.069 -.849** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
. .000 .000 .579 .000 .609 .000 









1.000 .746** .892** .500** .272* .365** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 . .000 .000 .000 .047 .008 









.746** 1.000 .219 .530** .157 .664** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 . .084 .000 .247 .000 







-.071 .892** .219 1.000 .241 .245 -.014 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.579 .000 .084 . .073 .069 .917 










.500** .530** .241 1.000 .233 .274* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .073 . .096 .039 









-.069 .272* .157 .245 .233 1.000 -.006 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.609 .047 .247 .069 .096 . .967 









.365** .664** -.014 .274* -.006 1.000 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .008 .000 .917 .039 .967 . 
N 64 52 64 62 57 55 64 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




 DV_R IV1PD_R IV2CA_R IV3MA_R IV4CU_R IV5MU_R IV6IA_R 
N 
Valid 67 54 65 63 59 58 64 
Missing 22 35 24 26 30 31 25 
Mean 2.1791 .5185 1.9231 1.4921 .5932 .5690 .5313 
Median 2.0000 .0000 1.0000 1.0000 .0000 .0000 1.0000 
Mode 4.00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.62299 .84095 1.83122 1.17601 .79043 .86068 .50297 
Variance 2.634 .707 3.353 1.383 .625 .741 .253 
Skewness -.255 1.126 .479 1.341 .874 .976 -.128 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.293 .325 .297 .302 .311 .314 .299 
Kurtosis -1.533 -.610 -1.260 1.002 -.822 -.928 -2.049 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.578 .639 .586 .595 .613 .618 .590 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 















 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 19 21.3 28.4 28.4 
1.00 4 4.5 6.0 34.3 
2.00 11 12.4 16.4 50.7 
3.00 12 13.5 17.9 68.7 
4.00 21 23.6 31.3 100.0 
Total 67 75.3 100.0  
Missing System 22 24.7   
Total 89 100.0   
 
IV1: CIVIL-MILITARY PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 38 42.7 70.4 70.4 
1.00 4 4.5 7.4 77.8 
2.00 12 13.5 22.2 100.0 
Total 54 60.7 100.0  
Missing System 35 39.3   
Total 89 100.0   
 
IV2: CIVILIAN ASSERTIVENESS 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 20 22.5 30.8 30.8 
1.00 16 18.0 24.6 55.4 
2.00 3 3.4 4.6 60.0 
3.00 10 11.2 15.4 75.4 
4.00 7 7.9 10.8 86.2 
5.00 9 10.1 13.8 100.0 
Total 65 73.0 100.0  
Missing System 24 27.0   










IV3: MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 6 6.7 9.5 9.5 
1.00 40 44.9 63.5 73.0 
2.00 5 5.6 7.9 81.0 
3.00 5 5.6 7.9 88.9 
4.00 6 6.7 9.5 98.4 
5.00 1 1.1 1.6 100.0 
Total 63 70.8 100.0  
Missing System 26 29.2   
Total 89 100.0   
 
IV4: CIVILIAN UNITY 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 35 39.3 59.3 59.3 
1.00 13 14.6 22.0 81.4 
2.00 11 12.4 18.6 100.0 
Total 59 66.3 100.0  
Missing System 30 33.7   
Total 89 100.0   
 
IV5: MILITARY UNITY 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 39 43.8 67.2 67.2 
1.00 5 5.6 8.6 75.9 
2.00 14 15.7 24.1 100.0 
Total 58 65.2 100.0  
Missing System 31 34.8   
Total 89 100.0   
 
IV6: INFORMATION ADVANTAGE 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
.00 30 33.7 46.9 46.9 
1.00 34 38.2 53.1 100.0 
Total 64 71.9 100.0  
Missing System 25 28.1   









DV: RELATIVE BALANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY POWER 
 
 




IV2: CIVILIAN ASSERTIVENESS 
 
 





IV4: CIVILIAN UNITY 
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